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A Study of the Indian Commentaries on

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Madhyamaka and Mind-only Philosophy

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**A Study of the Indian Commentaries on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*:  
Madhyamaka and Mind-only Philosophy**

**A thesis presented**

**by**

**Suah Kim**

**to the**

**Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies**

**in partial fulfillment of the requirements**

**for the degree of**

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A Study of the Indian Commentaries on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*:  
Madhyamaka and Mind-only Philosophy

Abstract

This dissertation examines the relation between the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* [LAS] and the Madhyamaka school, by focusing on two Indian commentaries, Jñānaśrībhaddra's *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* (Toh. 4018) and Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṅkāra* (Toh. 4019). It reexamines modern Buddhist scholars' opinion that the LAS was composed as a primary text for the Yogācāra school. The view commonly held in Japanese and Western scholarship is that the LAS was composed to provide some doctrines of the Yogācāra school. The dissertation problematizes this assumption by arising two questions. First, was the originally LAS composed after the appearance of the Yogācāra school? This question is doxographical. Second, did Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, who utilize the LAS, believe that the teachings in the LAS were compatible with those in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*? This is a question of comparative religion and philosophy.

In addressing the doxographical question, this dissertation examines various aspects of textual issues of the LAS based on the textual information from Indian commentaries on this sutra. None of these sources give any indication that the LAS provides sectarian doctrines only for the Yogācāra school. Furthermore, in addressing the religious doctrinal question regarding the relationship between the LAS and the Madhyamaka school, by focusing on the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka perspective,

the dissertation examines two doctrines: the two truths and mind-only, which are fundamentally associated with the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school and the fact that this school maintains the Madhyamaka philosophical position on the one hand, while it accepts the Yogācāra school's ontology on the other. Rather than negating the Yogācāra school's doctrines, the later Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers developed the notion of mind-only shown to be in accord with and complementary to the two truths as authorized by the LAS. They consider that the teachings in the LAS are in concordance with the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*. The LAS played a fundamental role in the development of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school.

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## Introduction

### I. The Topic

The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*<sup>1</sup> [LAS] is considered by Buddhist scholars to be one among three mind-only (*cittramātra*) sutras in the Mahayana Buddhist tradition. The other two sutras are the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and the *Samādhinirmocanasūtra*. Similar to other Buddhist sutras, the exact date and authorship of the original text is unknown. Buddhist scholars, taking all historical accounts into considerations, generally assume that the original form of the LAS, which is very similar to the four-volume version of the Chinese translation (*Laṅkāvatāra* or *Laṅkāvatāra treasure sutra*), was originally composed before the middle of the fourth century by Mahayanists in India. This conclusion is based on two recorded historical facts. First, the sutra was obviously composed later than the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*<sup>2</sup> that are the basis of Nāgārjuna's (ca. 2<sup>nd</sup> century A.D.) philosophy. The main doctrine in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* deal with the doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*). However, the LAS contains, in addition to these notions of emptiness, the theories of the three *svabhāva*, *ālayavijñāna*, *vijñaptimātra*, and

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<sup>1</sup> B. Nanjio, *The Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Kyoto: Ōtani University Press, 1956: the second edition), and L. Chandra, *Laṅkāvatārasūtra: Sanskrit Manuscript from Nepal* (New Delhi: Jayyed Press, 1977).

<sup>2</sup> See the detailed information of the history of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* in E. Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitāsūtra Literature* (Tokyo: The Reiyukai, 1978).



*tathāgatagarbha*, etc.,<sup>3</sup> that are not at all discussed by the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* or by Nāgārjuna.

Second, it is difficult to determine the date and the location of early Indian Mahayana Buddhist texts. Most of the date of Mahayana Buddhist texts are based on Chinese translations. The first Chinese translation of a version of the LAS appeared between 412-420 A.D. This version was translated into Chinese by Dharmarakṣa<sup>4</sup> (ca. 385-433), who came to China in 412 A.D.<sup>5</sup> By translating the LAS into Chinese, Dharmarakṣa introduced the ideas of Yogācāra to Chinese Buddhists.<sup>6</sup>

Based on the earliest Chinese translations of various Buddhist texts it is surmised that the original Indian Mahayana texts were composed one hundred to thirty years prior to the Chinese translations. K. Mizuno indicates that:

The majority of the scriptures that were translated into Chinese arrived in China via the Silk Road, although some were transmitted from India and Śrī Laṅka by sea... Among the extant Chinese translations of scriptures imported overland, renderings from the middle of the second century A.D. seem to be the oldest, and translations made some seventy years later,

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<sup>3</sup> D. T. Suzuki, *Studies in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra: one of the most important texts of Mahayana Buddhism, in which almost all its principal tenets are presented, including the teaching of Zen* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 239-281.

<sup>4</sup> Suzuki (1968), 4. There is some misunderstanding between Dharmarakṣa and Dharmakṣema. See K. Mizuno, *Buddhist Sutras Origin, Development, Transmission* (Tokyo: Kōsei Publishing Co., 1982), 71.

<sup>5</sup> Suzuki (1968), 4.

<sup>6</sup> D. Y. Paul, *Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 6, 46. Dharmarakṣa mentioned in E. Zürcher's *The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China*, is not the same person as Dharmarakṣa mentioned above. Dharmarakṣa mentioned by Zürcher arrived in China before Kumārajīva (ca. 344-413).

around the beginning of the third century A.D., appear to be the oldest Chinese versions of texts that arrived by sea.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover,

By the latter part of the fourth century the true doctrines of Buddhism still had not been conveyed fully to the Chinese, either because lack of knowledge prevented their understanding completely those sutras that had been translated or the true concepts of Buddhism had not been translated in the translations.<sup>8</sup>

Mizuno points to the difficult circumstances under which Buddhist texts were transmitted to China. Taking these factors into accounts, it is assumed that Mahayana texts were composed much earlier than the Chinese translations. Therefore, based on the first appearance of the LAS in China in 412 A.D., it is assumed that this text probably existed in India or in an Indic environment around the fourth century.

Modern scholars of Buddhism have different opinions about the origin of the LAS. D. T. Suzuki<sup>9</sup> and F. Sutton,<sup>10</sup> for example, argue that the LAS was composed by Buddhist of the Yogācāra school in India. In contrast, G. Tucci argues that Mādhyamika thinkers used the LAS text to formulate their own doctrines. Building upon the

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<sup>7</sup> Mizuno (1982), 42.

<sup>8</sup> Mizuno (1982), 57.

<sup>9</sup> Suzuki (1968), 239-281.

<sup>10</sup> F. G. Sutton, *Existence and Enlightenment in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra: A Study in the Ontology and Epistemology of the Yogācāra School of Mahāyāna Buddhism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991).

scholarship of S. Lévi,<sup>11</sup> Tucci asserts that the doctrines of the LAS are similar to those of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*:

Therefore, even if the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* was accepted as a fundamental text by the later Yogācāras, that does not necessarily imply that the ideas expounded there are true Yogācāra ideas. We cannot say anything very precisely until the enormous literature preserved, chiefly in Chinese and Tibetan, has been carefully and historically explored. Anyhow, the dogmatical structure of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* appears to me as very akin to that of the *Prajñāpāramitā* or of the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*. The chief tenet expounded in it is just the *anupādaḥ, sarvadharmāṇāṃ* and the *niḥsvabhāvaḥ*, that are the main teaching of the *Prajñā* as well as the Nāgārjuna school. There is even an allusion to the prasaṅga method which is peculiar to the latter and which was developed by Candrakīrti.<sup>12</sup>

Taking Lévi and Tucci's observation that the LAS was utilized by Mādhyamika thinkers as my point of departure, my dissertation will examine the relationship between the LAS and the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school.<sup>13</sup> My dissertation is based on six different versions of the LAS: one Sanskrit manuscript, three Chinese translations, and two Tibetan translations. In addition, I will use four commentaries: Āryadeva's two short

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<sup>11</sup> Tucci quotes in his work S. Lévi, ed. *Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi* (Paris: H. Champion, 1925), 19: "Nor shall we forget that the LAS is very often quoted as a canonical book by authors belonging to the pure Mādhyamika current, and who, at least dogmatically, are opposed to the Yogācāra school, such as Candrakīrti, Śāntideva etc."

<sup>12</sup> G. Tucci, "Notes on the *Laṅkāvatāra*," *Indian Historical Quarterly* 4 (1928): 550.

<sup>13</sup> The classification of Indian Madhyamaka schools, such as Svātantrika, Prāsaṅgika, Yogācāra-Svātantrika, and so forth, was created by Tibetan Buddhists rather than Indian Buddhists. See, K. Mimaki, "The *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, and the Mādhyamika Classification in Tibetan *grub mtha'* literature," *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy: Proceedings of the Csoma de Kőrös Symposium*, vol. 2. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 11, eds. E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 1983), 161-167.

commentaries (ca. 4th century A.D.),<sup>14</sup> Jñānaśrībhadra's *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* (ca. 11<sup>th</sup> century A.D.),<sup>15</sup> and Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* (ca. late 11<sup>th</sup> or early 12<sup>th</sup> century A.D.).<sup>16</sup> My dissertation will focus on the latter two texts which are longer and later Indian commentaries than Āryadeva's.

Although the LAS, along with its commentaries, plays an important role in Mahayana thought, relatively little Western Buddhist scholarship has been devoted to its study. In focusing on the above Indian commentaries on the LAS, I hope to contribute to the identification of the place occupied by the LAS in the Indian Buddhist tradition. The main question I will explore in this dissertation is, if the LAS was originally composed as a primary text for the Yogācāra school, why do Bhāvaviveka and other Madhyamaka thinkers quote the LAS as their source of authority in arguing against certain doctrines of the Yogācāra school?

My dissertation offers two thesis statements to the above question. The first thesis is, in two parts, as follows. First, the original form of the LAS was supposedly composed before the Yogācāra school arose. J. Takasaki argues that the four-volume version in the Chinese Buddhist canon is the original or the earliest form of the LAS.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the

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<sup>14</sup> Taishō, vol. 32, no. 1639, pp. 155-156 and no. 1640, pp. 156-158. See, G. Tucci, "Un traité d'Āryadeva sur le Nirvāṇa des hérétiques," *T'oung Pao* 24 (1925/26): 16-31. Āryadeva is a well known disciple of Nāgārjuna in the tradition of Mahayana Buddhism.

<sup>15</sup> Tōhoku catalogue, no. 4018.

<sup>16</sup> Tōhoku catalogue, no. 4019.

<sup>17</sup> J. Takasaki, "Analysis of the *Laṅkāvatāra*: In search of its original form," *Indianisme et Bouddhisme, Mélanges offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte* (Louvain-La-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1980), 339-352. There are three different Chinese versions of the LAS: the four-volume, the seven-volume, and the ten-volume.

four-volume version of the Chinese LAS contains fundamental doctrines of Mahayana Buddhism, rather than specific tenets of Buddhist schools. In other words, it is not a text formulated by and for the Yogācāra school.

Secondly, the two later Chinese versions of the LAS, namely, the seven-volume version (*Mahāyānalankāvatārasūtra*) and the ten-volume version (*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*), include the first chapter, *Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā*, the ninth chapter, *Dhāraṇī*, and the tenth chapter, *Sagāthakam*, that are not included in the four-volume version. These two later versions of the LAS appeared because both the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra schools attempted to interpret the LAS from their own philosophical perspectives. The first chapter, *Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā*, was composed by the Madhyamaka school and it represents their philosophical interpretations. The tenth chapter, *Sagāthakam*, was developed by the Yogācāra school and it represents their views. However, the ninth chapter, *Dhāraṇī*, emphasizes practices that are common to both Mahayana schools and does not contain philosophical discourse. Hence, while it is an important chapter, I will not discuss it here.

The second thesis is, in two parts, as follows. First, Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers did not believe that the LAS was a primary text for the Yogācāra school. Instead, they thought that the teachings in the LAS were compatible with those in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*. Developing their own philosophical ideas based on the above assumption, Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers contested that the Buddha's true teachings as disclosed in the LAS, are incompatible with the Yogācāra school's interpretation of the LAS. The two schools' main disagreement was over the notion of mind-only.

Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers continued to use the Sanskrit term *cittamātra* to refer to mind-only, while the Yogācāra thinkers introduced the Sanskrit term *vijñaptimātra* for mind-only.

Secondly, Svātantrika-Madhyamaka's philosophical ideas greatly influenced the later development of Indian Buddhism. Two examples of this influence can be seen in the two Indian commentaries on the LAS, Jñānaśrībhadrā's *Āryaśālikāvatārasūtravṛtti* and Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra*. These two commentaries were interpreted from the perspective of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. This school is one of the later branches of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school.<sup>18</sup> The *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* commentary composed by Jñānavajra is an explicit example of the philosophical position of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. In fact, Jñānavajra cites an unknown commentary on Kamalaśīla's (ca. 740-795) *Madhyamakāloka*, a key-work that belongs to this school, to support his analysis.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> The Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school divided into two branches around the eighth century. The other branch is the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. The classification of these two schools were created by Tibetan Buddhists.

<sup>19</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 42a-6 : འདིའི་དོན་ཞིབ་དུ་ནི་དབུ་མ་རྒྱུ་བའི་རྣམ་པར་འགྲུབ་པ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྒྲོན་མ་ལས་ཤིས་པར་  
བྱོལ། The Sanskrit title of this probably Indian work would be something like \**Madhyamakāloka-*  
*bhāṣyatattvadīpaka/ pradīpa*.

## II. Modern Scholarly Opinion About the Date of Composition of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*

Modern scholars generally agree that the LAS was composed after the Yogācāra school. H. Ui, for example, states that:

the LAS belongs to the group of Mahāyāna sūtras in the third period, the period after Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and that, since it already existed at the end of the fourth century A.D., the date of Vasubandhu, to whom it was unknown, should be some time in the fourth century.<sup>20</sup>

L. Schmithausen also considers that the LAS was written later than Vasubandhu.<sup>21</sup>

Likewise, in agreement with Ui and Schmithausen, Takasaki writes:

...the LAS belongs to the group of Mahāyāna sūtras in the third period, the period after Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and since it already existed at the end of the fourth century A.D., the date of Vasubandhu, to whom it was unknown, should be sometime in the fourth century, and assumes that the LAS is also one of the later compositions, since it expresses concurrently the *vijñaptimātra* theory and *tathāgatagarbha* theory, two theories unknown to Nāgārjuna. Furthermore, because of its unique doctrine of the identification of *ālayavijñāna* with *tathāgatagarbha*, a doctrine that is not found even in the works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the LAS is sometimes regarded as of a date later than Vasubandhu.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> H. Ui, *Indian philosophy* (in Japanese), vol. I (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1924), 406.

<sup>21</sup> L. Schmithausen, "A note on Vasubandhu and the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*," *Asiatische Studien/ Études asiatiques* 46-1 (1992): 392-397.

<sup>22</sup> J. Takasaki, "Source of the *Laṅkāvatāra* and its position in Mahāyāna Buddhism," *Indological and Buddhist Studies in honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his sixtieth birthday* (Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, 1982), 546.

Some Buddhist scholars, however, challenge this view and argue that the LAS was composed earlier than Vasubandhu. Ch. Lindtner, for example, insists that the LAS was composed in Nāgārjuna's time.<sup>23</sup> S. Yamaguchi, after examining the Tibetan translation of the *Vyākhyāyukti*,<sup>24</sup> attributed to Vasubandhu, found a series of verses similar to verses 135-7 in the tenth chapter, *Sagāthakam*, of the LAS. Building upon Yamaguchi's research, N. Funahashi<sup>25</sup> rightly notes that these very same three verses in Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti* are also found in the third chapter of the LAS. Based on his discovery, Funahashi asserts that the LAS was composed earlier than Vasubandhu.<sup>26</sup>

This difference in dating the LAS between Ui, Takasaki, and Schmithausen, and Yamaguchi and Funahashi stems from their different methodologies. For the former group of Buddhist scholars, the major criterion to determine the date of the composition of the LAS is related to the combined appearance of the theory of *ālayavijñāna* along with the theory of *tathāgatagarbha*. They believe that this theory was created sometime later than Vasubandhu's time. In contrast, in attempting to prove that the LAS was composed

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<sup>23</sup> Ch. Lindtner, "The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* in early Indian Madhyamaka literature," *Asiatische Studien/ Études asiatiques* 46-1 (1992): 244-279. However, Lindtner's idea that the LAS was composed in Nāgārjuna's time was rejected by L. Schmithausen. See note 21.

<sup>24</sup> For this work, see now P. Skilling, "Vasubandhu and the *Vyākhyāyukti* Literature," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 23 (2000): 297-350.

<sup>25</sup> N. Funahashi, "An Origination of the Aṣṭa-vijñāna thought-With Special Reference to the Date of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (in Japanese)," *Bukkyōgaku Seminar* 13 (Kyoto: The Society of Buddhist Studies Ōtani University, 1971): 40-50.

<sup>26</sup> After Frauwallner presented the idea of two Vasubandhus, many Buddhist scholars had suggested regarding his view. The recent detailed information was presented by E. Hanson, *Early Yogācāra and Its Relation to Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: Change and Continuity in the History of Mahāyāna Buddhist Thought* (Ph. D. Dissertation: Harvard University, 1998), 36-65. In it, she proposes that the date of Vasubandhu, who was a younger brother of Asaṅga, is 320-400 CE.



earlier than Vasubandhu, the latter group argues that some verses in the Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti* are similar to the verses in the LAS. However, there is not sufficient evidence to support their argument. Instead, I will propose another criterion to determine when the LAS was composed.

My hypothesis is that, based on Takasaki's analysis,<sup>27</sup> the original form of the LAS, which is similar to the four-volume version of the Chinese translation, was composed earlier than Vasubandhu for two reasons. First, Āryadeva's commentaries on the LAS was composed around the fourth century.<sup>28</sup> Second, the earliest form of the LAS seems to have served as the foundational text for Āryadeva's commentaries. As mentioned above, although the four-volume version of the LAS discusses object of knowledge (*jñeya*) from the epistemological aspect, it was originally approached from the ontological perspective.<sup>29</sup> The tenth chapter, *Sagāthakam*, was composed by Yogācāra thinkers from the epistemological aspect. Based on these observations, the other versions of the LAS must have appeared later in the Mahayana Buddhist world. Thus, it is assumed that the four-volume version of the LAS must have existed in Āryadeva's time.

A major problem in proving my hypothesis is it is difficult to show the connection between Āryadeva's two commentaries on the LAS and the LAS itself. However, Takasaki and Tucci have done some preliminary research to demonstrate the relationship between Āryadeva's commentaries and the LAS. Takasaki writes:

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<sup>27</sup> Takasaki (1980), 339-352.

<sup>28</sup> See note. 14.

A fairly long passage discussing the concept of *nirvāṇa* in various heretical doctrines also has no counterpart in the *Sagāthakam* and is therefore probably a later addition. The same contents as this passage are found in a commentary to the LAS allegedly by Āryadeva. Attribution of this work to Āryadeva is usually regarded as a pretense, but based upon the present assumption, Āryadeva may be the real author of this work, it afterward having been introduced into the LAS.<sup>30</sup>

Tucci also indicates that Āryadeva's two commentaries are related to some doctrines in the third chapter, *Anityatā*, of the LAS.<sup>31</sup> This chapter consists of dialogues between the Buddha and a non-Buddhist about *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.<sup>32</sup>

In addition to Takasaki and Tucci's view that Āryadeva's two works presents various heretical doctrines, R. Sonam also contributes toward the above view by examining other works by Āryadeva:

According to modern Buddhologists there were two Āryadevas, and the works on *tantra* are not considered to be by the author of *The Four Hundred*. There appears to be a consensus, however, that at least two other works may be attributed to the author of *The Four Hundred*. One is a text called *The Hundred*, found in the Chinese but not in the Tibetan canon, which, together with the works of Nāgārjuna, was considered of great importance for the study of the Mādhyamika system in China and Japan. The other is *The Hundred Syllables*, an extremely terse refutation of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika assertions, attributed to Āryadeva in the

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<sup>29</sup> The Mahayana ontological and epistemological aspect will be elaborated on in detail in Chapter 4.

<sup>30</sup> Takasaki (1980), 346.

<sup>31</sup> Tucci (1925/26), 17.

<sup>32</sup> See chapter I.

Chinese canon and to Nāgārjuna in the Tibetan canon. *The Four Hundred, The Hundred and The Hundred Syllables* displays a certain homogeneity in style and subject-matter which supports their attribute to Āryadeva.<sup>33</sup>

In order to support my hypothesis that the four-volume version of the LAS was composed before Vasubandhu, I will explore in the first chapter four different approaches to examine the LAS: the textual transmission, the date of composition, the Sanskrit text and other translated versions, as well as, the primary textual form of the LAS. There are six different existing textual versions of the LAS: One Sanskrit manuscript, three Chinese translations, and two Tibetan translations. I will divide them into two categories: (1) the four-volume version, and (2) the seven-volume and the ten volume versions.

### III. The Identities of Jñānaśrībhadrā and Jñānavajra and Their Commentaries on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*

The two Indian commentators, Jñānaśrībhadrā and Jñānavajra, were Buddhist scholars of the Yogācāra school and the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school respectively. A few modern scholars have studied the Kashmirian scholar, Jñānaśrībhadrā, and his writings. H. Hadano broadly studies Jñānaśrībhadrā's identity through his *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti*, and describes Jñānaśrībhadrā from both esoteric

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<sup>33</sup> R. Sonam, tr. and ed. *Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas Gyal-tsap on Āryadeva's Four Hundred* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1994), 16.

and exoteric aspects.<sup>34</sup> Jñānaśrībhadra's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, shows that he was also a logician.<sup>35</sup>

Unlike Jñānaśrībhadra, next to nothing is known about Jñānavajra. Due to this lack of information, our construction of the scholar Jñānavajra must rely on his work, the *Tathāgatahrdayālaṃkāra*. In his work, Jñānavajra clearly identifies himself as a Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinker. None of his other writings, if he did write anything else, have been transmitted to us. Due to limited primary sources, I treat historical and biographical materials as ideological depictions of these two Indian commentators and their works in chapter two. In particular, I rely upon the content of Jñānavajra's philosophical work to construct his biography.

Given that their commentaries, *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* and *Tathāgatahrdayālaṃkāra*, are preserved only in the Tibetan canon, the transmission of these texts in Tibet must be clarified. Based on Hadano's research on Jñānaśrībhadra's life, his *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* was most likely originally delivered as a series of lectures in Tibetan to a Tibetan Buddhist audience, and that Jñānaśrībhadra's lectures

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<sup>34</sup> H. Hadano, "A Note on the *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* by Jñānaśrībhadra, Toh. 4018," *Acta Asiatica* 29 (1975): 78.

<sup>35</sup> L. W. J. van der Kuijp, Introduction Gtsang-nag-pa's *Tshad-ma rnam-par nges-pa'i ṭi-ka legs-bshad bsdu-pa* An Ancient Commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Ōtani University Collection No. 13971, in *The Ōtani University Tibetan Works Series Volume II* (Kyoto: Ōtani University, 1989), 19. S. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *A History of Indian Logic, Ancient, Medieval, and Modern Schools* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), 342. J. Naudou, *Les bouddhistes Kasmiriens au Moyen Age* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1968): English translation, *Buddhists of Kaśmīr* by Bareton and Picon (Delhi: Agam Kala Prakashan, 1980), 221-227.

were recorded by his Tibetan disciples. There are two reasons to support this assumption. First, unlike his other works, no translator is given in this commentary's colophon. Second, the structure of the *Āryaṇīkāvatārasūtravṛtti* does not seem to follow the outline and principles of Indian commentarial literature. This fact becomes much more obvious when one compares it to Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahrdayālamkāra*, which is representative of the Indian commentarial tradition.

Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahrdayālamkāra* is a late Indian Buddhist commentary on the LAS. By using the method of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamaka's position,<sup>36</sup> he intended to clarify the fundamental teachings of the LAS. I will demonstrate that Jñānavajra's work was initially written in Sanskrit or another Indian language, and was only later translated into Tibetan. However, the translator's name is not mentioned in its colophon. My assumption is that this text was introduced into Tibet around the turn of the twelfth century. At this time in Tibetan Buddhism, there was a philosophical conflict

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<sup>36</sup> D. S. Lopez, *A Study of Svātantrika* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1984), 37-54: Buddhapālita, in his commentary, presented many of his arguments in terms of consequences (*prasāṅga*, *thal'gyur*), logical statements put in terms of the opponent's assertions in order to reveal to the opponent the fallacy of his position. In *The Lamp for wisdom*, Bhāvaviveka criticized Buddhapālita's use of consequences, insisting that the Mādhyamika's own position must finally be stated in the form of an autonomous syllogism (*svatantraprayoga*, *rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba*). Subsequently, Candrakīrti came to Buddhapālita's defense in his *Clear Words*, arguing that the faults ascribed by Bhāvaviveka were not entailed by Buddhapālita and that the use of autonomous syllogisms is unsuitable for Mādhyamikas, thereby rejecting Bhāvaviveka's position. The dispute between Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka on the question of consequences (*prasāṅga*) and syllogisms (*prayoga*) has been brought to light in the West by Y. Kajiyama.

N. Katz, "An Appraisal of the Svātantrika-Prāsāṅgika debates," *Philosophy East and West* 26-3 (1976): 253-268. P. Santina, *Madhyamaka Schools in India: A Study of the Madhyamaka Philosophy and of the Divisions of the System into the Prāsāṅgika and Svātantrika Schools* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986).

between the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school<sup>37</sup> and the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. As the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school began to dominate Tibetan Buddhism, the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school began to slowly diminish in popularity. Despite the diminishing of this school, the teachings of this tradition was preserved by the Tibetan “New Epistemology” school. I propose that this school borrowed from Jñānavajra’s work to formulate their theory. Therefore, Jñānavajra’s work provided an occasion for new theories of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school to be introduced to Tibetan Buddhists.

#### IV. The Relationship between the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and the Madhyamaka School

Modern Buddhist scholars, specifically Japanese Buddhist scholars, believe generally that the LAS is a primary text for the Yogācāra school. Suzuki, for instance, states:

When the LAS is studied apart from its connection with the philosophy of Zen Buddhism, it is usually as one of the textbooks of the Yogācāra school.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> The introduction of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school in Tibetan Buddhism by Atiśa (ca. 982-1054) and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags. Recent research of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags’ biography can be found in *The Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas*, trans. and ed. Ruth Sonam (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1994), 21-22.

<sup>38</sup> Suzuki (1968), 239.

In light of the predominant opinion that the LAS is a primary text for the Yogācāra school, some scholars, such as Tucci and Lévi, caution against an overly simplistic depiction of the sutra's teachings.

This is not to deny that Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers in Indian Buddhism did not use some doctrines from the LAS that are compatible with the fundamental teachings in Mahayana Buddhism. For example, Bhāvaviveka (ca. 490-570), Jñānagarbha (ca. 700-760), Śāntarakṣita (ca. 680-740), and Kamalaśīla, utilize the LAS to support their ideas of the notion of mind-only, which is considered to be the main tenet in the LAS. While Bhāvaviveka utilized the LAS by rejecting the notion of mind-only, others used the LAS by accepting its notion of mind-only. In assessing the relationship between the LAS and Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, Y. Kajiyama states:

While arguing in this way, Kamalaśīla cites many verses from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* as an authority, a reliance on which he shares with Śāntarakṣita and Ratnākaraśānti. It seems that this sutra, which was compiled after the establishment of basic Yogācāra doctrines, written with an intention to synthesize Mādhyamika and Yogācāra doctrines, suggested to later Madhyamaka thinkers a method whereby to accord a proper rank to each of the Buddhist philosophical systems.<sup>39</sup>

His analysis comes out of the philosophical tendencies of later, rather than earlier, Indian Buddhists.

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<sup>39</sup> Y. Kajiyama, "Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation," *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice*, eds. M. Kiyota and E. W. Jones (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978), 134.

Instead of blatantly dismissing modern scholarship, which points to a relationship between the LAS and the Madhyamaka school, I will attempt to define more distinctly the historical and philosophical boundaries of this relationship. Madhyamaka thinkers became more engaged with the LAS text as they began to criticize late Yogācāra thinkers for interpreting Mahayana doctrines radically. As S. Anacker writes:

...these are really the disagreements of sixth-century followers of Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu. They belong to a time when Buddhism had become an academic subject at places such as the University of Nālandā. They may have disagreed because they were academics fighting for posts and recognition.<sup>40</sup>

Bhāvaviveka in the sixth century was the first scholar of the Madhyamaka school to criticize the Yogācāra school by citing the doctrines of the LAS. In his works, he explicitly repudiates the views of Yogācāra thinkers. Especially, he is critical of their interpretation of the notion of mind-only (*cittamātra*), which they interpreted as the non-existence of external objects.<sup>41</sup> In attacking the views of Yogācāra thinkers, he proves that his ideas are legitimated by the LAS.

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<sup>40</sup> S. Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu, the Buddhist Psychological Doctor* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 3.

<sup>41</sup> Bhāvaviveka wrote the two primary texts of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school: *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti* and *Madhyamakahrdaya* (*Essence of the Middle Way*) and its auto-commentary, *Tarkajvālā* (*Blaze of Reasoning*). Among them, chapter 25<sup>th</sup> of his *Prajñāpradīpa*, in chapter 5 of his *Madhyamakahrdayakārikās*, and in his auto-commentary the *Tarkajvālā* are dealt with the Yogācāra school's ideas. However, Y. Ejima considered that the *Tarkajvālā* which is only preserved in a Tibetan version (Toh. No. 5256) is not Bhāvaviveka's work. See, in detail, Y. Ejima, *Development of Mādhyamika Philosophy in India: Studies on Bhāvaviveka* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1979), 13-15. See also D. S. Ruegg, "On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/ Bhavya," *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka: Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference*, vol. 2, eds. David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 59-71.



During the seventh and the eighth centuries, the Madhyamaka school's utilization of the LAS became more involved. This is evident in the works of Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, such as Jñānagarbha's *Differentiation of the Two Truths* (*Satyadvayavibhāṅga*), Śāntarakṣita's *Ornament for the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakālaṃkāra*) and Kamalaśīla's *Illumination of the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakāloka*).<sup>42</sup> In Tibetan Buddhism, the above three Indian Buddhist scholars were referred to as "the three eastern Svātantrikas" (*rang rgyud shar gsum*). As is obvious in their works, they started to develop new doctrinal interpretations of the Madhyamaka school, specifically the notion of mind-only.

Although all Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers quote the LAS in their works, the fundamental distinction between Bhāvaviveka and later thinkers is that the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers adopt the Yogācāra school's notion of mind-only--the non-existence of external objects. Furthermore, they, unlike Yogācāra thinkers, apply the concepts of both causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*) and self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) to conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) rather than to ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*). These philosophical tendencies in the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school are the result of two factors. First, although the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers borrow

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<sup>42</sup> D. M. Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the distinction between the two truths: An eighth century handbook of Madhyamaka philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). M. Ichigō, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (Tokyo: Buneido, 1985) and "Śāntarakṣita and Bhāvaviveka as Opponents of the Mādhyamika in the *Madhyamakāloka*," *Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search For Understanding* J. A. Silk, ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 147-170.

some ideas from the Yogācāra school, they maintain Madhyamaka philosophy's ontological position as their foundation. Second, they seek to connect conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) with ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*) by means of the notion of mind-only. This is due to the fact that they chose the LAS as primary source of reference, rather than the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* or the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* that form the canonical basis of the Yogācāra school.

Generally, Buddhist scholars believe that the Yogācāra school is opposed to the Madhyamaka school. Some scholars, however, challenge this notion. E. Hanson, for example, argues that this view of the existence of a dispute between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra is a result of examining this relationship through the lenses of later writers—either later commentators within the Yogācāra school or later detractors of the Yogācāra in the Madhyamaka school.<sup>43</sup> Likewise, when Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers utilize the LAS, either by rejecting the notion of mind-only or by adopting it, they consider that the notion of mind-only was originally taught by the Buddha. According to Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, some Yogācāra thinkers, however, have incorrect views of the mind-only doctrine. Thus, by using the LAS, they attempted to legitimate their interpretation of what the Buddha really taught. They argued that they understood the Buddha's fundamental teachings in the sutras, specifically the LAS, which contains the teachings on the mind-only and emptiness. Similarly, W. Rahula also demonstrates that the two schools were not opposed to each other in the early stages:

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<sup>43</sup> E. Hanson, *Early Yogācāra and Its Relation to Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: Change and Continuity in the History of Mahāyāna Buddhist Thought* (Ph. D. Dissertation: Harvard University, 1998), 17.

The *śūnyatā* philosophy elaborated by Nāgārjuna and the *cittamātra* philosophy developed by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are not contradictory, but complementary to each other. These two systems, known as Mādhyamika and Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda, explain and expound, in different ways with different arguments, the very same doctrines of *nairātmya*, *śūnyatā*, *tathatā*, *pratītyasamutpāda*, but are not a philosophy of their own which can properly be called Nāgārjuna's or Asaṅga's or Vasubandhu's philosophy.<sup>44</sup>

I contend that Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers did not believe that the LAS was composed as a primary text for the Yogācāra school. They adopted the LAS in their works because it possesses some doctrines that are compatible with, rather than contradictory to, the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*.

My third chapter will investigate the relationship between the LAS and the Madhyamaka school in India and in China. In attempting to elucidate these relations between the LAS and the Madhyamaka school, I will provide doxographical materials: Āryadeva's two short commentaries as early sources, and Jñānaśrībhadrā's and Jñānavajra's commentaries as later sources. I will examine primarily the two later Indian commentaries. In examining these two commentaries, I will explore how they understood the LAS from their own philosophical positions, and how they preserved their predecessors' philosophical tendencies in their own works.

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<sup>44</sup> W. Rahula, "Vijñaptimātra Philosophy in the Yogācāra System and Some Wrong Notions," *Middle Way: Journal of the Buddhist Society* (1974): 120.

## V. Philosophical Identities in the Two Indian Commentaries on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*

In attempting to identify philosophical tendencies in the two Indian commentaries, the basic thesis is that both the *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* and the *Tathāgatahrdayālaṅkāra* are interpreted from the perspective of “cognitive centrism,” (*rnam rig dbu ma*, \* *vijñānamadhyama/ vijñaptimadhyama*).<sup>45</sup> The cognitive centrism is a unique theory that Ratnākaraśānti proposed in the eleventh century.<sup>46</sup> Jñānaśrībhaddra and Jñānavajra built upon Ratnākaraśānti’s theory of cognitive centrism, although they use slightly different terminologies in Tibetan.

In the fourth chapter, I will concentrate on two main philosophical ideas within the history of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school: the first is the notion of two truths, and the second is the notion of mind-only. The fundamental position of this school is that they maintain the Madhyamaka school’s view of ultimate truth, while they borrow the view of conventional truth from the Yogācāra school. Because of this, they claim themselves to be within the Madhyamaka tradition, rather than the Yogācāra tradition in Indian Buddhism. After applying the Yogācāra view of conventional truth to the Madhyamaka doctrines, they create their own notion of two truths. Similarly, by

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<sup>45</sup> Jñānaśrībhaddra, D: 9b- 2: ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པའི་མདོ་ལྟེ་ནི་ཞེས་པ་ནི་རྣམ་པར་ཞེས་པ་དབུ་མའི་རྒྱལ་ཟབ་མོ་གློ་

See Hadano (1973), 19.

Jñānavajra, D: 1b-5, P: 2b-1, C: 1b-5: མཐའ་གཉིས་རྣམ་ཐུངས་རྣམ་རིག་དབུ་མའི་རྒྱལ་ལྷགས་མདོ་དོན་གསལ་བར་

གློ་

<sup>46</sup> Kajiyama (1978), 140.

incorporating notions from the Yogācāra school, they develop their own ideas of mind-only. I will show how their notion of two truths and mind-only is unique. I will demonstrate this by investigating three important ideas: the non-existence of external objects (*bāhyārtha*), causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*), and self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*).

The central aim of fourth chapter is to investigate the main issues from historical and religious-philosophical perspectives. First, from historical perspective, I will examine, by whom and how these unique ideas were created and transmitted to the two Indian commentators on the LAS. Second, why were these ideas which were developed by Dharmakīrti in the seventh century,<sup>47</sup> applied to the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school; and how were these new ideas accepted by the later Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, especially the commentators of the LAS.

Madhyamaka's fundamental philosophy concerns the identification of object of knowledge (*jñeya*) based on the notion of the two truths: *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*. The notion of the two truths is the basic structure of Madhyamaka philosophy. In the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*, *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are equally based on emptiness.<sup>48</sup> With the theory of depending co-arising, as well as the notion of both non-substantiality of self (*pudgala*) and phenomenon (*dharma*), Madhyamaka thinkers show how to manipulate this world, which is considered impermanent in the conventional world and empty in ultimate truth. Based on the teachings of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*, they divide object of

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<sup>47</sup> G. B. Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 47-345.

<sup>48</sup> E. Conze, "The Ontology of the *Prajñāpāramitā*," *Philosophy East and West* 3-2 (1953): 127.

knowledge into two categories: conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa*) and ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya, don dam bden pa*). Conventional truth is concerned with the nature of phenomenon: whether or not the external object exists separate from the subjective mind. Phenomena in conventional truth are impermanent because they are depending co-arising. Phenomena, however, are empty in ultimate truth, based on the non-substantiality of both self and phenomenon.

In surveying the brief history of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, the crucial turning points in the development of its own tenets appeared in Indian Buddhism between the sixth and the eighth centuries. The fundamental philosophical development is from the ontological to the epistemological. The epistemological tendency in the tenets of the Madhyamaka school began with Jñānagarbha in the eighth century, although Bhāvaviveka, in the sixth century, had already adopted aspects of Dignāga's logical system. Jñānagarbha followed, to a certain degree, notions having to do with ontology and epistemology that were well developed by Dharmakīrti.<sup>49</sup>

Even though both Svātantra-Madhyamaka thinkers, Bhāvaviveka in the sixth century, and Jñānagarbha in the eighth century, adopt the same concepts from the Buddhist logicians, their emphasis on interpreting the notion of the two truths is different. Bhāvaviveka's emphasis is on ultimate truth, while Jñānagarbha's is on conventional truth. The unique aspect of Jñānagarbha's work is that he applied causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*) to conventional truth. Dharmakīrti in his work originally applied this concept

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<sup>49</sup> See note. 36.

to ultimate truth. Jñānagarbha's idea was adopted by two later Buddhist scholars, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. M. Ichigō indicates that:

...Śāntarakṣita's idea of conventional truth seems very much in accordance with Jñānagarbha's... Jñānagarbha's view of conventional truth can be summarized as follows; true conventional truth is that which is not of the nature of imagination, arises co-dependently, has causal efficiency, and appears in the knowledge of man, whether they be wise or not. On the other hand, false conventional truth has been explained as that which is of the nature of imagination, and which possess no causal efficiency. Thus, we can easily understand that Jñānagarbha's view is reflected in the definition of conventional truth of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.<sup>50</sup>

In addition to their different interpretations of two truths, their interpretation of the external objects are also different. The Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school argues that, in conventional truth, the observed-object conditions (*ālambanapratyaya*, *dmigs rkyen*) of sense consciousness are accepted as external objects, which are compounds of subtle particles. The Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, however, asserts that, in conventional truth, there is mere knowledge or cognition (*rnam par rig pa tsam*, *vijñaptimātratā*) and that there are no external objects that are substances.<sup>51</sup> Unlike Bhāvaviveka, Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers introduce the notion of self-awareness (*svaśamvedana*) in their interpretation of conventional truth. In other words, the basic difference in the tenets between Bhāvaviveka and Jñānagarbha, and the

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<sup>50</sup> Ichigō (1985), LXVI- LXIX.

<sup>51</sup> Kajiyama (1978), 114-143.

**Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers is whether or not they accept the epistemological approach in conventional truth.**



## Chapter 1

### The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*

#### I. Introduction

The date of the LAS is far from certain in Indian Buddhism. I will argue below that the early or the original form of the LAS, similar to the four-volume version in Chinese, was utilized by Indian Buddhists as early as the fourth century. This assumption is based on the existence of Āryadeva's two short commentaries on the LAS that are preserved in the Chinese canon. These two works were translated the Sanskrit text to Chinese by Bodhiruci in 513 A.D., right after he translated the ten-volume Sanskrit version of the LAS into Chinese.<sup>1</sup>

Presently, six different versions of the LAS are available—one Sanskrit, three Chinese, and two Tibetan. The Sanskrit manuscript of the LAS, the *āryasaddharmalaṅkāvatāronāmahāyānasūtra*, was found in Nepal in the early twentieth century.<sup>2</sup> This manuscript consists of ten chapters. In addition to the above Sanskrit manuscript, there are five other translations. The extant three Chinese versions of the LAS were translated by Guṇabhadra (ca. 394-468), Bodhiruci (ca. 6<sup>th</sup> century A.D.), and Śikṣānanda (ca. 652-710) in the fifth, sixth and eighth centuries respectively.<sup>3</sup> The two

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<sup>1</sup> Taishō, vol. 32 no. 1639, pp. 155-156 and no. 1640, pp. 156-158. Tucci (1925/26). This issue is discussed in detail in the next section.

<sup>2</sup> L. Chandra, *Laṅkāvatārasūtra: Sanskrit Manuscript from Nepal* (New Delhi: Jyayed Press, 1977).

<sup>3</sup> Suzuki (1968), 12.

Tibetan versions were translated from the Chinese translations to Tibetan by ‘Gos Lo tsā ba Chos grub during the first half of the ninth century.<sup>4</sup> The first Chinese translation of the LAS was done by Dharmarakṣa sometime after his arrival in China in 412 A.D. Since the time of the south Indian monk, Bodhidharma, who supposedly transmitted his teachings along with this sutra in China around the fifth century, East Asian Buddhists have paid close attention to the LAS.<sup>5</sup> However, Tibetan Buddhist scholars have not yet conducted on how the LAS impacted or was utilized by Tibetan Buddhists to develop their religious-philosophical system.

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the LAS. Due to its complicated structure, this sutra has not yet been extensively examined by Buddhist scholars. To date, Suzuki has been the primary scholar who has done the most labor-intensive research on the LAS.

In this chapter, while compiling all the accessible information concerning the LAS, I will present my own discoveries of new materials relating to the LAS. My dissertation contributes new insights on the LAS. First, my research uncovers three different versions of the first chapter of the LAS. Second, in my analysis, I examine two new sources, *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* and *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra*—two Indian

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<sup>4</sup> Suzuki (1968), 4. S. Inaba, “On Chos grub’s translation of the *Chieh-Shên-mi-ching-shu*,” *Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization: Essays in Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on His Sixtieth Birthday*, eds. Leslie S. Kawamura and Keith Scott (Emeryville: Dharma Publishing, 1977), 105-113, “Yüan-ts’ê of Hsi-ming Monastery and His school,” *Ancient Copies of Buddhist Scripture Discovered in the Tun-Huang caves* vol. 2, ed. Shunjo Nogami (Kyoto: Seminar of Oriental Studies in Ōtani University, 1972), 113-119, and D. Ueyama, *Studies on Dunhuang Buddhism* (in Japanese) (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1999), 84-110.

<sup>5</sup> P. B. Yampolsky, *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 1- 57, and J. L. Broughton, *The Bodhidharma Anthology: The Earliest Records of Zen* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 53-65.

commentaries on the LAS written during the eleventh and the twelfth centuries by Jñānaśrībhadra and Jñānavajra respectively,<sup>6</sup> that Buddhist scholars have not yet fully explored. My research is based on Hadano's edition of *The Āryaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti*,<sup>7</sup> which compares three different Chinese versions and two Tibetan versions of the LAS. Hadano attempts in his edition to recover the root text utilized by Jñānaśrībhadra. Of the above two Indian commentaries, I will focus on Jñānavajra's commentary, which until now has received little attention.

To convey the general ideas of this text in an organized manner, I have divided this chapter into four sections. The first section discusses the textual transmission of the six different versions of the LAS which spans over a period of four centuries. In the second section, I will address the most controversial issue concerning the LAS among Buddhist scholars; namely, the date of its composition. In the third section, I will compare the Sanskrit text with other translated versions in order to identify the translation that is closest to it. Finally, I will attempt to discover the primary or the original textual form of the LAS to distill its essential teachings. This aspect of the research is crucial to understand the original form of the LAS. These four sections examine the main textual format of the LAS and not its philosophical content.

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<sup>6</sup> See Chapter Two.

<sup>7</sup> H. Hadano, *The Āryaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* (Sendai: Tibetan Buddhist Text Society, Tōhoku University, 1973).

## II. The Textual Transmission

Generally, a discussion of the transmission of Mahayana Buddhist texts begins with the date of the original Sanskrit text, and then traces its translations into other languages. In the case of the LAS, however, one has to take the opposite approach. One begins with the translated versions of the LAS in order to trace back the original text. This method is used due to the lack of Sanskrit texts of the LAS.

Throughout the history of Indian Buddhism, the textual transmission of the LAS has been obscure. Research on the works of Madhyamaka thinkers conducted by contemporary Buddhist scholars pays specific attention to the relationship between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools. Their research reveals that the Indian Madhyamaka thinkers, such as Bhāvaviveka, Candrakīrti, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla utilized the LAS in their own philosophical texts.<sup>8</sup> However, interestingly enough, these Madhyamaka thinkers never attempted to compose a commentary on the LAS. Thus, based on these fragments of information concerning the LAS in Indian Buddhism, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the textual transmission of the LAS in India.

However, in China, there exists three different Chinese versions of the LAS. The LAS was officially first transmitted to China in the beginning of the fifth century. Four Chinese translations of the LAS were made from Sanskrit texts between 420 A.D. and 704 A.D. Presently, only three of them are preserved in the Chinese canon.<sup>9</sup> These three

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<sup>8</sup> The relationship between the LAS and the Madhyamaka school will be discussed Chapter Three.

<sup>9</sup> Suzuki (1968), 3-44: the Chinese and Tibetan translations of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* are discussed in his introduction.

versions are referred to as either the Song, Wei, and Tang versions or the four-volume, ten-volume, and seven-volume versions respectively.

The first Chinese translation, the so-called four-volume version, was translated by Dharmarakṣa, who traveled to China from central India in 412 A.D. Unfortunately, this first Chinese translation, called the *Laṅkāvatāra*, is lost. The second translation of the four-volume version, the *Laṅkāvatāra treasure sūtra*,<sup>10</sup> was translated into Chinese by Guṇabhadra in 443 A.D. Guṇabhadra arrived in China from central India in 435 A.D. This version is also known as the Song version. Fazang (ca. 643-712), one of the most eminent Buddhist monk-scholars of the Tang period (618-907), participated in the translation of the seven-volume version into Chinese and criticized the four-volume version as an inaccurate translation. In spite of his criticism, almost all of the Chinese commentaries on the LAS were based on the Song version. The continued use of the four-volume version was due to the Chinese Chan Buddhists who considered the four-volume version to have been transmitted by Bodhidharma in the fifth century to his chief disciple, Huiko (ca. 5<sup>th</sup> century).<sup>11</sup> This attitude toward and use of the four-volume version is still prevalent throughout East Asian Buddhism.

While it is difficult to determine whether or not these two early Chinese translations are based on the same Sanskrit text, since both Dharmarakṣa and Guṇabhadra came to China from central India around the same time, it is highly possible that the two early Chinese translations were based on the same Sanskrit text. In addition, although

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<sup>10</sup> Taishō, vol. 16 no. 670, pp. 479-514.

<sup>11</sup> See note. 4.

there is no extant Sanskrit text of the four-volume version, it can be assumed that the Sanskrit text of the LAS, similar in form to the Chinese translation, circulated in India during the fourth century. This is premised on the fact that Dharmarakṣa and Guṇabhadra were in China in 412 A.D. and 435 A.D. respectively.<sup>12</sup> In other words, these texts must have been prevalent in India in order for Dharmarakṣa and Guṇabhadra to have transmitted these texts to China.

The ten-volume version or the Wei version of the LAS, entitled, *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*,<sup>13</sup> was translated in 513 A.D. by Bodhiruci who came to China from northern India. This version is the longest of the three Chinese translations. Later I will address the importance of the relationship of Bodhiruci to the Dilun school in China.<sup>14</sup> Based on this relationship, the ten-volume version of the LAS was probably studied by Chinese Buddhists of the Dilun school.

The fourth Chinese translation, the Tang version, *Mahāyānalāṅkāvatārasūtra*,<sup>15</sup> or the seven-volume version, was translated by Śikṣānanda between 700 and 704 A.D. with Fazang's assistance. This version is almost identical to the ten-volume version with the exception of being much shorter and having fewer chapter divisions. Based on the fact that Bodhiruci and Śikṣānanda came from the northern part of India, the seven- and the ten-volume versions originally circulated after the sixth century in northern India.

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<sup>12</sup> See note. 5.

<sup>13</sup> Taishō, vol. 16 no. 671, pp. 514-587.

<sup>14</sup> D. Y. Paul, *Philosophy of Mind in Sixth century China Paramārtha's 'Evolution of Consciousness'* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 41-64.

<sup>15</sup> Taishō, vol. 16 no. 672, pp. 587-640.

Two different versions of the LAS were translated into Tibetan. The first version of the LAS has been divided into nine *bam po-s*. The Tibetan title of his translation of the Sanskrit text is བཞག་པ་ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་ཟེལ་པ་རྩོད་པོའི་མཛོད་. According to Suzuki, the colophon of the Peking edition does not mention the translator, but the colophons of the Narthang and Derge editions indicate that it was translated from Chinese by 'Gos Lo tsā ba Chos grub. However, while Suzuki admits that 'Gos Lo tsā ba translated this version into Tibetan, Suzuki doubts that this Tibetan translation is based on the Chinese version since it is similar to the extant Sanskrit text of the LAS.<sup>16</sup> I believe that 'Gos Lo tsā ba was a the translator of this Tibetan version by using both the Sanskrit and the Chinese manuscripts for his translation of the LAS. This assumption is based on the fact that, not only was he Chinese, but his other translation of the LAS into Tibetan, which will be discussed later, was based on a Chinese translation. In addition, based on the fact that the extant Sanskrit text was found in Nepal in the early twentieth century, it can be assumed that some version of the Sanskrit text existed in the early ninth century in Dunhuang region.

In addition, Hadano and Yamaguchi argue that the two Indian commentators, Jñānaśrībhadrā and Jñānavajra, used the first Tibetan version of the LAS as the basis for their commentaries.<sup>17</sup> However, according to Tibetan materials, there is the nine *bam po-s* of the LAS from the Sanskrit version with an unknown translator in the *Sde dge'i bka'*

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<sup>16</sup> Suzuki (1964), 12-13.

<sup>17</sup> Hadano (1973), 75.

'gyur dkar chag',<sup>18</sup> and there is the eleven *bam po-s* of the LAS from a Chinese version in the *Bu ston chos 'byung*.<sup>19</sup> In contrast to Hadano and Yamaguchi, I assert that the two Indian commentators must have had access to the ten-volume Sanskrit version.<sup>20</sup> I believe this is true because the chapter divisions in their commentaries are similar to the ten-volume Chinese version's division of chapters.

The second Tibetan version of the LAS was translated by 'Gos Lo tsā ba from the Chinese four-volume version and is entitled འཕགས་པ་ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་ཟིན་པོ་ཆེན་མོ་འདོ་ལས་པངས་རྒྱལ་ཐམས་ཅད་

ཀྱི་གཟུང་གི་རྒྱུད་པོ་ཆེས་བྱ་བའི་ལེན། According to the colophon of this second translation, when 'Gos

Lo tsā ba translated this text into Tibetan, he used the commentary by Ācarya Wenhui of China.<sup>21</sup> Wenhui's commentary was originally written during the Tang dynasty, and fragments of a Tibetan translation of Wenhui's commentary exist.<sup>22</sup> Based on these

<sup>18</sup> *Sde dge 'i bka' 'gyur dkar chag*, p. 354: འཕགས་པ་ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་ཐམས་པོ་དགུ་དང་ལེན་ཉེར་བརྒྱད་པ་  
རྒྱ་གར་ནས་འགྱུར་བར་གྲགས་ཀྱང་རྒྱུར་མཐའ་ཀྱི་གཡལ་ཀ་མ་བྱང་།

<sup>19</sup> *Bu ston chos 'byung*, p. 219: ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་རྒྱ་ལས་བསྐྱུར་པ་ཐམས་པོ་བརྒྱ་གཅིག་

<sup>20</sup> See next section.

<sup>21</sup> This Tibetan translation of the LAS is mentioned in both the *Bu ston chos 'byung* and the *Sde dge 'i bka' 'gyur dkar chag*: The *Bu ston chos 'byung*, p. 219: ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་ཟིན་པོ་ཆེན་མོ་འདོ་ལས་པངས་རྒྱལ་

ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་གཟུང་གི་རྒྱུད་པོ་ཆེན་པོའི་ལེན་འགོམ་ཆོས་གྲུབ་ཀྱིས་བསྐྱུར་པ་ཐམས་པོ་བརྒྱད།

The *Sde dge 'i bka' 'gyur dkar chag*, p. 354: འཕགས་པ་ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་ཟིན་པོ་ཆེན་མོ་འདོ་ལས་པངས་རྒྱལ་ཐམས་ཅད་  
ཀྱི་གཟུང་གི་རྒྱུད་པོ་ཆེན་པོའི་ལེན་ཐམས་པོ་བརྒྱད་པ། རྒྱའི་རྒྱུ་དོན་མེད་ཉེ་ཡིས་མཛད་པའི་འགྲེལ་པ་དང་རྒྱུར་ནས་ལོ་ཅ་བ་འགོམ་  
ཆོས་འགྲུབ་ཀྱིས་རྒྱའི་དཔེ་ལས་བསྐྱུར་བ།

<sup>22</sup> Takasaki (1978), 460; Stein No. 219, and Pelliot No. 609-a small fragment.



Tibetan fragments, it may be assumed that Wenhui originally wrote the commentary in Chinese, although it has not been proven. It was only later that his commentary was translated into Tibetan. I believe that 'Gos Lo tsā ba used Wenhui's commentary when he translated the four-volume version of the Chinese text into Tibetan because the original Sanskrit text of the four-volume version, which was translated into Chinese in the early fifth century, was lost at an earlier stage. As mentioned above, Fazang criticized the four-volume version of the Chinese translation as both inaccurate and too difficult to understand, even for Chinese Buddhist scholars. For this reason, 'Gos Lo tsā ba used Wenhui's commentary based on the four-volume version as a guide in order to determine the correct understanding of the LAS.


Ironically, 'Gos Lo tsā ba did not translate the ten-volume version of the LAS into Tibetan. I think this is because he did not consider this version to be credible. Although the ten-volume version is more disorganized than the seven-volume version, both are culturally and contextually quite similar. Based on this observation, I believe that the seven-volume version was composed in northern India earlier than the ten-volume version, and that the former version is a more condensed form of the latter version. Based on when these texts were translated into Chinese, it can be surmised that the ten-volume version was originally composed in India in the fifth century, and that the seven-volume version was composed also in India at least by the end of the sixth century. After the completion of the seven-volume version, due to its simplicity and hence popularity, the ten-volume version did not circulate widely.

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Therefore, taking all of the above factors into consideration, I believe that in India the sequence in which the LAS was composed is as follows: the four-volume version, the ten-volume version, and the seven-volume version. Based on this conclusion, I believe that a plausible outline of the textual transmissions of the LAS in India, China, and Tibet is as delineated below. Based on the fact that the three Chinese versions of the LAS were translated in 443 A.D., 513 A.D., and 704 A.D., respectively, the original Sanskrit texts of the LAS were probably composed at least several decades before their Chinese counterparts. As I pointed out earlier, according to two Chinese sources--the first Chinese translation which appeared sometime after 412 A.D. and the two short commentaries on the LAS attributed to Āryadeva--I conjecture that the first Sanskrit text of the LAS was composed in India before the fourth century in a form quite similar to the four-volume version of the Chinese translation. I also propose that the second Sanskrit text of the LAS was composed in India around the fifth century in a form similar to the ten-volume version of the Chinese translation, and was transmitted to China in 513 A.D. Moreover, I believe that the third Sanskrit text of the LAS was written in India around the sixth century, and that its structure was similar to both the extant Sanskrit manuscript of the LAS and to the seven-volume version of the Chinese translation.

The following diagram of the textual transmission of the LAS [Table 1] is based on the three Chinese versions of the LAS rather than the single Sanskrit text:

**Table 1**



### III. The Date of Composition

Although the composition of most Mahayana Buddhist texts are unknown, still Buddhist scholars speculate about the dates in general. One of the most contested issues among Buddhist scholars is when the LAS was composed. Knowing the date of the text would be helpful in identifying the sutra's philosophical position within the broader context of other Mahayana Buddhist texts. Buddhist scholars believe that one of the most significant philosophical ideas presented in the LAS is that *ālayavijñāna* is identical to *tathāgatagarbha*. Due to these theories, Buddhist scholars assume that the LAS was composed later than Vasubandhu.

In this section, based on my map of the textual transmissions of the LAS in India [see Table 1 above], I argue that the early or the original text of the LAS is a form quite similar to the four-volume version of the Chinese translation, which was written earlier than Vasubandhu. I also espouse that the other two versions of the LAS, the seven-volume and the ten-volume versions which include both the first and the tenth chapters, were composed later than the time of Vasubandhu.

In order to support my argument, not only will I examine previous research by Buddhist scholars, but also provide my own recent study of Āryadeva's two short commentaries on the LAS, both preserved in the Chinese canon. Regarding Āryadeva's two commentaries on the LAS, I propose that at least one of the three different Chinese versions of the LAS was definitely written before Āryadeva wrote his commentaries on the LAS.

Scholars who argue that the LAS was written later than Vasubandhu, repeatedly base their arguments on the same evidence. For example, following Ui's opinion,<sup>23</sup> Takasaki writes in his article:

...the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* belongs to the group of Mahayana sūtras in the third period, the period after Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and since it already existed at the end of the fourth century A.D., the date of Vasubandhu, to whom it was unknown, should be sometime in the fourth century, and assumes that the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* is also one of the later compositions, since it expresses concurrently the *vijñaptimātra* theory and *tathāgatagarbha* theory, two theories unknown to Nāgārjuna. Furthermore, because of its unique doctrine of the identification of *ālayavijñāna* with *tathāgatagarbha*, a doctrine that is not found even in the works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* is sometimes regarded as of a date later than Vasubandhu.<sup>24</sup>

Takasaki's basis for concluding that the LAS was written later than the time of Vasubandhu is solely based on the appearance of the *ālayavijñāna* and the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrines in the LAS. However, Funahashi,<sup>25</sup> building on Yamaguchi's examination of the Tibetan translation of the *Vyākhyāyukti*, a text attributed to Vasubandhu, reveals that a series of verses in the tenth chapter, the *Sagāthakam*, of the LAS (v.135-7) are also found in the third chapter of the LAS. Thus, Funahashi asserts

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<sup>23</sup> Ui (1924), 406.

The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* belongs to the group of Mahāyānas Sūtras of the third period, which the period after Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Since it already existed at the end of the fourth century A.D., the date of Vasubandhu, to whom it was unknown, should be some time in the fourth century.

<sup>24</sup> Takasaki (1982), 545.

<sup>25</sup> N. Funahashi, "An Origination of the Aṣṭa-vijñāna thought-With Special Reference to the Date of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (in Japanese)," *Bukkyōgaku Seminar* 13 (Kyoto: The Society of Buddhist Studies, Ōtani University, 1971): 40-50.

that the origin of *ālayavijñāna* starts with the LAS. Hence he argues that the LAS was composed earlier than Vasubandhu. However, even though Yamaguchi and Funahashi conclude that the LAS already existed at the time of Vasubandhu, there remains the problem that the *Vyākhyāyukti* contains no mention of the name of the LAS, but only the name of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.

Now I will direct my attention to the two short commentaries on the LAS attributed to Āryadeva, a chief disciple of Nāgārjuna. Āryadeva's two commentaries on the LAS were translated by Bodhiruci into Chinese in 513 A.D. According to Tucci's investigation, these two commentaries by Āryadeva, which discuss *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, are included in the third chapter of the LAS.<sup>26</sup>

Here, the fundamental question is whether they are really Āryadeva's works. As mentioned before, Takasaki presents his radical opinion regarding this issue.<sup>27</sup> Ironically, although Takasaki does not deny that the two commentaries on the LAS preserved in Chinese were composed by Āryadeva, he argues that the LAS was composed later than Vasubandhu. This is contradictory since Āryadeva lived before Vasubandhu. To resolve this contradiction in his theory, Takasaki contends that Āryadeva's commentaries are related to a later addition, *Sagāthakam*, to the LAS. I consider this a doubtful possibility. At any rate, it seems to me that since Āryadeva was able to compose the two commentaries on the LAS, it must be assumed that the LAS existed prior to the time that

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<sup>26</sup> Tucci (1925/26), 16-17.

<sup>27</sup> See Introduction, note. 28.

he could read and write.<sup>28</sup> I propose that Āryadeva's commentaries on the LAS were probably based on the four-volume Chinese version of the LAS, which was definitely composed earlier than Vasubandhu.

Taking into consideration the contents of Āryadeva's works to validate the authorship of these two commentaries, I will compare them in two ways. First of all, as indicated by the titles of Āryadeva's commentaries, the first commentary presents non-Buddhist and Hinayana viewpoints on four main tenets (*siddhānta*): permanence, oneness, duality, and non-duality. The second commentary discusses twenty kinds of *nirvāṇa*. These two commentaries are related to the *Lokāyata* and the *Nirvāṇa* chapters or sections found in the *Anityatā* chapter of Bodhiruci's ten-volume version of the LAS.<sup>29</sup> They are also found in the four-volume version of the LAS without chapter divisions<sup>30</sup> and again in the seven-volume version in the *Anityatā* chapter.<sup>31</sup>

These two chapters are relatively short and contain non-Buddhist tenets, especially Lokāyatika's views about all dharmas (phenomena) found in the *Lokāyata* chapter and the concept of *nirvāṇa* found in the *Nirvāṇa* chapter. A. Kunst also indicates in his article that there are non-Buddhist tenets in the LAS:

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<sup>28</sup> Ch. Lindtner, "The *Lankāvatārasūtra* in Early Indian Madhyamaka Literature," *Asiatische Studien/ Études asiatiques* 46 (1992): 244 -279.

<sup>29</sup> Taishō, vol. 16 no. 671, *Lokāyata* chapter, pp. 547-548, and *Nirvāṇa* chapter, p. 549.

<sup>30</sup> Taishō, vol. 16 no. 670, pp. 497-509.

<sup>31</sup> Taishō, vol. 16 no. 672, pp. 607-618.

...The *Laṅkāvatāra* is a highly polemical text. As is often the case with Mahayana texts, the focus of attack and defense is directed towards the Theravāda and its diverse branches; the *Laṅkāvatāra*, however, introduces polemics, both explicitly and implicitly, against the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṃkhya and the 'Lokāyatas'.<sup>32</sup>

The third chapter of the LAS, entitled *Anityatā* (Impermanence), presents various non-Buddhist views. The chief aim in providing non-Buddhist viewpoints is to distinguish between correct perception of the world of phenomenon and *nirvāṇa* according to the doctrine of non-substantiality of both self and phenomenon (*pudgala* and *dharma nairātma*) from incorrect views. None of the tenets of non-Buddhist schools, however, accept the theory of non-substantiality of both self and phenomenon. Thus, before revealing the Buddha's ultimate teachings, it is necessary for one to abandon all incorrect tenets.

Therefore, I believe that Āryadeva's two short commentaries explain non-Buddhist viewpoints in order to help Buddhists understand the main ideas of the third chapter of the LAS. Āryadeva's fundamental strategy, however, is to reject the two ontological extremes of existence and non-existence.<sup>33</sup> Although the LAS shows that all phenomenon originate from the self-mind, the doctrine of mind-only, especially the

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<sup>32</sup> A. Kunst, "Some of the Polemics in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*," *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula*, ed. Somaratna Balasooriya (London: Gordon Fraser, 1980), 103.

<sup>33</sup> Taishō, vol. 16 no. 670, p. 490-c.

唯願為說離有無一異俱不俱非有非無常  
無常一切外道所不行自覺聖智所行離  
妄想自相共相入於第一真實之義諸地相  
續漸次上上增進清淨之相隨人如來地相



theory of *vijñaptimātra*, was established as a later addition in the *Sagāthakam* chapter. Schmithausen supports my assumption by showing that the *Sagāthakam* chapter is a later addition to the LAS. He writes:

... the quotation at LAS 169, 3ff uses the term *vijñaptimātra*. This term is, to be sure, aberrant in LAS which prefers *cittamātra* instead; according to Suzuki's index, *vijñaptimātra* does not occur in any other place in LAS except for two passages of the *Sagāthaka* chapter which, however, does not yet form part of Guṇabhadra's version. But *vijñaptimātra* is in perfect harmony with the terminology of *Triṃśikā* where only this term is used but not *cittamātra*.<sup>34</sup>

For this reason, Āryadeva's two commentaries on the LAS must have been composed before the revival of mind-only doctrine (*vijñaptimātra*) in Mahayana Buddhism. Therefore, one can conclude that the LAS version that Āryadeva had access to in writing his commentary excluded the tenth chapter, *Sagāthakam*, which emphasizes the theory of *vijñaptimātra*. Thus, the early form of the LAS is very similar to the four-volume version of the Chinese translation.

Secondly, as mentioned above, Āryadeva in his commentaries divides the tenets of non-Buddhist schools into four categories. These four categories are the same as those found in the third chapter of the LAS. Two passages from Āryadeva's commentary illustrate this point:

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<sup>34</sup> Schmithausen (1992), 393.

Question: what are non-Buddhists' four tenets that Buddha does not teach?  
Answer: non-Buddhists' four tenets are oneness, difference, duality, and non-duality.... Those all non-Buddhists attach to impermanent entities (*dharma*s), because (they believe that) the external object exists as substance.<sup>35</sup>

Because phenomena are established by the dependent co-arising, phenomena are appeared based on the convention, but in ultimate truth, there is nothing. Non-Buddhists' discrimination is fault.<sup>36</sup>

As seen in the above quotations from Āryadeva's works, he considers the four categories of non-Buddhist viewpoints to be oneness, difference, duality, and non-duality. These four categories are also found in the third chapter of the LAS.

In a similar manner, Jñānaśrībhadrā utilizes the above four categories to explain all non-Buddhist and Hinayanist viewpoints in his commentary on the LAS which was written in the eleventh century.<sup>37</sup> In the first chapter, he gives the following explanation:

The Lord has explained the *dharma* ? with a view of *dharma* to yoga-practitioners who are non-Buddhist. In response to an argument (levelled)

<sup>35</sup> Taishō, vol. 32 no. 1639. P. 155-a.

問曰 °外道所立四宗法佛法者何者是 °答  
曰 °謂一異俱不俱 °問曰 °云何言一異俱不  
俱 °答曰 °有諸外道言 °一切法一 °有諸外道  
言 °一切法異 °有諸外道言 °一切法俱 °  
有外道言 °一切法不俱 °是諸外道於虛妄法中  
各執著 °以為實有物故

i

<sup>36</sup> Taishō, vol. 16 no. 1639. P. 155-c

以彼法相待成故依世諦虛妄分別 C第  
一義諦中無彼外道虛妄分別戲論過故 ;

<sup>37</sup> It will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.

at positions involved with speculative thought, he explains the dharma, saying [it a] without permanence, without oneness, without two, and without non-duality....These arguments, the Lord has made abundantly clear in the very *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*.<sup>38</sup>

Although Jñānaśrībhadra's approach is slightly different from Āryadeva's, they both classify all non-Buddhist viewpoints using the same four categories.

In conclusion, although the exact date of the composition of the LAS is still controversial, based on Āryadeva's two commentaries on the LAS, I have shown that the early or original form of the LAS, the four-volume version, was known to Āryadeva. However, the other two versions of the LAS, the ten-volume and the seven-volume versions, appeared after Āryadeva's time. Therefore, I propose that Vasubandhu must have utilized the latter two versions of the LAS. Whether or not he had access to the original four-volume text is not certain. Furthermore, Āryadeva and Vasubandhu examined the LAS with quite different approaches. Āryadeva studied the four-volume version of the LAS to present the doctrines of Mahayana Buddhism from an ontological

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<sup>38</sup> Jñānaśrībhadra, D: 5a and 6b: བཅོམ་ལྷན་འདས་གྱིས་ཐུ་སྟེགས་ཅན་གྱི་རྣམ་པའི་རྒྱུ་ལ་རྣམས་ལ་ཆོས་གྱི་ལྟ་བུ་ཆོས་བཤད་དོ། རྟོག་གིས་ལྟ་བུ་རྣམས་ལ་བསྟན་པའི་ལན་དུ་ཡང་རྟག་པ་དང་གཅིག་པ་དང་། གཉིས་པ་དང་། མི་གཉིས་པ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་ཆོས་འཆད་པར་མཛད་དོ། འོ་ཆོས་པ་དེ་དག་ཉིད་བཅོམ་ལྷན་འདས་གྱིས་ལང་ཁར་གསེགས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བྱ་བྱེད་གསུམ་གྱི་

See Hadano (1973), 10-11.

approach. His examination of the four-volume version of the LAS is significant because this version of the LAS contains the original teachings on the *cittramātra*. Vasubandhu, on the other hand, explored and interpreted the two latter versions of the LAS that contain the theory of mind-only (*vijñaptimātra*) from an epistemological approach.

#### IV. The Sanskrit Text and Other Translated Versions

In the previous two sections, I have discussed the textual transmission and the composition date of the LAS. In this section, I will briefly examine the contents of the Chinese and the Tibetan versions of the LAS, and compare them with the extant Sanskrit text. This section is based on the single extant Sanskrit manuscript. This manuscript is divided into ten chapters:

1. *Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā*
2. *Ṣaṭtriṃśatsāhasarasarvadharmasamuccaya*
3. *Anityatā*
4. *Abhisamaya*
5. *Tathāgatanityānitya*
6. *Kṣaṇika*
7. *Nairmāṇika*
8. *Māṃsabhakṣaṇa*
9. *Dhāraṇī*
10. *Sagāthakam*

All six versions of the LAS can be roughly divided into two categories: (1) the four-volume version, and (2) the seven- and ten-volume versions. This division is based upon the number of chapters and their contents. The first criterion for my division is the

number of chapters. The extant Sanskrit text is similar to the seven-volume version in Chinese and Tibetan. Both Chinese and Tibetan seven-volume versions contain all ten chapters of the Sanskrit text. The Chinese ten-volume version, while basically the same as the Sanskrit text, has more chapter sub-divisions in the third and the sixth chapters. However, the Chinese four-volume version combines the second through the eighth chapters into a single chapter called, “All Essential Words of the Buddha [*sarva-buddha-vacana-hṛdaya*].” This four-volume version of the Chinese translation is exactly the same as the four-volume version of the Tibetan translation. Thus, it is for this reason that the six different versions of the LAS can be divided into two categories.

The second defining criterion for my division of the six versions of the LAS into two categories is the content of the chapters. The main distinction between the four-volume version and the seven- and ten-volume versions is that while the seven- and ten-volume versions contain the following three contents, the four-volume does not. The three contents are the *Rāvaṇa* story found in the first chapter, and the *Dhāraṇī* and the *Sagāthakam* found in the last two chapters. Here, I especially pay attention to the story of *Rāvaṇa*. *Rāvaṇa* is the Lord of *Laṅkā* along with other *Yakṣas*. *Rāvaṇa* in *Laṅkā* is related to the Indian epic, the *Ramayana*.<sup>39</sup> Because of this story, it is my belief that the first chapter of the LAS was added by later Mahayanists.

I consider the first chapter to be a later addition for the following reasons. The early translations of the four-volume version into Chinese were done by Dharmarakṣa and

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<sup>39</sup> W. Buck, *Ramayana* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 294-348.

Guṇabhadra, both of whom were from central India.<sup>40</sup> In addition, as mentioned before, Bodhidharma, who transmitted the four-volume version of the LAS to China, was from southern India. It is important to note that none of these versions contain the *Rāvaṇa* story which is set in northern Indian.

The story of *Rāvaṇa* appears in the ten-volume and the seven-volume versions translated by Bodhiruci and Śikṣānanda respectively. They both come from northern Indian. Moreover, this relationship between the *Rāvaṇa* and *Ramayana* stories is mentioned in the first chapter of Jñānavajra's commentary.<sup>41</sup> Jñānavajra was a northern Indian Buddhist during the twelfth century. Thus, I think that the northern Mahayana Buddhists added this story to the first chapter.

<sup>40</sup> See Chapter One.

<sup>41</sup> Jñānavajra, D:15b 1-5, P: 18a 8-18b 4, C: 15b 2-6: །འདིར་དུང་མོང་འབལ་མི་ཀ་ལ་མོགས་པ་ཕྱི་རོལ་པ་རྣམས་  
གྱིས་ལུ་མའི་བདག་པོ་འདོད་པའི་ཡོན་ཏན་ལ་ཆེས་ལུ་ཆགས་ཤིང་རོལ་པ་མཐུ་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཉིད་དུ་རང་དགར་བརྟགས་པ་ནི་མ་  
ཡིན་ཏེ། ཇི་ལྟར་དེ་བཞིན་གསལ་གསལ་པ་ལ་རྒྱལ་པོ་ཟེས་གཙང་གི་ལྷ་མ་མ་འཛོལ་མའི་བདག་པོ་ལ་མོགས་པར་བརྟགས་པ་ནི་དེའི་  
རང་བཞིན་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་མཚུངས་མོ། གཞན་ཡང་འབལ་མི་ཀའི་ཆོག་ལ་ཡིད་ཆེས་པར་མི་དུང་གླེ་དེའི་གཙུག་ལག་ལས་ཐོན་  
གྱི་དུས་ལུ་ཐུབ་འཇུག་གི་ཕྱོགས་ལུ་གཏོགས་པ་རྒྱ་མ་ཆམ་འདོད་འཕྱོགས་གྱི་ཐེ་ལ་དམག་དངས་པ་ན། རྒྱ་མ་ཆའི་ཕྱོགས་ལུ་  
གཏོགས་པའི་གླུ་ཁུའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་རྣམས་མིན་པའི་ཕྱོགས་གྱིས་དུམ་ལུང་བརྟགས་པ་<sup>1</sup>བརྒྱ་ཕྱིན་ལྟའི་དབང་པོའི་རྫོན་ལམ་གྱིས་མེས་  
པར་གྱུར་ཅིང་གཞོན་ཕྱིན་དང་མིན་པའི་ཕྱོགས་མཚོན་གྱིས་རྣམས་པ་<sup>2</sup>རྣམས་ནི་གི་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ་ཞེས་རྣམས་པ་ལ། དེ་ནི་མི་འམད་  
དེ། དེ་ལྟ་ན་དུས་འགའ་ཞིག་གི་ཆོ་བརྒྱ་ཕྱིན་རང་ཡང་མིན་པོས་བརྟུང་མིང་བཅིངས་ན། དེའི་རྫོན་ལམ་གྱིས་མིན་པོ་རྣམས་ཅིའི་  
ཕྱིར་ཐོག་མ་ཉིད་དུ་མི་གཞེད་དེ། དེས་ན་དེའི་ཆོག་ནི་བཟུན་པའོ།

1. P. བརྟགས་པ་ 2. P. རྣམས་པ་

Due to the lack of information about the Sanskrit texts used by Indian Buddhists, it is difficult to determine the exact number of Sanskrit texts that were originally composed. The uncertainty of the number of Sanskrit texts was and continues to be a problem for the Chinese Buddhist scholars. Between the first appearance of the first Chinese translation of the LAS and its last translation is about three hundred years. When the last Chinese translation appeared during the Tang dynasty, there was a huge controversy over the number of original Sanskrit texts. This problem is discussed by Fazang in his commentary.<sup>42</sup> Fazang writes in his introduction to his commentary that the Tang version was translated by comparing seven different versions of the LAS: five different Sanskrit versions of the LAS and two Chinese translations. Empress Wu (d. 705), in contrast, in her preface to the seven-volume Chinese version of the LAS,<sup>43</sup> states that there are three version of the original Sanskrit texts [san ben].” However, scholars are uncertain as to what Empress Wu’s phrase “three books means.” In other words, it can be assumed that several different Sanskrit manuscript existed during the Tang dynasty.

I believe that there were three different Sanskrit manuscripts originally rather than five. This is because, if five different Sanskrit versions circulated in China at that time, then Chinese Buddhist scholars would have attempted to translate them into Chinese. Furthermore, if these texts or manuscripts existed, they would have been mentioned in other texts. To date, scholars have not been able to find any evidence of translations of

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<sup>42</sup> Taisho, vol. 39 no 1790, p. 425.

<sup>43</sup> Taisho, vol. 16 no 672, p. 587.  
三本之要詮 ° 成七卷之了教

any other versions or of any historical records of them. This raises the question of which texts Fazang was referring to when he mentioned the five Sanskrit manuscripts. I think that he probably meant five different manuscripts, rather than five different Sanskrit versions. Based on the fact that Empress Wu only mentions three books, I conclude that there were at least three different Sanskrit versions during the Tang dynasty.

At this point, I will take another approach to resolve several issues related to the Sanskrit version of the LAS. Jñānaśrībhaddra and Jñānavajra's commentaries on the LAS were composed during the eleventh and twelfth centuries either in northern India or in Tibet. In order to compare the root texts to these commentaries one must know the Sanskrit texts at that time or from an earlier period. Similar to Hadano's assumption,<sup>44</sup> I conclude that both Jñānaśrībhaddra and Jñānavajra's commentaries are based on the seven-volume version translated in Tibetan. Furthermore, I conclude that the third and sixth chapters follow the same chapter divisions as the ten-volume version in the Chinese translation. Although the two Indian commentators use the seven-volume version of the Tibetan translation as their root text, due to the fact that this was the only translation available in Tibetan at that time, they also knew the ten-volume version of the Sanskrit text. This knowledge is reflected in their works. If these two Indian commentators knew about the ten-volume version of the LAS, then we can assume that there were at least three different Sanskrit versions in India at that time.

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<sup>44</sup> Hadano (1973), 75.



## V. The Primary Textual Form of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* in Relation to the Three Additional Chapters

The two categories of the LAS will be analyzed in this section: (1) the four-volume version, and (2) the seven- and the ten-volume version. The main distinction between these categories is whether or not the additional three chapters--chapters one, nine, and ten--are included. My main focus in this section is to define the primary textual form of the LAS in relation to the three additional chapters--chapters one, nine, and ten. I will clarify the main structure of the LAS and its main teachings.

My basic assumption is that the main body of the LAS consists of the entire four-volume version of the Chinese translation. This LAS version contains the *Māṃsabhakṣaṇa* (the prohibition on eating-meat) chapter. I believe that the three remaining chapters, the *Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā*, the *Dhāraṇī*, and the *Sagāthakam*, are all later additions. My hypothesis is based on the fact that while Jñānaśrībhadrā comments on the first six chapters and briefly touches on the *Nairmāṇika* and the *Māṃsabhakṣaṇa* chapters, he does not comment on the *Dhāraṇī*, chapter 9, or the *Sagāthakam*, chapter 10. Although Jñānaśrībhadrā does not mention the *Sagāthakam* chapter in his commentary, he does quote some verses from the *Sagāthakam* chapter.

Moreover, Jñānavajra comments on this entire sūtra, which is the same root text on which Jñānaśrībhadrā's commentary is based. In the first chapter, he clearly mentions that the main body of this sūtra consists of eight chapters:<sup>45</sup>

These establish the body of the sutra after the introduction was taught previously; further, while the sutra is taught by means of eight chapters, their summaries are four-fold: [1] To show in detail all knowable object, [2] their summary that the nature of mind is either *tathāgatagarbha* or *gotratā* itself, [3] to show the particular of the path, the realization purifies defilement[s] of that very (*garbha* or *gotra*) and [4] the preliminary and ultimate results, the attainment of purity by having purified (that). From among these four, the first is the chapter of Buddha having been petitioned by Rāvaṇa; it too shows the very nature of object of knowledge.

According to the two commentators, the main body of the LAS is from the first chapter up to, and including, the eighth chapter, the *Māṃsabhakṣaṇa*. These two commentators agree that the main body of the LAS, and their interpretations of the main body of this sutra, are similar to those of the four-volume version. When one compares their interpretation of the main body of the LAS to the four-volume version, one discovers that

<sup>45</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 12a-8- 12b-2, P: 14b-5-15a-1, C: 12b-1-12b-3:

འདི་རྣམས་ཀྱིས། བོ་སྤང་གཏེན་གཞི་བསྐྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུ  
 པ་མཛོད་ཀྱིས་ཀླུ་མ་པར་འཁོར་པ་གྲོ་དེ་པར་ཡེ་ལྷུ་མ་པ་བསྐྱེད་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ལ་དེ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དོན་བསྐྱེད་པ་མཇུག་པ་བསྐྱེ  
 གྲོ་ལེས་པར་ལུ་བའི་དོན་ཀླུ་མ་པར་བསྐྱེད་པ་དང་དེ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དོན་བསྐྱེད་པ་མཇུག་ཀྱི་ཆོས་ཉིད་དེ་བཞིན་གཤམས་པའི་ཉིད་དེ  
 འཕམ་པའི་ཆོས་ཉིད་མཇུག་པར་བསྐྱེད་པ་དང་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཉི་མ་ཆོས་པར་གྲོ་པ་མཛོད་པར་རྟོགས་པ་འཕམ་ཀྱི་ལུ་ལུག་བསྐྱེད་པ་དང་  
 རྒྱུ་ལ་པར་རྣམས་པར་དག་པ་མོས་པ་གཙམ་རྩམས་དང་མཚན་ལུག་པའི་འཇུག་ལུག་ཉིད་ལས་དང་དེ་མཛོད་འཇུག་ཀྱིས་གཞོན་པ་  
 བདེན་པའི་ཡེ་ལུ་གྲོ་ལེས་ཀླུ་མ་པར་ལུ་བའི་དང་བཞིན་ཉིད་ཆོས་རྟོ་། ་P. ཨི

the first chapter, the *Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā*, exists as a part of the main body of their commentaries, but is not included in the four-volume version of the Chinese translation. This is because these two Indian commentators wrote their commentaries based on the later version of the LAS. For this reason, I conclude that the four-volume version of the Chinese translation is close to the primary textual form of the LAS.

Takasaki,<sup>46</sup> in his careful analysis of the LAS based on Shiren's (1287-1346) commentary<sup>47</sup> on the four-volume version, concludes that the primary text of the LAS is similar to the four-volume version of the Chinese translation:

It would be allowable to suppose that the *Sagāthakam* and the main body of the *Laṅkāvatāra* were different texts in the beginning – different texts from the same source materials. Development took place in both independently until finally they were combined into one volume.<sup>48</sup>

Suzuki also believes that the *Sagāthakam* chapter, the tenth chapter, is an independent text that was later added to the main body of the LAS.<sup>49</sup> He indicates that the *Sagāthakam* chapter consists of a total of 884 verses, of which more than 200 verses are from the main body of the LAS. Therefore, the remaining 680 verses in this chapter are later additions. According to Takasaki's detailed analysis shows that the two hundred

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<sup>46</sup> Takasaki (1980), 339-352.

<sup>47</sup> Takasaki (1980), 34: Shiren whose commentary is divided into two parts. The first part of his commentary is a summary of first 108 pādas of the LAS. In the second part of his commentary, Shiren discusses the remainder of the LAS by dividing it into 86 divisions including the portion corresponding to the *Māṃsabhakṣaṇa* chapter; see Suzuki (1968), 43-44 and 64.

<sup>48</sup> Takasaki (1980), 345.

verses of the tenth chapter are drawn mainly from the second and third chapters, while a few verses are from various other chapters. Nevertheless, although in different styles, the function of these two additional chapters, the first chapter, the *Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā*, and the tenth chapter, the *Sagāthakam*, is to summarize the main body of the LAS. Unlike Suzuki and Takasaki, I do not believe that the main body of the LAS and the *Sagāthakam* chapter were originally different texts.

My main focus, here, is to shed insight the relationships between the main body of the LAS and two of the three additional chapters--chapter one, *Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā*, and chapter ten, the *Sagāthakam*. I will not cover the ninth chapter, the *Dhāraṇī* chapter. The first chapter, *Rāvaṇādhyeṣaṇā*, and the last chapter, *Sagāthakam*, were probably added sometime between Guṇabhadra's translation in 443 A.D. and Bodhiruci's translation in 513 A.D. During this period of Indian Buddhism, the two main Mahayana schools, the Madhyamaka school and the Yogārāca school, co-existed in harmony and were beginning to develop new interpretations of the Mahayana tenets. Much of this development was based on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. It should be taken into account, however, that in general, Chinese translations of Mahayana Buddhist texts were introduced a few decades later than the original Sanskrit texts. At any rate, the additional chapters were composed in India around the late fourth century A.D. or at the beginning of the fifth century.

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<sup>49</sup> Suzuki (1968), 21.

As noted above in Jñānavajra's quotation, the subject of the first chapter deals with the essence of object of knowledge (*jñeya*). This is the first of the four aspects of the LAS. In other words, based on Jñānavajra's interpretation, I believe that the first chapter is a summary of the second chapter. At the beginning of the third chapter, I think that Jñānavajra introduces the other three aspects of the LAS:

In that (connection), [1] the remaining chapters, too, show (the sutra) in detail by means of existence of the knowable, the objectivity that includes all phenomena, [2] the very essence of these, that which is the *tathāgatagarbha*, [3] the path which purifies it, and [4] the result which is attained by means of the path; (and) removing the [counter] arguments these four, etc.<sup>50</sup>

However, Suzuki argues that the first chapter is a summary of the main body of the LAS rather than a summary of the second chapter.<sup>51</sup> In my opinion, the first chapter summarizes the second chapter because according to the title of the second chapter, it deals with all *dharma*s. The *tathāgatagarbha* is mentioned at the end of the first chapter of Jñānavajra's commentary, but he offers no explanation of the *tathāgatagarbha* until the

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<sup>50</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 186b-7-187a-1, P: 214a-5-214a-7, C: 191a-7-191b-2: དེ་ལ་ལེན་ལྟ་ན་མ་འདི་རྣམས་གྱིས་ཀྱང་  
 ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་བརྒྱུས་པའི་དོན་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བའི་གནས་དང་དེ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པའི་རྣམ་པོར་འགྱུར་  
 པ་དང་དེ་སྦྱོར་བར་བྱེད་པའི་ལམ་དང་ལམ་གྱིས་ཐོབ་པར་བྱ་བའི་འབྲས་བུ་སྟེ་བཞི་པོ་དེ་རྣམས་ཉིད་རྟོག་པ་<sup>1</sup> སྤངས་པ་ལ་<sup>2</sup>  
 མེགས་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་རྒྱས་པར་སྟོན་ཏེ་

1. P. བརྟན་པ་ C. རྟོན་པ་ 2. P. no ལ་

<sup>51</sup> Suzuki (1968), 20 and 65. He provides English translation in his *Studies* because he thinks that the first chapter is a summary of the LAS, pp. 65-85.

beginning of the third chapter of his commentary. The main idea of the last paragraph of the first chapter is that, at the time of abandoning *dharma* and *adharma*, one obtains Oneness and *Samadhi*, after which one enters into the essence of *tathāgata*.<sup>52</sup> Jñānavajra also mentions the essence of *tathāgata* at the end of the first chapter, but he offers no commentary concerning it.<sup>53</sup> Consequently, it is my belief that the main goal of the second chapter is to explain how one obtains the highest truth, the so-called essence of *tathāgata* or inner realization, by means of the knowledge of the nature of all *dharma*s.

The author of the first chapter attempts to present the essential meaning of the second chapter utilizing a dialogue between Buddha and *Rāvaṇa*. In the *Sagāthakam* chapter of both the seven-volume and the ten-volume versions of the Chinese translation, the *Rāvaṇa* is mentioned at the end of the ten-volume version, but it is not mentioned in the seven-volume version at all. Because the original Sanskrit text of the ten-volume version does not exist today, I used the extant Sanskrit text of the seven-volume version

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<sup>52</sup> *atha svavikalpayanti puṣṇanti na praśamaṃ pratilabhante/ eka-agrasya-etad-adhivacanam---  
tathāgata-garbha-svapratyātma-ārya-jñāna-gocarasya-etat-praveśo yat-samādhiḥ paramo jāyata iti//*

ཆེས་དང་ཆེས་མེད་པར་རྒྱལ་པར་རྟོག་ཅིང་། ཆེས་དང་ཆེས་མེད་པ་སྤོང་བ་ལ་མི་སྤྱོད་དེ་སྤྱོད་དོ། ། རྒྱལ་པར་རྟོག་གོ། རྒྱལ་པར་བྱེད་དོ། ། རབ་དུ་མི་མི་  
འཛོལ་དོ། ། འདི་ནི་ཕྱེ་གཅིག་པའི་ཆོག་སྤྲད་གསལ་ཏེ། འདི་ནི་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པའི་རྟིང་པོ་བདག་གི་འཕགས་པ་མེས་རབ་གི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་སྤྱོད་ལུ་པ་  
དུ་འཇུག་པའི་ཕྱིར་མཆོག་གི་དྲིང་པེ་འཛིན་སྤྱོད་པོ། ། འཕྲོད་སྤྱོད་གསལ་གྱིས་གསོལ་བ་བདད་པའི་ལུ་སྤྱོད་དང་པོ་དོ། །

<sup>53</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 62b-2-3, P: 72b-1-2, C: 62b-3-4: དེ་ལྟར་སྟོན་པའི་གཞུང་འདི་ཆོག་ཕྱེ་གཅིག་པ་སྤྱེ་རེས་པ་དོན་གྱི་  
མདོ་ལྟེན་ཏེ་ལ་བཞིན་ནས་མོས་པ་དང་བསམ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་མེགས་པའི་རིམ་གྱིས་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པའི་རྟིང་པོ་ལ་འཇུག་  
ཅེས་པ་སྤྱེ་ཤེས་པར་ཟད་དོ།

of the Chinese translation. Consequently, the *Sagāthakam* chapter does not contain the *Rāvaṇa* story that is found in the first chapter. Therefore, these two additional chapters, chapter one and chapter ten, are excluded. I strongly believe that these two chapters were added not only at different times, but also by different Buddhist schools. In my opinion, the first chapter was composed by Madhyamaka thinkers, especially the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, while the tenth chapter, *Sagāthakam*, was composed by the Yogācāra thinkers. The Yogācāra school and the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school arose around the third and the fifth century respectively. Based on my research, these two chapters were also composed and added to the LAS during the fifth centuries.

## Chapter 2

### The Identities of Jñānaśrībhaddra and Jñānavajra

#### 2-1. On Jñānaśrībhaddra and Jñānavajra

##### I. Introduction

Although not well known by modern Buddhist scholars, Jñānaśrībhaddra of Kashmir (ca. 11<sup>th</sup> century A.D.) and Jñānavajra (ca. late 11<sup>th</sup> or early 12<sup>th</sup> century A.D.) were monk-scholars of the LAS. In addition to his commentary on the LAS, Jñānaśrībhaddra also wrote a commentary on Maitreyanātha's *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* entitled, the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkārapīṇḍārtha*, and one on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, which is called, *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*. Jñānaśrībhaddra was an exponent of the Yogācāra school which was founded by Asaṅga in fourth century India. He was also a follower of the school of Buddhist logic and epistemology, established in India by Dignāga (ca. 6<sup>th</sup> century A.D.) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 7<sup>th</sup> century A.D.). Furthermore, we can assume that Jñānavajra belonged to the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school during the early twelfth century, due to the fact that the content of his commentary on the LAS relied on the philosophical methods of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. The personal and philosophical backgrounds of Jñānaśrībhaddra and Jñānavajra have yet to be thoroughly uncovered. Since there are not a lot of information on their life and scholarship, I will explore these areas by focusing on



their relationship with other Indian Buddhists, and their commentaries preserved in Tibetan.

Due to the lack of traditional accounts regarding the history of Indian Buddhism, biographical information about later eminent Indian Buddhist scholars also needs to be investigated, especially in relation to Tibetan historical materials. From the eighth through the twelfth centuries, Indian Buddhists were involved in the transmission of Buddhism into Tibet. Based upon modern scholarship on Jñānaśrībhadra,<sup>1</sup> we know that he was a famous Buddhist logician who was educated in Kashmir during the rule of King Harṣadeva. While in Tibet he was connected to the so-called “Old Epistemology” school (*tshad ma rnying ma*), originally established by Rma Lo tsā ba Dge ba'i blo gros (ca. 1020-1080), in the middle of the eleventh century. Taking a slightly different approach in this chapter, I will investigate Jñānaśrībhadra's identity by two means: first, by studying his relationship with other eleventh century Buddhist logicians in India, and secondly, by examining his connection to early Tibetan Buddhists.

Unlike Jñānaśrībhadra, the identity of Jñānavajra is difficult to ascertain. His name has only come down to us in a Tibetan translation: “Ye shes rdo rje.” In Sanskrit, this name would read “Jñānavajra.” Jñānavajra's nationality is uncertain because of a lack of biographical information and due to the fact that his commentary, preserved only in the Tibetan canon, does not contain the translator's name in the colophon. His only work known to us is *Tathāgatahṛdayālamkāra*, his commentary on the LAS found in the

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<sup>1</sup> Hadano (1975), 82, van der Kuijp (1989), 19, and Naudou (1980), 221-227.

Tibetan canon. In all colophons, this work is ascribed to Ye shes rdo rje who, they say, was a “Chinese abbot” (*rgya 'i mkhan po*). I believe there is plenty of evidence in the text itself to show that this colophon is incorrect. He was an Indian, and not a Chinese scholar. I hope to resolve the issue of Jñānavajra’s nationality by utilizing the contents of his commentary. Because Jñānavajra cites Jñānaśrībhadrā in his commentary on the LAS, it can be assumed that Jñānavajra lived later than Jñānaśrībhadrā.

## II. On Jñānaśrībhadrā

Because only a scant amount of biographical information on Jñānaśrībhadrā’s life is available to us, not much about the period in which he lived can be known for certain. The earliest account of Jñānaśrībhadrā appears in ‘Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal’s (1392-1482) *The Blue Annals* and Tāranātha’s (1575-1634) *History of Buddhism in India*. Modern scholars have been unable to ascertain Jñānaśrībhadrā’s date of birth,<sup>2</sup> but it is clear that he flourished during the eleventh century. Hadano, after examining the Tibetan historical materials, notes:

It would certainly be amiss to place the period of his [Jñānaśrībhadrā’s] activities somewhere in the middle to the late years of the eleventh century A.D., in view of the above-mentioned people, such as Sajjana, Rma Dge ba’i blo ‘gros, Khyung po Chos kyi brtson ‘grus, and Khyung po Grags seng, who surrounded him.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Chattopadhyaya (1990), 430-431 and Roerich (1996), 70 and 355.

<sup>3</sup> Hadano (1975), 84.

Hadano's major criterion revolves around the Tibetan Buddhist religious council of 1076 A.D., which was sponsored by King Mnga' bdag Rtse lde in Tibet. Hadano also mentions other council participants, some of whom included Jñānaśrībhadrā's name in their biographical works about eleventh century Tibetan Buddhist scholars who were studying in northern India. Naudou places his floruit during the reign of king Kalaṣa and Harṣadeva.

However, there is still a point of difficulty regarding the details of Jñānaśrībhadrā's life. Tāranātha exacerbated the already controversial details of Jñānaśrībhadrā's biography by stating that Jñānaśrībhadrā was one of the four major followers of Suvarṇadvīpa (Dharmakīrti or Dharmapāla).<sup>4</sup> This observation presents further confusion in that Jñānaśrīmītra was one of Dharmapāla's disciples in Vikramaśīla monastery, while Jñānaśrībhadrā was a Buddhist logician in Kashmir.<sup>5</sup> Because of the discrepancies concerning this issue I will look more closely at Jñānaśrībhadrā's career as a Buddhist logician.

During the tenth and the eleventh centuries, the cities of Kashmir and Magadha, both located in northern India, were appropriate places for the study of Buddhism, especially for the study of Buddhist logic and Madhyamaka thought. In *The Religions of*

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<sup>4</sup> Chattopadhyaya, (1970), 430:

The great Paṇḍita Jñānaśrī of Kashmir who went to Tibet without having been invited. Sum-pa 118 mentions Jñānaśrī as one of the four eminent disciples of the guru of Suvarṇadvīpa (Dharmakīrti or Dharmapāla)

<sup>5</sup> H. Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism A Survey with Bibliographical Notes*, Intercultural Research Institute Monograph, no. 9 (Hirakata: KUFS Publication, 1980), 309.

*Tibet*, Tucci emphasizes the influence of Kashmir in the development of early Tibetan Buddhism:

Ye shes 'od chose several youths and sent them to Kashmir to study the Buddhist teachings. One of these youths was later to become prominent under the name of Rin chen bzang po (958-1055). Kashmir was an appropriate place not only because of its nearness, but also because the last splendor of Buddhist schools then held sway there, and famous religious teachers preserved both the speculative and logical tradition, and the practice of tantra and ritual.<sup>6</sup>

In addition, Naudou also stresses the importance of Kashmir by dividing the relationship between Kashmirian Buddhist teachers and Tibetan Buddhists into two periods:

1. Buddhists in Kashmir and the activity of Kashmiri Buddhists in Tibet at the beginning of the seventh century until the persecution by Glang dar ma.
2. The contribution of Kashmir to the second propagation of the doctrine and, in particular, her role in diffusion of logic and of the Vajrayana.<sup>7</sup>

From the biography of Atiśa, we know that during the eleventh century in Vikramaśīla monastery, there were three Buddhist logicians: Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrīmitra, and Ratnakīrti. According to Kajiyama's work,<sup>8</sup> when Atiśa stayed in Vikramaśīla monastery, he studied Buddhist logic with Dharmapāla's disciples, such as

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<sup>6</sup> G. Tucci, *The Religions of Tibet*, tr. Geoffrey Samuel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 27.

<sup>7</sup> Naudou (1980), 27.

<sup>8</sup> Y. Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy* (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien 1998), 6-8.

Ratnākaraśānti, Jñānaśrīmitra, and Ratnakīrti. Around 1041, when Atiśa left Vikramaśīla monastery and traveled to Tibet, Ratnākaraśānti was the chief abbot in Vikramaśīla monastery. Kajiyama<sup>9</sup> suggests that these three Buddhist logicians were active early to mid eleventh century. He also notes that, in their texts on logic, they frequently mention the ideas of contemporary Buddhist and non-Buddhist logicians. To date, Jñānaśrībhadra's name is not mentioned in the works of any of these logicians. I believe that this strongly indicates that Jñānaśrībhadra was not their contemporary, but instead wrote later in the eleventh century.

Jñānaśrībhadra's move to Tibet was recorded in the history of Indian Buddhism, mainly in the *The Blue Annals*.<sup>10</sup> While living in Tibet, Jñānaśrībhadra translated his own commentaries, the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkārapañcārtha* and the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, into Tibetan with the assistance of the translator Khyung po Chos kyi brtson 'grus. He also translated Dharmakīrti's *Vādanīyā* with the help of Rma Lo tsā ba.<sup>11</sup> Because of these translations, I think that Jñānaśrībhadra worked in Tibet with some Tibetan logicians. As a result, he was called "Mahāpañcārtha" or "Kashmirian pañcārtha" by Tibetan Buddhists.

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<sup>9</sup> Y. Kajiyama, *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy* (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien 1998), 1-13 and *The Antaryāptisamarthana of Ratnākaraśānti* (Tokyo: The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology Soka University, 1999), 1-39.

<sup>10</sup> Roerich (1996), 355:

...Later, when the Kashmirian Jñānaśrī came to Tibet, he took up residence at Chos 'khor Ta bo (in Spiti). After three years' stay, this Pañcārtha learned to speak Tibetan, and Gñāl studied under him for three years.

<sup>11</sup> Hadano (1975), 78.

Unlike Atiśa whose dates are well known, there is no traditional account of when Jñānaśrībhadra moved to Tibet. At this point I must clarify some of the dates which I have already discussed. While studying Buddhist logic and Madhyamaka ideas, Rngog Lo tsā ba Blo lden ses rab (1059-1109)<sup>12</sup> resided in Kashmir from 1076 until 1092; and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, born in 1055, lived and studied in Kashmir for 23 years, sometime between the late eleventh and the early twelfth century. Both of the Tibetan Buddhist scholars mentioned above, did not cite Jñānaśrībhadra's activities during their time spent in Kashmir. In addition, Naudou suggests that Jñānaśrībhadra's career preceded the arrival of Rngog Lo tsā ba and Nyi ma grags.<sup>13</sup>

Based on Rngog Lo tsā ba's biography, the most plausible theory is that Jñānaśrībhadra left Kashmir for Tibet just after Rngog Lo tsā ba had arrived in Kashmir in 1076; and, by the time Rngog Lo tsā ba returned to Tibet in 1092, after 17 years of study in Kashmir, Jñānaśrībhadra had already passed away. In Tibetan Buddhism, the "New Epistemology" (*tshad ma gsar ma*) was founded after Rngog Lo tsā ba returned to Tibet in 1092. Therefore, since Jñānaśrībhadra's translations contributed to the "Old Epistemology" school in Tibetan Buddhism, he obviously lived in Tibet between 1076 and 1080. Taking into account all the currently existing historical materials found in both

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<sup>12</sup> D. Jackson, "An early biography of Rngog Lo tsā ba Blo lden ses rab," *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 6<sup>th</sup> Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies* (Oslo: Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1994), 372-392.

<sup>13</sup> Naudou (1980), 227.

Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, I can say with a large degree of certainty that Jñānaśrībhadrā's date of birth is sometime between 1020-1080.

Based on L. W. J. van der Kuijp's periodicization of the Tibetan Epistemology school, both of the old and the new belong to the pre-classical period.<sup>14</sup> Although Jñānaśrībhadrā is connected to the "Old Epistemology" school in Tibetan Buddhism,<sup>15</sup> his educational lineage is continuously connected to the "New Epistemology" school. Onoda<sup>16</sup> points out that, during the time of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169), there existed both old and new epistemology schools in the gSang phu ne'u thog monastery. After returning from Kashmir in 1092, this is the monastery where Rngog Lo tsā ba wrote many Buddhist commentaries.

A parallel to Jñānaśrībhadrā's educational background appears in Gser mdog Paṇ chen's brief biography of Rngog Lo tsā ba, considered to be the founder of the "New Epistemology" school in Tibetan Buddhism.<sup>17</sup> During his 17 years in India, Rngog Lo tsā ba studied the seven works of Dharmakīrti and the five works of Maitreyaṇātha. *The Blue Annals* contains a short biography of Rngog Lo tsā ba, but there is no detailed

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<sup>14</sup> van der Kuijp (1989), 9-19.

<sup>15</sup> Detailed information concerning Tibetan scholars and their works during the early period of the Tibetan Epistemology school are found in the works of L. W. J. van der Kuijp, D. P. Jackson and S. Onoda. See L. W. J. van der Kuijp, *Contributions to the development of Tibetan Buddhist epistemology: From the eleventh to the thirteenth century*, Alt-und Neu-Indische Studien 26 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983), 29-96 and 268-300, D. Jackson, *The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III): Sa-skyā paṇḍita on Indian and Tibetan traditions of pramāṇa and philosophical debate*, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 17 (1987), 165-171 and S. Onoda, *The primary Course in Tibetan Monastic Universities*, *Tōyō Gakujutsu Kenkyū* 21-2 (1982): 193-203.

<sup>16</sup> Onoda (1982), 193-194.

<sup>17</sup> van der Kuijp (1983), 33.

information regarding his studies. Only mention is made that while in Kashmir, he was the attendant of six teachers, including the paṇḍita Sajjana and Parahitabhadra. However, after returning to Tibet, he composed commentaries and taught logic (*tshad ma*), the Five Treatises of Maitreyañātha (*byams chos sde lñā*), the Mādhyamika doctrine, and other texts.<sup>18</sup> I think that we can infer about his studies in Kashmir by noting his activities in Tibet. However, to determine the doctrinal relationship between Jñānaśrībhadra and Tibetan Buddhist scholars, we need a closer investigation of Tibetan works during the early stages of the Tibetan Epistemology school.

### III. On Jñānavajra

I now turn to the question of the identity of Jñānavajra, which can be inferred from his LAS commentary and his relation to Jñānaśrībhadra. Jñānavajra was a commentator on the LAS who came from India. Jñānavajra's commentary contains quotations from Jñānaśrībhadra's commentary. For example:

Furthermore, since the learned Ācārya Jñānaśrībhadra has stated the connectedness of this very sutra, do not doubt (this).<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Roerich (1996), 325-326.

<sup>19</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 50a-3, P: 51a-4, C: 50a-3: གཞན་ཡང་མང་དུ་ཆོས་པའི་སྒྲིབ་དཔོན་ཡི་ཤེས་དཔལ་བཟང་པོས་མདོ་རྩེ་  
འདི་ཉིད་ཀྱི་འཕྲེལ་པར་གསུངས་བས་ཐེ་ཆོས་མི་བྱུངོ། This is the first of a number of times that Jñānavajra refers  
to Jñānaśrībhadra. The term '*bre/ pa*' suggests the text's philosophical connectedness.



This quote serves as an evidence that Jñānavajra wrote his work after Jñānaśrībhadrā. There is not, however, any information about his date of birth. Based on my previous assumption in the second section, namely that Jñānaśrībhadrā probably lived between 1020 and 1080, I conclude that Jñānavajra's date of birth or the period in which he lived was during the late eleventh and the early twelfth century, or 1050-1110.

Despite the lack of biographical data, we can assume that Jñānavajra belongs to the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school's philosophical lineage. Especially, he belongs to the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school since he relies heavily on Kamalaśīla's ideas. When Jñānavajra explains the argument of one and many in his work, he states that "it is said like what was taught from the master Kamalaśīla."<sup>20</sup> In addition, in his commentary, he applies the probative syllogism (*\*svatantra hetu*) to his argument:

Therefore, if by means of a probative syllogism (*\*svatantra hetu*), the cessation [of a belief in things] is made understood for oneself or others, in this case, the subject is the subject when it appears commonly to the opponent and proponent for denying the external object such as form etc.

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<sup>20</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 42a-7-42b-2, P: 48b-5-49a-1, C: 42a-5-7: གཏན་ཚིགས་སྟུང་བའི་ཚུལ་ཡང་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་  
 དང་ལུ་པའི་ངོ་བོ་དེ་ནི་སྟུང་མ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་སྟུང་མའི་སྒྲུང་པོ་ལ་མེགས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། གཟུགས་ལ་མེགས་པའི་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་  
 རྒྱུ་པ་སྒྲུང་བ་ཡང་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་དང་ལུ་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བ་སྟེ། རང་བཞིན་གྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལས་རྒྱུ་གངས་  
 གྱིམ་ན་ཁྱེད་བྱེད་མི་དཔེགས་པར་ཡང་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ཇི་སྐད་དུ་སྟོབ་དཔོན་ཁ་མ་ལ་གྱི་ལས་བཀའ་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། གལ་ཏེ་འདིར་སྟུང་  
 མའི་སྒྲུང་པོ་ལ་མེགས་པ་ནི་རྒྱུ་པར་ཞེས་པའི་ངོ་བོ་བདེན་པས། དཔེ་མ་གྱལ་པོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ལྟར་བདེན་པ་ཉིད་ནི་འོག་ནས་འཁོག་  
 པར་འགྱུར་མོད་གྱི། འདིར་ནི་རེ་ཞིག་དེ་ལྟར་སྒྲུང་བ་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དཔོན་པོར་གཞན་པའི་ཆ་ནས་བདེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དེ་འདྲ་  
 བའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མས་སྟུང་པ་ཉིད་དཔེར་བྱེད་པའོ།

The mere appearance established by the valid cognition of the direct perception etc. is liberated the fault of it being a non-established subject.<sup>21</sup>

Hadano has also observed:

The *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* corresponds completely to the Tibetan translation of the *Āryalaṅkāvatarasūtra* (Toh. 107), and it takes the standpoint that the myriad pure and defiled dharmas are all manifestations of mind (*citta*), that they are not different to mind, and that they are mind-itself, in other words, the standpoint of the *Rnam par rig pa tsam gyi dbu ma* (*vijñapti-mātrika-mādhyamika*) which considers *saṃvṛtti* and *paramārtha* as two sides of the same coin, and discards duality.<sup>22</sup>

Let us examine the term “*rnam par rig pa tsam gyi dbu ma* (*vijñapti-mātrika-mādhyamika*)” in the above quotation. In Jñānavajra’s first chapter,<sup>23</sup> as mentioned above, he refers to himself as one who practices ‘cognitive centrism’ (*rnam rig dbu ma, vijñaptimadhyama*), thereby revealing his philosophical identity with the notion of mind-only. Ruegg<sup>24</sup> and Kajiyama<sup>25</sup> reveal that throughout the history of Indian

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<sup>21</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 38a-7-38b-1, P: 44a-5-7, C: 38a-6-7: དེས་ན་རང་གི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཆོག་ལས་ཀྱིས་རང་ཉིད་དམ་གཞན་  
དག་ལ་དགག་པ་རྟོགས་པར་བྱེད་པ་ནི་འདིར་ཆོས་ཅན་ནི་གཞུགས་ལ་མེགས་པ་ལྟེ་རྟོག་ཆད་པའི་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་དང་ཕྱིར་  
རྟོག་པ་ལ་མེགས་པ་ལ་མཐུན་པར་སྒྲུབ་པ་ནི་ཆོས་ཅན་ཏེ། ལྟར་ཆོད་ཅིང་མཐོང་ལ་མེགས་པའི་ཆོད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན་  
མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཉེས་པ་ལས་ཐྱོད་པ་ལོ།

1. P. ཅིང་དུ་

<sup>22</sup> Hadano (1975), 85.

<sup>23</sup> See note. 40.

<sup>24</sup> D. Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 122. Ruegg indicates that \**vijñaptimadhyamaka* is a unique theory in

Buddhism, to date, the word \**vijñaptimādhyama* appears only in Ratnākaraśānti's works. Ratnākaraśānti, in the eleventh century, wrote several Buddhist commentaries from the perspective of \**vijñaptimādhyama*. In later Indian Buddhism, the above word is considered to be an epithet for the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school.

Even though Jñānavajra utilizes the term *rnam rig dbu ma*, he does not entirely follow Ratnākaraśānti's idea. This is because in the beginning of his commentary he mentions his opponents:

So, also to say that those who claim specifically the color-form aggregates that derived from elements, the essence of the external (world) and those who speak of the mere cognition is false deal with what does not exist, is not correct; (this) will be shown below.<sup>26</sup>

In fact, Ruegg indicates that Ratnākaraśānti is considered to hold the *Alīkāṅgavāda* position.<sup>27</sup> Although it is not clear that Jñānavajra held the *Sākāravāda* position only from the above quotation, it can be assumed that he rejected the *Alīkāṅgavāda* position

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Ratnākaraśānti's work.

<sup>25</sup> Kajiyama (1998), 1-13.

<sup>26</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 2b-3-2b-4, P: 3a-1-3a-2, C: 2b-3-2b-4: དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་རོ་བོ་འབྱུང་བ་ལས་གྱུར་པའི་གཞུགས་གྱི་ཕུང་པོ་ལ་<sup>1</sup> ཁྱད་པར་དུ་འདོད་པ་དང་རྣམ་པར་རིག་པ་ཙམ་དུ་སྒྲ་བ་རྣམ་པ་བརྟུན་པར་འདོད་པ་གང་དག་འདི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་སྒྲ་བ་ཡང་མི་འབྲས་<sup>2</sup> རོ་འོག་ནས་བསྟན་པར་བྱའོ།

1. P. སྒྲ་བ་ 2. P. མེད་

<sup>27</sup> Ruegg (1981), 122-123.

in his work. Thus, I believe that he definitely follows the lineage of Kamalaśīla because he relies on Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka*, and also he is one among the \**vijñaptimadhyama*'s philosophers of late eleventh and early twelfth century Indian Buddhism. In the next section I will discuss his philosophical standpoint in detail.

Due to insufficient biographical materials, Jñānavajra's nationality has been a subject of some dispute. It seems strange that Tāranātha would include Jñānavajra's name in his *History of Indian Buddhism* because Tāranātha considers Jñānavajra to have been Chinese.<sup>28</sup> This is based on the colophon on Jñānavajra's commentary. However, based on Jñānavajra's work, Hadano does not consider him to be Chinese.<sup>29</sup> Interestingly, according to K. Mimaki's research on Tibetan *Grub mtha'* literature, the term, *rnam par shes pa dbu ma*, which we meet with in Jñānavajra's work, cannot be found in either the early period or the later period of Tibetan Buddhism.<sup>30</sup> Instead, Tibetan Buddhists prefer *Mdo sde pa'i dbu ma* and *Rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma* to classify the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. Consequently, I assume that, unlike *Mdo sde pa'i dbu ma* and *Rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma*, the word *vijñaptimadhyama* was created by later Indian Buddhists. Thus, Jñānavajra was neither Chinese nor Tibetan, but Indian.

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<sup>28</sup> Chattopadhyaya (1970), 432.

<sup>29</sup> Hadano (1975), 85.

<sup>30</sup> Mimaki (1983), 161-167.

Now, I will present three factors that are given as proof that Jñānavajra is not of Chinese origin. First, interspersed throughout the history of Chinese Buddhism, there are fifteen official commentaries on the LAS. Due to the tradition of Chinese Buddhism, most Chinese commentaries written on this sutra were based on the four-volume version of the LAS. Both Hadano and Yamaguchi<sup>31</sup> note that the basic text of Jñānaśrībhaddra's and Jñānavajra's commentaries on the LAS are the seven-volume-version of the LAS,<sup>32</sup> which was translated into Chinese in 704 A.D. and into Tibetan during the first half of the ninth century. This means that Jñānavajra followed the Indian tradition as did Jñānaśrībhaddra.

Secondly, as mentioned before, Jñānavajra is certainly one of the later Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas of the twelfth century. In later Indian Buddhism, from the eighth to the twelfth centuries, the tradition of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school held a strong position. Ruegg mentions that this school is not known to have been influential in China.<sup>33</sup> This is further clarified by the famous Bsam yas debate in Tibet. This debate, held in the late eighth century, was between the Chan tradition of Chinese Buddhism and the tradition of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school of Indian

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<sup>31</sup> S. Yamaguchi, "Jñānaśrībhaddra's *Āryaśālikāvatāraṅgī*," *Collection of Yamaguchi Susumu's Buddhist Studies* (in Japanese), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1973), 215-247.

<sup>32</sup> Taishō Vol. 16, no. 672 and Toh. No.107.

<sup>33</sup> Ruegg (1981), 95 note. 308.

Buddhism.<sup>34</sup> If Jñānavajra had been Chinese, it would have been impossible for him to have adhered to Kamalaśīla's Indian Buddhist position.

Finally, in the twelfth century, the Chinese had already created their own style of Chinese Buddhism and subsequently developed methods which were based on practice rather than the scholastic study of Buddhism. According to Takasaki, there are several twelfth-century Chinese Buddhist commentaries on the LAS written by Chan masters.<sup>35</sup> Compared to the earlier works on the LAS from the Tang dynasty, which remain fragmentary, the later Chinese commentaries on the LAS lack sophisticated scholastic qualities. Jñānavajra's commentary, on the other hand, is a highly academic work. His commentary does not belong to the twelfth-century Chinese Buddhist tradition.

## 2-2. The Text of the Two Commentaries in India

### I. Introduction

The philosophical positions, as they appear in the *Āryaṇikāvatārasūtravṛtti* and the *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra*, should be acknowledged and researched as extensions of a philosophical tradition of Indian Buddhism. In the *Āryaṇikāvatārasūtravṛtti*, Jñānaśrībhadrā interprets the LAS by means of the method of cognitive centrism (*mam par shes pa dbu ma*). In fact, this method of cognitive centrism is developed by the

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<sup>34</sup> Ruegg (1981), 95.

<sup>35</sup> J. Takasaki, (tr.) *The Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan, 1980).

Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, specifically, initiated by Ratnākaraśānti in the eleventh century.<sup>36</sup> Because some late Indian Buddhist scholars claim that Dharmakīrti is a Madhyamaka thinker,<sup>37</sup> I argue that although Jñānaśrībhadra does not seem to change his philosophical position of the Yogācāra school, he recognizes that the LAS should be interpreted from the cognitive centrism perspective. This is because of his own educational background and convictions, as well as the strong tendency of later Indian Buddhism.

On the other hand, Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* has not been studied by contemporary Buddhist scholars, although it is a very important text for understanding how the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school interprets the LAS through its philosophical system. The LAS has contributed to the development of tenets of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. This school was established by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the eighth century. Therefore, I will now focus on identifying the philosophical position of the *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* in relation to the ideas of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

To identify the philosophical position of Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra*, first, I will examine the following question: Why does the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school present their theory of mind-only through the teachings of the LAS rather than through other Yogācāra sutras, such as *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and *Samādhinirmocanasūtra*?

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<sup>36</sup> Ruegg (1981), 122-123.

<sup>37</sup> E. Steinkellner, "Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?" *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka: Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference Vol. 2* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 72-89.

Jñānaśrībhadrā frequently mentions these sutras, especially the latter, in his commentary. It is evident that the LAS plays an important role in synthesizing the tenets of Mahayana Buddhism in the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. They utilized the LAS to validate the authenticity of their ideas of the notion of mind-only. This inquiry can answer not only how Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers understand the main characteristic of the LAS, but also why Jñānavajra composes his commentary on the LAS as a late Indian Buddhist. My main focus here is to identify his philosophical standpoint in Indian Buddhism.

Second, in investigating Jñānavajra's position in the tradition of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, I will examine his interpretation of three verses in the tenth chapter of the LAS in particular. These three verses in the LAS serve as the basis for formulating philosophical idea, as well as, practical aspects of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. Generally, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla follow Dharmakīrti's *Sākāravāda* when they adopt the doctrines of Yogācāra thinkers. However, in late Indian Buddhism, like Ratnākaraśānti, some Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers accept *Alīkākaravāda*.

Rather than investigating the philosophical ideas of these two Indian commentaries, my main goal in this section is to identify the philosophical standpoint of these two commentaries within the tradition of Indian Buddhism, and the philosophical tendency of late Indian Buddhism. I will explore the above by drawing upon contemporary Buddhist scholarship and these two commentaries themselves.



## II. The Philosophical Standpoint of the *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti*

As a follower of the Yogācāra school, Jñānaśrībhadra's *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* is, beyond doubt, interpreted from the perspective of the notion of mind-only. In the *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti*, he explains the main purpose of this sutra:

The Lord stated in this [sutra] that, excepting the mind, there is no external entity such as form.<sup>38</sup>

Hadano points out:

... We can grasp one of the reasons why Jñānaśrī attempted to comprehend the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*. Namely, in his reappraisal of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, which he regarded as an exposition of all the true teachings of Buddhism, he was led to the reappraisal of all Buddhism including Tantra. But that is not all, for the theories of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and in particular the fusion of the *tathāgatagarbha* and *vijñaptimātra* systems together with their various concepts lie at the basis of the Buddhist doctrines that permit the systems of practice of Yoga Tantra. Consequently, his commentary on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* is an important means to understand his characteristics.<sup>39</sup>

I basically agree with Hadano's opinion that through *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* we can apprehend that he interprets this sutra from the perspective of both *tathāgatagarbha* and

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<sup>38</sup> Jñānaśrībhadra., D: 7b-1: [མཆོག་གི་རང་བཞིན་རྒྱུ་ཉིད་ཆོས་ཀྱི་གཏེར། བདག་མེད་ལྷ་དང་རྣམ་གྲུ་ཉིད་མེད། ཁོ་མོ་རང་རིག་  
ཞེས་པ་ལྟོན་པ་ལྟ། ཆོས་རྒྱུ་ལ་མགོན་པོས་འདིར་ཡང་བཤད་དུ་གསོལ་། ཞེས་པ་ལ། མཆོག་མ་གཏོགས་པར་གཟུགས་ལ་མཆོག་པ་ལྟེན་  
ཆོས་མེད་པ་ནི་བཅོམ་ལྷན་འདས་ཀྱིས་འདི་ཉིད་དུ་གསུངས་པ། See Hadano (1973), 15.

<sup>39</sup> Hadano (1975), 83.

*vijñaptimātra* systems. Furthermore, I believe that he continuously shows that all knowledge of external objects is non-existent. His interpretation of this idea is based on both the notion of three natures and non-duality.

However, in the first chapter, Jñānaśrībhadrā indicates that:

The so-called *Laikāvatārasūtra* profound [to be with] the way cognitive centrism (*rnam par shes pa*, \**vijñānamadhyama/ vijñaptimadhyama*).<sup>40</sup>

As mentioned, this method is also used by Jñānavajra:

The meaning of sutra, the modality of cognitive centrism (*rnam par rig pa*, \**vijñānamadhyama/ vijñaptimadhyama*), having avoided two extremes, will be clarified.<sup>41</sup>

Although the two Tibetan terms, *rnam par shes pa* and *rnam par rig pa*, look different, they are identical.<sup>42</sup>

Let us explore the question: Why does he interpret this sutra through the method of the centrist of cognition in his work? There are two possible reasons. First, because he was influenced by the philosophical tendency in late Indian Buddhism. Based on

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<sup>40</sup> Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 9b- 2: ལང་ཁར་གཞུགས་པའི་མདོ་ལྟེ་ནི་ཞེས་པ་ནི་རྣམ་པར་ཞེས་པ་དབུ་མའི་ཚུལ་ཟབ་མོ་ལྟེ།

<sup>41</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 1-5, P: 2b-1, C: 1-5: མཐའ་གཉིས་རྣམ་རྒྱུས་རྣམ་རིག་དབུ་མའི་ཚུལ་ལྷགས་མདོ་དོན་གསལ་བར་བྱ།

<sup>42</sup> S. Chandra Das, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary* (Calcutta: The Bangal Secretariat Book Depot, 1902), 761 and H. A. Jäschke, *A Tibetan-English Dictionary* (Kyoto: Rinsen Book Company, 1990), 315.

Shirasaki's papers,<sup>43</sup> Steinkellner<sup>44</sup> introduces the idea that the philosophical tendency in later Indian Buddhism was not sectarian.

Second, he interprets this sutra from the centrist of cognition perspective because of his educational background in Kashmir. Ruegg clearly states:

In short, this line of Kaśmīrian teachers, (the paṇḍita Sajjana and Parāhitabhadrā) about whom little is known to us with precision, appears to have specialized in several Śāstras and evidently represented a tendency in Buddhist thought that not only brought together Madhyamaka and Pramāṇavidyā but also sought to harmonize Madhyamaka and Vijñānavāda.<sup>45</sup>

This educational system in Kashmir influenced not only Jñānaśrībhadrā himself, but also other Tibetan Buddhists who studied Buddhism in Kashmir between the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, for example Rngog Lo tsā ba and Pa tshab Nyi ma grags.<sup>46</sup>

Moreover, as for the practical aspect, Jñānavajra in his *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* introduces Jñānaśrībhadrā's interpretation of the method of practice:

Here, the meaning of statement this stage (of the cognition) having no mental image by the master Jñānaśrībhadrā showed the first the aggregates

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<sup>43</sup> This is cited in Steinkellner below. Shirasaki shows that Jitāri (ca. 940-1000), who is considered to be a Yogācāra- Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, Mokṣākaragupta, and some early Tibetan scholars considered Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika regarding his final philosophical position.

<sup>44</sup> Steinkellner (1990), 72-89 and Ruegg (1981), 100.

<sup>45</sup> D. S. Ruegg, *Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy*, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 50 (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 2000), 19.

<sup>46</sup> See note. 17.

etc., and then he also explains the stage for showing simply mind-only or the stage of meditative integration (*samadhi*) which has and which has no mental image.<sup>47</sup>

These four stages of practice, based on the notion of mind-only, are developed by Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, such as Kamalaśīla and Ratnākaraśānti.<sup>48</sup> This method is based on three verses in the tenth chapter of the LAS. However, Jñānaśrībhadrā's *Āryaṭīkāvatārasūtravṛtti* does not include these three verses because his work only contains six chapters. The following quote from his second chapter shows that he followed the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school's practical method.

What is the stage without appearance? Mahāmāti asks all entities that having explained such as six objects, six cognitive organs, and six cognitions, the mere cognition will be explained. As for those who do not understand entity and without entity, gradually the contemplation of without appearance will be explained. The contemplation of having appearance and without appearance will be orderly explained.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 66b-4-5, P: 77b-2-3, C: 66b-6-7: འདིར་སྒྲོབ་དཔོན་ཡི་ཞེས་དཔལ་བཟང་པོས་སྐར་མེད་རིམ་པ་ཞེས་  
པའི་དོན་ནི་ཐོག་མར་སྐར་པོ་ལ་ཐོགས་པ་བསྟན་ཞིང་། དེ་ནས་མེས་པ་ཙམ་ཉིད་དུ་སྒྲོན་པའི་རིམ་པ་འཇགས་པར་སྐར་པ་དང་བཅས་  
པའི་ཉིད་ཇི་འཛིན་དང་སྐར་པ་མེད་པའི་ཉིད་ཇི་འཛིན་གྱི་རིམ་པའི་ཞེས་ཀྱང་འཆད་དོ།

l. p. ཅེར

<sup>48</sup> Kamalaśīla's readings of three verses.

cittamātram samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet,  
tathatālabane [1] sthitvā cittamātram atikramet. (v. 256)  
cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam [2] atikramet,  
nirābhāse [3] sthito yogī mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati. (v. 257)  
anābhogagatiḥ śāntā praṇidhānair viśodhitā,  
jñānaṃ nirātmaṃ śreṣṭhaṃ nirābhāseṇa [4] paśyati. (v. 258)

Comparing passages in both commentaries, Jñānaśrībhadrā's interpretation of the method of practice in his commentary is totally identical with Kamalaśīla's and Ratnākaraśānti's. Therefore, although Jñānaśrībhadrā maintains his philosophical position on the Yogācāra school, especially the lineage of Dharmakīrti, even in this commentary, he also accepts the philosophical tendency of later Indian Buddhism, which synthesizes both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools.

### III. The Philosophical Standpoint of the *Tathāgatahrdayālaṃkāra*

There is still the unsolved problem of why the LAS was quoted by Madhyamaka thinkers rather than Yogācāra thinkers throughout the history of Indian Buddhism. In regards to this problem, Kajiyama rightly remarks that the later Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, especially Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, in eighth century India, find philosophical links in the LAS. However, I suggest that this is not because this sutra initially attempts to synthesize Madhyamaka and Yogācāra doctrines as Kajiyama

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<sup>49</sup> Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 35b: ལྷ་མེད་རིམ་པ་ཅི་སྒྲན་དུ་ཞེས་བ་ནི། ལྷ་པོ་དང་། ལམས་དང་སྒྲི་མཆོད་ལ་ལོགས་པ་བཤད་ནས་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཙམ་བཤད་པར་མཛད་ཀྱང་དངོས་པོ་དང་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པར་སྒྲུང་བ་མེད་པའི་རྟིང་རེ་འཛིན་རིམ་གྱིས་བཤད་པར་མཛད་སྒྲུང་། བ་དང་བཙམ་པ་དང་། ལྷ་པོ་མེད་པའི་རྟིང་རེ་འཛིན་གོ་རིམས་ལུ་བཤད་པར་མཛད་ཀྱང་དངོས་པོ་མམས་ཅད་མཐུན་པའི་དགོངས་བདེ་བསྐྱན་དུ་གསོལ། See Hadano (1973), 70-71.

suggests. Rather, as Tucci suggests, this sutra, like *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*, contains fundamental Mahayana tenets taught by the Buddha.

I propose that Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers discovered that the LAS insists upon the notion of mind-only in conventional truth, while it maintains its ontological tenets, such as the non-arising of all entities (*anutpādaḥ sarvadharmāṇām*) and the non-substantiality of all entities (*niḥsvabhāvaḥ sarvadharmāṇām*), in ultimate truth. According to modern scholarship on the texts of Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers,<sup>50</sup> it is apparent that Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers never tried to change their view of ultimate truth. However, influenced by their study of the LAS, they reevaluated the notion of conventional truth from various different perspectives.

Subsequently, when Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, specifically those who belong to the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, adopted the notion of mind-only from the LAS, they considered that the notion of mind-only was originally taught by the Buddha, rather than being a unique theory invented by the Yogācāra school. Some scholars in Buddhist studies are concerned that the doctrines in the early Yogācāra school are different from the doctrines in the Madhyamaka school. However, a few Buddhist scholars insist that their doctrines are compatible with each other, rather than being different. Recent scholarship regarding this issue is found in Hanson's *Early Yogācāra and its Relation to Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka: Change and Continuity in the History of*

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<sup>50</sup> In the tradition of Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, new theories are appeared in three times; first is Bhāvaviveka, second is Jñānagarbha, and third is Śāntarakṣita.

*Mahāyāna Buddhist Thought*.<sup>51</sup> Like Nagao,<sup>52</sup> her main thesis is that the tenets of the early Yogācāra school are not opposed to the tenets of the early Madhyamaka school. In addition, contemporary Buddhist scholars,<sup>53</sup> who hold a similar position, consider that the notion of mind-only (*cittamātra*) is the fundamental theory for all Mahayana schools, although they may have different interpretations of it. However, they consider the notion of mere-cognition (*vijñaptimātra*) as a unique theory of the later Yogācāra school, especially Dharmapāla's lineage which flourished from the sixth to the seventh centuries in India. Personally, I align myself with scholars who view that the theories of the early Yogācāra school are compatible with those of the Madhyamaka school.

Jñānavajra in his *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* has the same attitude towards the LAS as late Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers. Unlike late Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, such as Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla who incorporate the LAS into their philosophical works, Jñānavajra interprets the LAS with the methods developed by his predecessors, Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers. In other words, his *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* illumines various essential ideas of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. He shows his philosophical position in interpreting the LAS at the beginning of his commentary:

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<sup>51</sup> See Hanson (1998), Introduction.

<sup>52</sup> G. Nagao, *Mādhyamika and Yogācāra: A Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies*, tr. L. S. Kawamura (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991).

<sup>53</sup> Y. Ueda, "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* 17-4 (1967): 155-165.

The object of this sutra which has such a nature (is) the centrisim of awareness (*vijñaptimātra* of *madhya*) only, being free from two extremes, involving simply awareness and empty (ness). Since its intention also is that all phenomena (dharma) that are in every respect emotional conflicted and purified are wondrously manifestation of the mind, they have no difference from the mind and are simply mental. And furthermore, it is of the nature of mere experience in a convential (sense) and ultimately, it is emptiness.<sup>54</sup>

Later, in his first chapter, he divides all knowledge of objects into two truths, conventional and ultimate.

The philosophical characteristics of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school is that their synthesizing theories were strongly influenced by the lineage of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Particularly, Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers adopted their unique interpretation of non-external objects from Dharmakīrti's theory. According to Ueda, Matilal, and Ichigō,<sup>55</sup> Śāntarakṣita and his disciple, Kamalaśīla, who are considered to be the founders of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, adopted the non-existence of external objects from Dharmakīrti's *Sākāravāda* in the Yogācāra school.

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<sup>54</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 1-5-2b-5, P: 2b-1-3a-5, C: 1-5-2b-6: མཐའ་གཉིས་རྣམ་སྤངས་རྣམ་རིག་དབུ་མའི་ཚུལ་ལྟགས་མདོ་  
 རོན་གསལ་པར་བྱ། དེ་ནི་ལྷ་བུའི་ངོ་ཐོར་གྱུར་པའི་མདོ་ལྟེ་འཕྲིའི་བཟོད་པར་བྱ་བ་ནི་རིག་པ་དང་རྟོག་ཅན་དུ་འཇུག་པ་མཐའ་  
 གཉིས་རྣམ་པར་སྤངས་པ་རྣམ་པར་རིག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་དབུ་མ་གླེ་པའི་རོན་ཡང་ཀུན་ནས་ཉོན་མོངས་པ་དང་རྣམ་པར་བྱུང་བའི་ཚུལ་  
 བསམ་ཅད་ལེས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་འཇུག་པ་ཡིན་པས་ལེས་པས་ཐ་དང་པ་མེད་ཅེས་ལེས་ཉིད་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ཡང་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་སྤྱོད་  
 རིག་ཙམ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཡིན་ཞིང་རོན་དམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་ཉིད་དེ།

<sup>55</sup> Y. Ueda, "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* 17 (1967): 155-165, K. Matilal, "Buddhist Logic and Epistemology," *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology* (Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1986), 1-30, and M. Ichigō, *Madhyamakālamkāra* (Tokyo: Buneido,



In fact, Śāntarakṣita established his unique theory of mind-only in verses 91-92

based on three verses in the tenth chapter of the LAS (X. 256-8):

‘On the basis of the *cittamātra* one is to know the non-existence of external things, and on the basis of this (*madhyamaka*) system one is to know complete non-substantiality; riding the chariot of the two systems (the *cittamātra* and *madhyamaka*) and holding the reins of reasoning (*yukti*), the philosopher) therefore, attains the sense as it is, the Mahayanist one itself.<sup>56</sup>

Based on Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation of these three verses, it is very difficult to define whether or not he is *Sākāravāda*. On the other hand, his disciple, Kamalaśīla, wrote the detailed commentary, the *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*. Kajiyama points out that Kamalaśīla interpreted these three verses from the *Satyākāravāda* (or *Sākāravāda*):

If we understand the progress in epistemological stages according to Kamalaśīla’s interpretation, it becomes clear that *cittamātra* at the very beginning of v. 256 must mean not Yogācāravāda in general, but rather the standpoint of the Satyākāravāda. The original verses could be interpreted in this way; but we cannot ascribe such an intention to the author of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, the compilation of which occurs centuries before the controversy between the Satyākāravādin and Alīkāravādin.<sup>57</sup>

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1985), LXIX-LXXX.

<sup>56</sup> Ruegg (1981), 90.

<sup>57</sup> Kajiyama (1978), 137.

However, all Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers interpret these verses from the *Satyākāravāda*. Ratnākaraśānti, who is a well known Buddhist scholar of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school in Vikramaśīla according to Atīśa's biography, maintained his position on the *Alīkāravādin* in his *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (fol. 136a-b).<sup>58</sup> In his work, he criticizes those who accept the *Satyākāravāda* whether they are Madhyamaka thinkers or Yogācāra thinkers.

In the *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra*, as mentioned in the preceding section, it seems that Jñānavajra's position is on the *Sākāravāda*.<sup>59</sup> When he explains his philosophical position on the conventional truth in the first chapter, he argues with Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and non-Buddhist schools who asserted the existence of external objects. In contrast, he argues with Mahayana schools in clarifying his idea of ultimate truth.

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<sup>58</sup> Ruegg (1981), 122-123.

In the *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (fol. 136a-b) Ratnākaraśānti makes the stages of understanding recognized by the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* into four bhūmis of the Yogācāra.... In the same author's *Upadeśa* (fol. 266a) these four stages are referred to as the four *bhūmis* having respectively the *ālambana* of the existence of things in terms of the extreme of eternalism (as opposed to nihilism), the *ālambana* of *cittamātra*, the *ālambana* of *tathatā*, and absence of *ālambana*. The first *yogabhūmi* consists in taking all existing dharmas as (noetic) objects (*ālambana*). The second *yogabhūmi* consists in understanding that there is no external object of knowledge (*grāhya*); since everything appears as mind only (*cittamātra*) no dharma is different from mind. The third *yogabhūmi* consists in transcending this *cittamātra* and understanding that, because no *grāhya* exists, no corresponding cognizing subject (*grāhaka*) can exist either; *cittamātra* then becomes residence in the *ālambana* of *tathatā*, a non-dual gnosis which is without the *grāhaka-lakṣaṇa*. Finally the fourth *yogabhūmi* is direct comprehension of the Mahayana consisting in residence in gnosis absolutely free from appearance (*nirābhāsa*), and in which *nāman* and *lakṣaṇa* as well as *grāhya* and *grāhaka* have disappeared.

<sup>58</sup> Ruegg (1981), 122-123.

<sup>59</sup> See Note. 26.

Furthermore, when he interprets three verses in the tenth chapter of the LAS, he also maintains his Sākāravādin's position:<sup>60</sup>

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འདྲ་བྱེད་མཐོང་པ་ནི་དེ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་མཐོང་བས་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་རྒྱུར་པ་དེ་ལྟར་རྒྱུར་  
 པར་འགྱུར་པའི་ཚུལ་བརྟུག་ཏེ་བརྟན་པ་ཡང་། མེས་པ་ཙམ་ལ་ནི་ཞེས་པ་ལ་མོགས་པའོ། འདི་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དོན་  
 བྱིད་དང་ཅེ་མོའི་གནས་སྐབས་ན་གཞུང་པ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པའི་མེས་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྟོག་པ་ལ་གནས་ནས་  
 ཕྱིད་དོན་ལ་མི་བརྟག་ཅིང་ཡང་རིམ་གྱིས་མཐོང་པའི་ལམ་གྱི་གན་སྐབས་ན། འཛིན་པའི་མེས་པ་ཀུང་དོན་  
 དམ་པར་རོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཡང་དག་པའི་མེས་པ་ལ་གནས་ནས་འཛིན་པའི་མེས་པ་ལ་མོགས་པའི་མཉམ་པར་གནས་  
 ལས་འདྲའ་པར་བྱ་བའོ། མེས་པ་ཙམ་ལས་འདས་ནས་མཐོང་པའི་ལམ་ལ་མོགས་པའི་མཉམ་པར་གནས་  
 པའི་ཡེ་ཞེས་སྐར་པ་མེད་པ་ལ་རེ་ཞིག་<sup>1</sup> གནས་དེ་ལས་ཀུང་འདྲའ་པར་བྱ་བ་སྟེ། རྩམ་<sup>2</sup>ཐོབ་ཀྱི་གནས་  
 སྐབས་ལུ་མའི་ཡོངས་ལུ་སྐར་པ་<sup>3</sup> ལ་མོགས་པས་དེ་དང་དེ་དག་རྟོགས་པར་བྱའོ། དེ་ལས་གནས་རྟག་ཏུ་  
 སྐར་པ་མེད་པའི་དྲིང་རེ་འཛིན་ལ་གནས་ན། ཉན་ཐོས་ལྟར་མེས་པ་ཙམ་ཕན་ཕྱིན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ལ་མོགས་པའི་  
 བཟོད་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྟོགས་མ་རྟོགས་བས་འབྲས་བུའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཐོག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་མི་མཐོང་སྟེ། མི་ཐོབ་ཙམ་  
 པའོ། དེས་ན་རྩེ་གྱི་གནས་སྐབས་ལུ་སྐར་པ་ལྟ་བུར་རྟོགས་པའི་ཡེ་ཞེས་ལུན་གྱིས་ཀྱང་ཅི་ལོག་  
 ཞི་བ་དང་། དེ་འདྲ་བས་ཡོངས་ལུ་ཕྱིན་པའི་ཀུང་པར་ཏུ་མེས་པ་བསྐྱེད་པ་དང་། རྟོན་ལས་དག་གིས་ཀུན་  
 གཞིའི་ཏི་མ་སྐར་པ་ནས་བདག་མེད་པའི་ཡེ་ཞེས་མཚོག་ཏུ་གྱུར་བ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་སྐྱོབ་པ་དང་བྲལ་བ་མཐོན་  
 ཏུ་བྱས་པ་དེའི་ཆོ་མཚན་མ་ཐམས་ཅད་མི་མཐོང་བའོ། ཡང་རེ་ལྟ་བུ་ཕྱིད་དོན་ལ་མི་རྟོག་ཅིང་མེས་པ་ཙམ་  
 ལས་འདྲའ་པར་བྱ་ཞེ་ན། མེས་པ་ཀྱི་རྟོན་ཡུལ་ཕྱི་རོལ་ལྟ་བུར་སྐར་པ་ལ་ཡང་དག་པའི་ཞེས་རབ་གྱིས་  
 བརྟ་པར་བྱ་སྟེ། དེ་ལྟར་བརྟུག་པས་ཕྱིད་དོན་བརྟན་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་མཐོང་བ་ན་མི་རྟོག་པའོ།

Consequently, it is safe to conclude that his interpretation of the LAS is from the philosophical ideas of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school in general, and in particular, he belongs to the Sākāravādin.

<sup>60</sup> Jñānavajra, D:277a- 6- 277b- 5, P: 323a- 5-323b- 5, C: 277a-6-277b-5: 1. P. ཞིག་ 2. P. རྩམ་ 3. P. སྐར་པ་

In fact, Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* obviously relies on Jñānaśrībhadrā's work. It is not only because the latter was composed earlier than the former, but also because some of his own philosophical ideas agree with those of Jñānaśrībhadrā's. The similarity of his philosophical ideas in the *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* with that of Jñānaśrībhadrā's is because the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school maintains their fundamental ideas of Madhyamaka thought on ultimate truth, while it adopts the notion of mind-only of Yogācāra thought on the conventional truth as found in the LAS. As a result of its synthesizing these two Mahayana theories, this school agrees with the Yogācāra school's interpretation of conventional truth, specifically the notion of mind-only. However, even though they are in agreement with respect to the notion of mind-only, both conventionally and ultimately, their method of analyzing object of knowledge is not the same. Jñānaśrībhadrā focuses on explaining object of knowledge by the notion of three natures, while Jñānavajra basically divides it into two truths (conventional and ultimate).

## 2-3. The Text of the Two Indian Commentaries in Tibet

### I. Introduction

Today, the original Sanskrit texts of Jñānaśrībhadrā's *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* and Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra*, are no longer extant. In general, colophons in Tibetan texts give a great deal of textual information, such as the author, translator, time,

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lineage, etc. We have seen that the colophons of both Jñānaśrībhadrā's *Āryaṇikāvatārasūtravṛtti* and Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* provide by little information. It is likely that the *Āryaṇikāvatārasūtravṛtti* was originally composed in Tibetan, while the *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra* was originally written in Sanskrit and then later translated into Tibetan.

I will briefly investigate the ways in which these Indian commentaries contributed to developing or formulating theories within Tibetan Buddhism. However, due to the insufficient textual and historical materials, outlining the textual identity of these two Indian commentaries, as well as, considering their relationship with Tibetan Buddhism is difficult. Thus, the goal of my inquiry is not to present a definitive conclusion, but instead, to consider a hypothetical answer to identify the position of these two Indian commentaries within Tibetan Buddhism.

## II. Their Doxographical Identity and Position

According to Hadano<sup>61</sup> and Yamaguchi,<sup>62</sup> as previously mentioned, the basic texts of these two commentaries are similar to the Tibetan version of the LAS. However, it is quite difficult to determine whether or not the two Indian commentators used the Tibetan version of the LAS, since they were not Tibetan Buddhists but Indian Buddhists. In addition to this fact, as previously discussed, the extant Sanskrit manuscript excavated in

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<sup>61</sup> Hadano (1975), 75.

<sup>62</sup> Yamaguchi (1973), 235-241.

Nepal is more similar to the Tibetan version of the LAS, and seems to be a text written for Buddhists in northern India. Therefore, it is assumed that the two Indian commentaries are based on the Tibetan version of the LAS along with the Sanskrit text.

Moreover, although we do not have the exact dates of the composition of these two commentaries, based on the authors' date of activity in India and Tibet, they probably were written around the late eleventh and the early twelfth centuries. The two commentaries by Jñānaśrībhadrā and Jñānavajra provide a clear division of its chapters to identify the main ideas in the LAS. In his commentary, Jñānaśrībhadrā indicates his ideas in detail in three chapters. In the first chapter there are three sub-sections, in the second chapter there are nine sub-sections, and in the third chapter there are seventeen sub-sections. In addition, there is one sub-section in the fourth, fifth and sixth chapters. The sixth chapter also contains a conclusion. The titles of the sub-sections help us to determine the main subject of each chapter. While Jñānaśrībhadrā's commentary provides a clear demarcation of the main ideas in each chapter, it is very difficult to understand the relationships between them. However, I believe that this problem can be solved with Jñānavajra's commentary. In the first and third chapters of his commentary, Jñānavajra gives the entire framework of the LAS. The first was given above chapter one note 45 and note 46.

As mentioned before, I think that the style of these two commentaries are not the same. As Hadano notes:

In the present commentary on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Toh. 107), for some reason or other, there is no colophon, so consequently the details

concerning the writing and translation of it are uncertain. One might hazard a guess that it was compiled from the lectures he gave on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* in Tibetan.<sup>63</sup>

This observation is quite reasonable. Jñānaśrībhadrā did not intend to write a commentary, but instead to give lectures to Tibetan Buddhists. But one of his disciples transcribed Jñānaśrībhadrā's lectures and thus they became a commentary. For instance, in Jñānaśrībhadrā's commentary, *Ye shes dpal bzang po* is frequently cited using the instrumental case.<sup>64</sup> Jñānavajra's commentary, on the other hand, follows the style of Indian commentary in that it is more formally written.

Kamalaśīla in the late eighth century and Atīśa in the eleventh century wrote their works, *Bhāvanākrama*<sup>65</sup> and *Bodhipathapradīpa*<sup>66</sup> respectively, while living in Tibet

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<sup>63</sup> Hadano (1975), 80.

<sup>64</sup> Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 1a: ཀུན་མཁྱེན་ལངས་རྒྱལ་ལགྲུང་བ་གསུང་བདག་མཚུངས། རེམས་དཔར་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཚེས་དང་འདུས་མཐའ་དག་རྒྱ་ལམ་ཐོག་གསུམ་ལ། དུག་འཛུལ་ནས་ནི་ཤེས་དཔར་བཟང་མིང་གིས། མོས་པའི་རེམས་ཅན་རྒྱལ་ལ་ཕན་གདགས་པར། བདག་གི་སྟོང་དག་གཞན་གྱི་སྟོང་གསུངས་པ། ལར་ཀར་གཤེགས་བ་ཐོས་རྒྱལ་ཚེས་དང་མྱོ་རིགས་པ་ཡིས་ནི་བཤད་པར་བྱེད་པའོ། See Hadano (1973), 2-3.

And Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 30a, 2: འཕགས་པ་ལར་ཀ་གཤེགས་པའི་བཤད་པ་ཡི་ཤེས་དཔར་བཟང་ཐོས་བྱས་པ་ལས། ལེའུ་དང་པོ་རྒྱ་མའི་རྒྱལ་པར་ཐར་པ་ཐོས་ཅིང་འཇིག་རྟེན་གསུམ་ལས་རྒྱལ་པར་རྒྱལ་བ་རྒྱལ་ལ་མི་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐབས་ལ་མཐུན་པས་བྱང་རྒྱལ་རེམས་དཔར་གྱིད་པ་དང་ཚེས་དང་ཚེས་མ་ཡིན་པ་གཞོན་པའི་ལན་བཀའ་རྒྱལ་པ་དང་ལེའུ་ཐོན་གསུམ་མོ། See Hadano (1973), 60-61.

<sup>65</sup> Ruegg (1981), 96-99 and Kajiyama (1978), 134.

<sup>66</sup> R. Sherburne, tr. *A Lamp for the Path and Commentary of Atīśa* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), x-xiii.

rather than in India. Likewise, Jñānaśrībhadrā and Jñānavajra composed their commentaries on the LAS in Tibet. Because Tibetan Buddhism up until the thirteenth century depended on Indian Buddhist scholarship, Indian Buddhist scholars wrote their commentaries on sūtras and śāstras in Tibet, in order to give instructions or to respond to inquiries made by Tibetan Buddhists.

This raises another question. Initially, since the commentaries were written in Sanskrit, a very complex and sophisticated language, Indian Buddhist scholars had great difficulty translating Sanskrit into Tibetan. For this reason, Jñānaśrībhadrā and his Tibetan disciples worked together to revise his commentary. Evidently, in Jñānaśrībhadrā's biography,<sup>67</sup> it mentions that Jñānaśrībhadrā translated his *Mahāyanasūtrālaṃkārapīṇḍārtha* and *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* with Khyung po Chos kyi brtson 'grus, and Dharmakīrti's *Vādayāya* with Rma Lo tsā ba. There is, however, neither a mention of his *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* nor any translator's name in the colophon. In addition to this fact, Jñānaśrībhadrā lived first in Ta bo for seven years working with Ra byad Lo tsā ba as his interpreter. Gnyal pa Nyi ma shes rab also worked with him for 10 years. During his stay at Ta bo, he translated his own works with the help of his Tibetan disciples and gave lectures to Tibetan Buddhists. This was possible because he could speak Tibetan three years after he arrived in Tibet.<sup>68</sup> Consequently, it

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<sup>67</sup> Hadano (1975), Naudou (1980), Roerich (1996), and Chattopadhyaya (1970).

<sup>68</sup> See note. 10.



can be assumed that *Āryalaṅkāvatārasūtravṛtti* was based on lectures he gave to Tibetan Buddhists that were subsequently transcribed by one of his disciples.

What, then, was Jñānaśrībhadrā's intention in composing this text while residing in Tibet? It is generally believed that Kamalaśīla wrote his *Bhāvanākrama* to introduce the Gradual Enlightenment way of practice which was adopted by Tibetan Buddhists after the Bsam yas debate. Similarly, Jñānaśrībhadrā personally experienced some of the controversy in Tibetan Buddhism. As noted in the previous section, Jñānaśrībhadrā came to Tibet around 1076 or a little later. During this period of Tibetan Buddhism, the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school was still dominant in Tibet. On the other hand, Atiśa, who arrived in Tibet in 1042, introduced the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school containing Candrakīrti's works. Ruegg<sup>69</sup> describes the philosophical situation in Tibetan Buddhism during this period as follows:

Of the above-mentioned four schools of the dBu ma, Bhāvaviveka (or Bhavya)' branch of the pure Madhyamaka and Śāntarakṣita's synthesizing Yogācāra-Madhyamaka were especially strong in periods I and II, and they continued to be studied in the succeeding two periods when they, however, no longer occupied the same predominant position. Candrakīrti's Thal 'gyur ba branch of the pure Madhyamaka and the synthesizing gZhan stong traditions came to the fore early in period II, and they have continued to be strongly represented in subsequent periods up to the present time.

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<sup>69</sup> D. S. Ruegg, "On the Reception and Early History of the *Dbu-ma (Madhyamaka)* in Tibet," *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*, eds. Michael Aris and Aung San Suu Kyi (Warminster: Aris and Phillips Ltd., 1980), 277-9.

Preliminary assimilation (mainly in the 8<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> centuries)

Full assimilation (end of the 10<sup>th</sup> to the 14<sup>th</sup> century)

Classical period (mainly the 14<sup>th</sup>-16<sup>th</sup> centuries)

Scholastic period (16<sup>th</sup> century onwards)

According to Ruegg's analysis, out of the four periods in Tibetan Buddhism, Jñānaśrībhadra was in period II. Period II (the end of the tenth to the fourteenth centuries) is defined by the coexistence of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school. There was a controversy between these two schools of Indian Madhyamaka in Tibetan Buddhism. At the same time, other Buddhist traditions also emerged. Thus, I believe that, in his work, Jñānaśrībhadra was responding to the controversy between the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school. The controversy was over the recognition of the existence of external objects which is the main issue of the LAS. The LAS was already well known to Tibetan Buddhists, who had been introduced to it by Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, who held the same philosophical tendency as Jñānaśrībhadra regarding the notion of mind-only in Indian Buddhism. Thus, in order to teach Tibetan Buddhists the means to determine all dharmas (entities) in the notion of mind-only--the non-existence of external objects--Jñānaśrībhadra chose the seven-volume version of the LAS in accordance with the tradition of Indian Buddhism.

Unlike Jñānaśrībhadra's work, which seems to have been written originally in Tibetan, it appears that Jñānavajra's work was originally written in Sanskrit and then translated into Tibetan. As for the classification of Buddhist schools in the two commentaries, Jñānaśrībhadra does not use the classification system properly, although

he adequately describes the non-Buddhist schools.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, Jñānavajra uses not only the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika doctrines of the Abhidharma schools, but also the doctrines of the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka schools. He also comments on the Svātantrika, Prāsaṅgika, Sākāravādin, and Alīkākaravādin schools. Based on the fact that the detailed classification of Indian Buddhist schools appeared in Tibetan Buddhism in the thirteenth century, I conclude that Jñānavajra's work was written originally in Sanskrit and then translated into Tibetan.

Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that in the twelfth century and afterwards, Tibetan Buddhists began to make a distinction between '*rang rgyud pa*' and '*thal 'gyur pa*.' J. Feher notes that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags played a very important role in the spread of Candrakīrti's doctrines, and that Nyi ma grags must have been busy translating Candrakīrti's works at the end of the eleventh or the beginning of the twelfth century. Furthermore, he also insists that the early Tibetan authors did not recognize the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika branch as a distinct philosophical system. Later, during and after the second propagation (*phyi dar*) in Tibetan Buddhism, several new viewpoints of Indian Buddhism were introduced, encouraging Tibetan scholars to begin to make further classifications of the Madhyamaka school.<sup>71</sup> However, in Jñānavajra's commentary on the LAS, he utilizes the *Svatantra* method by using the probative syllogism (*rang gyi*

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<sup>70</sup> T. Unebe, "Jñānaśrībhadra's interpretation of Bhartṛhari as found in the *Laṅkāvatāravṛtti*," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 28 (2000): 329-360.

<sup>71</sup> J. Feher, "Buddhapālita's *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* arrival and spread of Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika Literature in Tibet," *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies: Commemorating the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the birth of Alexander Csoma de Kőrös* vol. 1 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984), 218-9.

*rgyud gtan tshigs*), and criticizes other methods with the term apogogical reasoning (*thal ba'i gtan tshigs kyis gzhan gyi phyogs*). Evidently, while Jñānavajra defines himself as a Svātantrika philosopher, he also says to one of his opponents that:

“Candrakīrti and his followers do not accept the probative syllogism and its inferential cognition.”<sup>72</sup>

Thus, he composed his commentary on the LAS to show the philosophical differences between the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school and the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school in Indian Buddhism.

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<sup>72</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 58b-5-6, P: 68a-5, C: 58b-5-6: ལྟོབ་དཔོན་སྒྲིབ་པའི་གཏམས་པ་རྗེས་ལུང་དང་བཅས་པ་རྣམས་རང་གི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་ཚད་མ་ཁས་མི་ལེན་པ་[ལྟ]་.

## Chapter 3

### Main Themes of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*

#### 3-1. Historical Account

##### I. Introduction

There is a paucity of modern scholarship on the LAS: Suzuki attempted to describe the main ideas of this sutra in his *Studies in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (1968). More recently, Sutton tried to present the main philosophical tenets in his *Existence and Enlightenment in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (1991). But these studies only skim the surface of the main subjects of the LAS, and are insufficient for understanding the fullness of the ideas introduced or structured this complex text.<sup>1</sup> To address this gap in scholarship, in this chapter, I will explore the main themes of the LAS. To set the stage, I will introduce the relationship between the LAS and Buddhist schools in India and China. Having the historical background in mind is an important factor in understanding why many themes in the LAS are addressed. With this in place, I will move on to presenting the philosophical views based on the two Indian commentaries on the LAS.

The main aim of this section is to present the relationship between the LAS and Mahayana Buddhist schools in Indian and Chinese Buddhism. My research is focused on two aspects. First, how did Mahayana Buddhist scholars both Indian and Chinese, utilize the LAS in their philosophical systems? Second, what were the philosophical viewpoints

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<sup>1</sup> D. T. Suzuki, *The Laṅkāvatārasūtra: A Mahayana Text: translated from the Sanskrit text*, (Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1978), Tucci (1928), A. Suganuma, "The five Dharmas in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 15-2 (1967): 963-956, and E. Hamlin, Discourse in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 11-3 (1983): 267-313.

on the LAS on which Mahayana Buddhists chose to comment? Not only research on the commentaries on the LAS, but also the analysis of the relationship between the LAS and the Mahayana schools are a relatively new areas of investigation for scholars of Buddhism. For this reason, I will present a general survey of the philosophical tendencies regarding commentaries on the LAS by both Indian and Chinese Buddhist scholars, rather than providing a detailed investigation of each of the commentaries.

## II. The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* in Indian Buddhism

The main aim of this section is to demonstrate how the LAS was utilized by Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers in Indian Buddhism. The LAS was a respected source used by both the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra schools. But, in this section, I will limit my investigation to passages of the LAS in the major works from Svātantrika-Madhyamaka traditions. This is because, as mentioned before, even though none of the thinkers from the early period of Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, such as Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla, attempted to compose a commentary on the LAS, nevertheless, in their major works written during the sixth to the eighth centuries, it is evident that these thinkers drew on philosophical ideas found in the LAS.

The prime motivation behind the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers quoting the LAS in their major works was their interest in interpretations of mind-only concept. The

mind-only concept was understood by these thinkers as originally taught by Buddha and was refined during the third and fourth centuries by Yogācāra thinkers, such as Maitreyañātha, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. But Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers did not agree with the refinements imposed by Yogācāra thinkers. For example, Bhāvaviveka rejects the Yogācāra doctrine of mind-only (*vijñaptimātra*) and the doctrine of the existence of dependent-on-other (*paratantra svabhāva*) in his works.<sup>2</sup> It can be assumed that Bhāvaviveka utilized the LAS not only to refute the Yogācāra notions of mind-only, to demonstrate what he regarded as the true teachings of Buddha. Importantly, Bhāvaviveka's treatment of the LAS was held as the main stream view by the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school until the thirteenth century in Indian Buddhism.

I will turn now to presenting the material sources of the LAS found in major works of Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers. In the sixth century, Bhāvaviveka's criticism of the tenets of the Yogācāra school are found prominently in Chapter 25<sup>th</sup> of his *Prajñāpradīpa*, in Chapter 5 of his *Madhyamakahrdayakārikās*, and in his auto-commentary, the *Tarkajvālā*. In the fifth chapter of his *Tarkajvālā*, he quotes two verses

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<sup>2</sup> Ch. Lindtner wrote an article based on Chapter IV, "Bhavya's critique of Yogācāra in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, chapter IV," *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, eds., B. K. Matilal and R. D. Evans (Holland, 1986), 239-263. Ch. Lindtner also edited Chapter XXV of the Tibetan text, "Bhavya's controversy with Yogācāra in the Appendix to *Prajñāpradīpa*, Chapter XXV," *The Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica* XXIX/2, ed. Louis Ligeti (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1984), 77-97. D. M. Eckel wrote an article based on the above edition of Tibetan text, "Bhāvaviveka's Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy in Chapter XXV of the *Prajñāpradīpa*," *Miscellanea Buddhica*, ed. Ch. Lindtner (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1985), 25-75.

from the LAS,<sup>3</sup> and in chapter 25<sup>th</sup> of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, he quotes six verses from the LAS.<sup>4</sup>

In the eighth century, Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhāga* primarily discussed the doctrine of the two truths. In 1986, D. M. Eckel translated and annotated the translation of the Tibetan text in his *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the distinction between the two truths*. Jñānagarbha quoted three verses from the LAS in his *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha* sections, verses 15 to 30.<sup>5</sup>

According to Ichigō, in his research in 1985, Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, his auto-commentary, *Vṛtti*, and Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, Śāntarakṣita quoted a total of 16 verses of the LAS in his explanation of the Yogācāra

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<sup>3</sup> S. Yamaguchi intensively studied the fifth chapter, in his *Controversies concerning existence and non-existence in Buddhism* (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Kobundo Shobo, 1941).

<sup>4</sup> Suzuki (1978), 1. III. 33, 2. II. 191 and X. 305, 3. II. 144 and X. 89, 4. III. 14 and X. 196, 5. II. 198 and X. 374, 6. III. 48 and X. 91.

1. The external objects which appear do not exist. Mind appears to be diverse, as if were body (*deha*), experience (*bhoga*), and abode (*pratiṣṭhāna*). Thus I say that it is mind-only.
2. There is nothing imagined, but there is (something) dependent; for to conceive of reification (*samāropa*) or denial (*apavāda*) is to be destroyed.
3. Nowhere is there anything to be produced, anything that has been produced, or any condition: there are designated as conventions.
4. One for whom nothing either arises or ceases and who sees the world in isolation, does not think "it is" or "it is not".
5. When intelligently investigated, there is no imagined (nature), no dependent (nature), and no absolute (nature). How (then) can they be intelligently discriminated?
6. There is no nature (*svabhāva*), no ideation (*viññapti*), no entity (*vastu*), and no storehouse (*ālaya*). They are imagined by foolish dunces (*kutārkika*) who themselves are no more than corpses.

<sup>5</sup> Suzuki (1978), 1. X. 429, 2. II. 191 and X. 305, 3. X. 150.

1. Things arise in a relative sense, but ultimately they are empty. An erroneous cognition (*bharānti*) of empty (things) is (rightly) considered a relative (cognition).
2. There is nothing imagined, but there is (something) dependent; for to conceive of reification (*samāropa*) or denial (*apavāda*) is to be destroyed.
3. No dharmas arise with imagined nature. People develop concepts on the basis of dependent (nature).



doctrine. Importantly, the quotes concern the mind-only doctrine. These 16 verses of the LAS are located in verses 44-60 and verses 61-62.

Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* (Toh. 3887) also served as a vital text for the later Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers. In 1980, Y. Ejima wrote his *Development of Mādhyamika Philosophy in India: Studies on Bhāvaviveka*, and utilized Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* for the general ideas set forth in his book. Kamalaśīla quotes the LAS many times.

Based on the aforementioned materials, almost all the quotations are taken from the second, third and tenth chapters of the LAS. Among them, the most important two verses are verses 91 and 305 from the tenth chapter. These verses are identical to verse 48 of the third chapter and verse 191 of the second chapter respectively:

V. 91: There is no nature (*svabhāva*), no ideation (*vijñapti*), no entity (*vastu*), and no storehouse (*ālaya*). They are imagined by foolish dunces (*kuṭārkika*) who themselves are no more than corpses.<sup>6</sup>

V. 305: There is nothing imagined, but there is (something) dependent; for to conceive of reification (*samāropa*) or refutation (*apavāda*) is to be destroyed.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Nanjio edition, p. 276:

na svabhavo na vijñaptir na vastu na ca ālayaḥ  
bālair vikalpitā hyete vaśabhūtaiḥ kuṭārkikaiḥ

།རང་བཞིན་མེད་ཅིང་རྣམ་རིག་མེད། །ལྷན་གཞི་མེད་ཅིང་དོམ་མེད་ན། །བྱིས་པ་རྒན་པ་འོློག་གེ་པ། །རྟོ་དང་འདྲ་བས་འདི་དག་བརྟགས།།

<sup>7</sup> Nanjio edition, p. 304:

nāsti vai kalpito bhāvaḥ paratantram ca vidyate  
samāropāpavādam ca vikalpaṃ no vinaśyati

These two verses are fundamental tenets of the two truths in the above mentioned works of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers. However, due to opposing interpretations of verse 305 by the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, such as Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha, and Śāntarakṣita, the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school split into different sub-schools of Mahayana Buddhism.

Consequently, Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers utilize this sutra to substantiate their interpretations of object of knowledge (*jñeya*) in both the conventional truth and ultimate truth with regard to the three natures of phenomena (*svabhāva*): imagined, dependent-on-other, and consummated. While the theory of the two truths is an extremely important doctrine for Madhyamaka thinkers, the doctrine of the three natures originated in the Yogācāra school and is fundamental to the thought of Yogācāra thinkers. The Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school attempted to combine these two different theories into one. This was accomplished by dividing the three-nature doctrine into the notion of the two truths. However, between the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers and the Yogācāra thinkers, the crucial point of disagreement concerns the interpretation of the second nature, *paratantra svabhāva* (dependent-on-other). To articulate and assert their position, Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers turn to passages from the LAS to underscore their arguments. Although the LAS emphasizes the notion of mind-only, it also contains the ontological approach to the interpretation of

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འཇགས་པ་ཡི་ནི་དངོས་པོ་མེད། གཞན་གྱི་དབང་ནི་ཡོད་པ་རྟེ། རྫོགས་པ་དང་སྐྱེ་བ་ནི། རྣམ་པར་བརྟགས་ནི་འཇགས་པར་འགྱུར།

phenomena that is the same as that found within the tenets of the Madhyamaka school. For example, the idea of non-origination fundamental to the Madhyamaka school, is also found in the LAS.

### III. The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* in Chinese Buddhism

The main aim of this section is to investigate the relationship between the LAS and the Buddhist schools in China. Although the study of Chinese Buddhism is not the main focus of my dissertation, because many Chinese Buddhist scholars paid attention to the LAS, and composed various commentaries on the LAS, it is necessary to discuss the relationship between the LAS and Chinese Buddhism.

Throughout the history of Chinese Buddhism, there have been fifteen Chinese commentaries on the LAS. These commentaries have been completely preserved in the Chinese canon. Two of the commentaries are from the Tang dynasty, four from the Song dynasty, seven from the Ming dynasty, and two from the Qing dynasty.<sup>8</sup> In addition to the canonical commentaries mentioned above, there are numerous other commentaries on the LAS which have been excluded from the Chinese canon. These commentaries were written by Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Buddhist scholars. It is believed that Bodhidharma wrote a commentary on the LAS, entitled the *Leng jia yao yi*. Also called *Ta mo lun*,<sup>9</sup> it is no longer extant. The Chinese scholar Wenhui and the Korean scholar

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<sup>8</sup> Suzuki (1968), 63. The detailed textual information of Chinese commentaries on the LAS is in the introduction of Takasaki's Japanese translation of the LAS in 1980.

<sup>9</sup> Yampolsky (1967), 21.

Weonhyo (617-678) each wrote a commentary on the LAS during the Tang dynasty. Because of the large number of commentaries on the LAS, both in the Chinese canon and outside the Chinese canon, and since there was such a great interest in the LAS by many East Asian commentators, this must have inspired an equal interest in the LAS by Indian Buddhist scholars.

Because this is a relatively new area of study, research material addressing the relationship between the LAS and Chinese Buddhist scholars is limited just as it is with respect to Indian Buddhist textual materials. For this reason, I will present only a brief overview of the involvement of Chinese Buddhism and its relationship with the LAS.

I will focus on how two main Chinese schools of thought handle the study of the LAS: the Chan school and the Huayan school. The Huayan school of thought includes the Dilun school of Chinese Buddhism. These two Chinese Buddhist schools possess numerous historical records regarding the LAS, and some of the most valuable sources available to date. But although I have selected among Chan and Huayan sources for many of my examples, the reader should note that other Chinese sources are to be found in addition to these two schools. Sutton has provided as important caveat:

It is important to remember that there was another school in the study of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* beside the one transmitted by Bodhidharma and his followers of the northern (Chan) school of Buddhism. This school is called as Yogācāra Idealism, based on Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgrāha*, whose lineage is still traceable today.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Sutton (1991), 6.

Sutton's point is that not only the Chan school, but also other Chinese Buddhist schools studied the LAS. Specifically he points out the relationship between the Shelun school and the LAS. The Shelun school is based on Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha*, and this school claims to be the followers of Asaṅga's and Vasubandhu's teachings. Although it is highly probable that Chinese Buddhist scholars belonging to the Shelun school might have studied the LAS, there are no historical records confirming the relationship between the LAS and the Shelun school. However, there is historical evidence that Buddhist scholars belonging to the Huayan school wrote commentaries on the LAS. I will outline below the resources that are available that evidence that the Chan and the Huayan schools of Chinese Buddhism had a close relationship with the LAS.

The relationship between the LAS and the Chan school has been studied by Yampolsky, in his book entitled *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch*, in 1967. Although his main focus is the *Platform Sutra*, composed by Huineng (?-713), the section called "the *Laṅkāvatāra* school" deals with the early stage transmission of the teachings of the Chan school based on the LAS.<sup>11</sup>

The first of these documents to concern us is a Chan history, the *Chuan fa pao chi*... A brief work, it contains a short preface and then presents brief biographies of the Patriarchs in China. References to and quotations from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* demonstrated that the school which the *Chuan fa pao chi* represents concentrated its teachings on this sutra... This sutra is frequently cited in later Chan histories to prove the legitimacy of the Chan tradition.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Yampolsky (1967), 3-57.

<sup>12</sup> Yampolsky (1967), 5-6.

Even though there is much evidence supporting the Chan school's utilization of the LAS during the early stage of the teaching transmissions between master and disciple, to date, almost no research has been conducted on specific areas of concentration in the LAS, or how the LAS was applied to Chan teachings. I believe that one reason for this lack of written evidence that in China the early followers of the Chan school, who were Buddhist practitioners, depended on the oral transmission of their teachings, rather than committing the teachings of the LAS to written commentaries, as was usually done by monk scholars of other traditions. Still, the way in which the Chan masters understood the essential teachings found in the LAS, requires more attention and further research. However, this will not be discussed here.

In China, after the fall of the Tang dynasty, the later stages of scholastic Buddhism declined, and as a result, the glorious Huayan school was gradually absorbed into the Chan school. During the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties, most of the commentaries on the LAS were written by Chan masters.<sup>13</sup> Due to this combination of the two schools of Buddhism, I believe that the doctrinal interpretation of mind-only in the Huayan school provided the Buddhist philosophical background for the Chan school, which is apparent in the commentaries on the LAS by later Chan masters. Even though East Asian Buddhism was established upon the doctrines of both the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and the *Avataṃsakasūtra*, research in this field of studying Chinese commentaries on the LAS is highly limited and needs further investigation.

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<sup>13</sup> Takasaki (1980), 1-2.

In Chinese Buddhism, the LAS was related to the Dilun school through Bodhiruci's influence during the Sui dynasty.<sup>14</sup> It is important to remember that Bodhiruci translated the LAS and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. The Dilun school's doctrine was based upon the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, and in particular, on Vasubandhu's commentary, the *Daśabhūmikavyākhyā*. The Dilun school was divided into two branches, the southern Dilun school and the northern Dilun school. This division was brought about due to the different interpretations of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* of Bodhiruci and Ratnamati.<sup>15</sup> As a result of this division, while the southern sect of the Dilun school was based upon the four-volume version of the Chinese translation of the LAS, the northern sect of the Dilun school drew from the ten-volume version of the Chinese translation of the LAS by Bodhiruci.<sup>16</sup> By favoring the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* the Dilun school did not declare the LAS as their primary text, even though the Dilun school was among the Chinese Yogācāra schools. What connected of the LAS to the Dilun school is found the fact that the Yogācārin Bodhiruci translated the LAS as well as the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* which they favored.

Among the Chinese sources from the Tang dynasty, there are three commentaries on the LAS. These were written by Wenhui, Chiyan (ca.602-680), and Fazang (ca. 643-712). Among these three commentators, Chiyan and Fazang were the major figures in the

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<sup>14</sup> Paul (1984), 46-68.

<sup>15</sup> Paul (1984), 48-49.

<sup>16</sup> Paul (1984), 46-71.

development of the Huayan school.<sup>17</sup> Among the three commentaries, Wenhui's<sup>18</sup> and Chiyan's are based on the four-volume version of the Chinese translation of the LAS. Unfortunately, these two commentaries exist only in fragments.

Chiyan's commentary is also based on the four-volume version, and some fragments of the chapters remain in the *Zhokuzōkyō*.<sup>19</sup> The significance of these two commentaries to the history of Chinese Buddhism is threefold. First, these works are officially the first Chinese commentaries on the LAS. Second, these works span the entire four-volume version of the Chinese translation of the LAS. And third, they are explained by a Buddhist scholar with philosophical depth. Unlike Wenhui and Chiyan, both of whom based their commentaries on the four-volume version of the Chinese translation of the LAS, Fazang's commentary is based on Śikṣānanda's seven-volume version of the Chinese translation. Fazang did not write an in-depth commentary but only a summary.<sup>20</sup> Fazang's work was composed after Śikṣānanda's completion of the Chinese translation of the seven-volume version of the LAS. The main aim of Fazang's summary was to present the philosophical position of the LAS in Mahayana Buddhism.

It is not clear to me why Buddhist scholars in the Huayan school were so interested in the LAS. It could be that the inspiration came from doctrines of the Dilun school. Prior to the establishment of the Huayan school, Dilun school scholars studied

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<sup>17</sup> P. Williams, *Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 116-138, and R. Gimello and P. Gregory, ed. *Studies in Chan and Huayan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983).

<sup>18</sup> See Chapter Two.

<sup>19</sup> *Zhokuzōkyō*, vol. 91.

<sup>20</sup> *Ru leng jia xin xuan yi*, Taisho vol. 39 no. 1790, pp. 425-433.



the doctrine of mind-only, which was based on the *Dasābhūmikasūtra*. As is well known, the Huayan school absorbed the fundamental philosophy worked out by Dilun school scholars. As we have seen above the LAS was an influence on Dilun scholars. And two relevant Buddhist texts for understanding the doctrine of mind-only for the Huayan school were the LAS and the *Da cheng qi xin lun*.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Y. Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), 3-19.

## 3-2. Philosophical Account

### I. Introduction

The main aim of this section is to investigate the primary themes of the LAS through new approaches which appear in the two Indian commentaries on the LAS, *Āryaṇkāvatārasūtravṛtti* and *Tathāgatahṛdayālaṃkāra*. In order to investigate the main themes in the LAS my research concentrates on the first chapter of two Indian commentaries instead of focusing on the tenth chapter. There are two reasons for this. First, my assumption is that the first chapter was added by Madhyamaka thinkers, and the tenth by Yogācāra thinkers. This assumption is based on my research on both the second and the third chapters of my dissertation.

Second, Buddhist commentators introduce the main ideas and structures of the text in their first chapters. Similarly, these two Indian commentators also express their major ideas in their first chapters. This is particularly true for Jñānavajra.<sup>22</sup> For these two reasons, I will focus on the first chapter of their commentaries to investigate the main themes of the LAS along with other chapters of the LAS.

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<sup>22</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 32b and 60b.

## II. Main Themes of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*

Relying on the previous research on the LAS, Buddhist scholars have considered the unique teachings of the LAS from many different aspects. Among these teachings, a few doctrines are commonly shared: first, the four subjects, i.e., the five *dharma*s, the three *svabhāva*s, the eight *vijñāna*s, and the two *nirātmanyas*. Second, the notion of *tathāgata*garbha is contemplated and considered identical with *ālayavijñāna*. Finally, the doctrine of mind-only is considered to be the main teaching of this sūtra.

The LAS consists of the teachings of the five *dharma*s, the three *svabhāva*s, the eight *vijñāna*s, and the two *nirātmanyas*.<sup>23</sup> Although these four subjects are representative of the LAS, no one knows how to utilize these teachings or connect them to the main teachings of this sūtra. These four subjects are mentioned in the sixth chapter, *Kṣaṇika* (momentary).<sup>24</sup> In the ten-volume version of the LAS, Bodhiruci sets up the sub-chapter, entitled *pañcadharma* (five dharma)s. One of the significant tenets in this sūtra, the five *dharma*s is explained in relation to the three *svabhāva*s.<sup>25</sup> This relationship appears in the second as well as in the sixth chapter.

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<sup>23</sup> Suzuki (1968), 169-201 and Suganuma (1967), 963-956.

<sup>24</sup> Nanjio edition, pp. 224-229.

<sup>25</sup> Nanjio edition, pp. 128-133, in the second chapter, and pp. 228-229, in the sixth chapter;  
This is example from the second chapter;  
nimittaṃ nāma saṃkalpaḥ svabhāva-dvaya-lakṣaṇam/  
samyagjñānaṃ hi tathatā pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇam//193//

	Nāma		
	Nimitta	Palikalpita	
The Five Dharmas	Vikalpa	Paratantra	The Three Svabhāvas
	Samyagjñāna		
	Tathatā	Pariniṣpanna	

The five *dharma*s (*pañcadharma*), i.e., name (*nāma*), appearance (*nimitta*), discrimination (*vikalpa*), right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*), and suchness (*tathatā*), are nothing but the two truths, conventional and ultimate (*saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*). This notion of two truths is divided into the three *svabhāvas* because the four subjects are tools in explaining the nature of object of knowledge (*jñeya*). Traditionally, Madhyamaka thinkers divide all knowledge of objects into two categories, the conventional truth and ultimate truth, while Yogācāra thinkers explain this through the three *svabhāvas*. Yogācāra thinkers attempt to find the common nature of all phenomena with nature (*svabhāva*). In the LAS, the attempt is to build a bridge between the two truths of the Madhyamaka school and the three *svabhāvas* of the Yogācāra school in order to define object of knowledge (*jñeya*). Consequently, this philosophical tendency is attractive to the later Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers. At any rate, the fundamental function of these four subjects is to describe the nature of object of knowledge both in conventional truth and ultimate truth.

Let us present the ideas of the two Indian commentaries concerning of these subjects. In the first chapter of his commentary, Jñānaśrībhadrā mentions these four subjects as common Mahayana tenets.

A summary of every intend of Mahayana: within the Five *dharma*s, the (three) *svabhāva*s, the eight consciousness, and two non-substantialities. The Mahayana goes beyond all. As for the Five *dharma*s, (they are name, mark, concept, true gnosis, and *tathāta*) and these are subsumed under the imaged, dependent-on-other what is consummatedly established...<sup>26</sup>

Jñānaśrībhadrā explains not only the relationship between the five *dharma*s and the three *svabhāva*s, but also the other two subjects. What is interesting in the above quotation is

<sup>26</sup> Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 4a: ཚེས་ལྟ་དང་། རང་བཞིན་དང་། རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དང་། བདག་མེད་པ་གཉིས་ཁོང་དུ་རྒྱུད་པར་རྟོགས་པ་ མདོ་ རྟེན་ ལས་ འབྱུང་ གྱེ། ཐེག་ པ་ ཆེན་ པོའི་ རོན་ རམས་ ཅན་ བསྟུ་ བ་ བློ་ ཚེས་ ལྟ་ རྣམས་ དང་ རང་ བཞིན་ དང་། རྣམ་ པར་ ཤེས་ པ་ བརྒྱུད་ རྣམས་ དང་། བདག་ མེད་ པ་ གཉིས་ གྱི་ བར་ རྟེན་ བློ་ ཐེག་ པ་ ཆེན་ པོ་ རམས་ ཅན་ འདས་ ཚེས་ ལྟ་ ལ་ མིང་ དང་། མཚན་ མ་ དང་། རྟོག་ པ་ དང་། ཡར་ དག་ པའི་ ཡེ་ ཤེས་ དང་། དེ་ བཞིན་ རྟེན་ དང་། དེ་ དག་ བློ་ གུན་ བརྟོགས་ པ་ དང་། གཞན་ གྱི་ དཔར་ དང་། ཡོངས་ ལྟ་ གྱུ་ བར་ བསྟུ་ གྱེ། མིང་ བློ་ གུན་ རྟེན་ བརྟོགས་ པར་ རོ་ མཚན་ མ་ དང་། རྟོག་ པ་ བློ་ གཞན་ གྱི་ དཔར་ རྟོག་ ཡར་ དག་ པའི་ ཡེ་ ཤེས་ དང་། དེ་ བཞིན་ རྟེན་ བློ་ ཡོངས་ ལྟ་ གྱུ་ བར་ བསྟུ་ རོ་ རང་ བཞིན་ བློ་ ཚེས་ གྱི་ དབྱིངས་ རེ། མིང་ པ་ དང་། བར་ པའི་ རྣམ་ མོང་ བློ་ རྒྱུད་ པར་ རྟེན་ བར་ རྟོགས་ རོ་ རྣམ་ པར་ ཤེས་ པ་ བརྒྱུད་ བློ་ མིག་ ལ་ རོགས་ པ་ འཇུག་ པའི་ རྣམ་ པར་ ཤེས་ པ་ རྟོག་ དང་། རྟོན་ མོངས་ པའི་ ཡིད་ དང་། གུན་ གཞི་ རྣམ་ པར་ ཤེས་ པ་ རོ་ བདག་ མེད་ པ་ གཉིས་ བློ་ བར་ ཟག་ ལ་ བདག་ མེད་ པ་ དང་། ཚེས་ ལ་ བདག་ མེད་ པ་ རོ་ བར་ རྟུན་ པ་ དེ་ དག་ རམས་ ཅན་ བློ་ རྒྱུད་ ཅིག་ པ་ ཡིན་ རེ། བེ་ རོགས་ གྱི་ རྒྱ་ དང་། འབབ་ རྒྱ་ བཞིན་ རོ་ རྟོག་ པ་ མ་ རྒྱེ་ ལས་ བློ་ ཡོད་ པར་ མི་ བརྒྱུད་ གྱེ། མོ་ གཤམ་ གྱི་ རྟེན་ ལ་ རོགས་ པ་ བཞིན་ པས་ བློ་ བར་ ཟག་ ལ་ བདག་ མེད་ རོ་ ཚེས་ ལ་ བདག་ མེད་ པ་ ཡར་ གཞུགས་ ལ་ རོགས་ པའི་ ཚེས་ རྟོག་ པ་ དང་། རྣམ་ ཤེས་ རྣམས་ ཤེས་ རབ་ གྱིས་ གཞིགས་ བ་ བློ་ བར་ བ་ དང་། རྟེན་ དང་། རྟོགས་ ཚེས་ ལ་ ཚེས་ ཤེས་ བ་ བཞིན་ རྟེན་ རོང་ པར་ འབྱུང་ རོ།

that nature is the expanded space (*dharmadhātu*), and it is the object of entering both *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.

One of the overall themes of the LAS is the notion of two truths, and these two truths have a common nature (*svabhāva*), which is the mind. As Mahayanists, two Indian commentators Jñānaśrībhaddra and Jñānavajra insist on the notion of non-substantiality of phenomenon, going so far as to explain that even in conventional truth, the mind is the same of all objects, i. e. there are no substances separate from those of the mind. Therefore, the final goal of teaching the four subjects is that, in the conventional truth, mind-only (*cittamātra*) should be realized, and doing so is the entrance of inner realization (*pratyātmagatigocara*) into ultimate truth.

In the beginning of his commentary, Jñānavajra explains the subject, object, purpose, and connection of this sutra in detail.<sup>27</sup>

དེ་ཡང་འདིར་རྣམ་པ་བཞིའི་སྒོ་ནས་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བྱེད་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་དགོས་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་  
 དགོས་པའི་དགོས་པའོ་དེ་ལ་འདིར་དགོས་འབྲེལ་དེ་རྣམས་དང་ལྡན་པའི་རྫོད་བྱེད་མདོ་ལྟེན་རྩིས་གང་ཞེ  
 བླ་མདོ་ལྟེན་འདིར་གཏོགས་པའི་མིང་ཚིག་ཡི་གེའི་ཚིགས་དུ་མར་འབྲེལ་བར་ཡིན་གྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལམ་  
 དེ་གནས་གྱུར་པ་ཡི་ཤེས་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་འགའ་ཞིག་ལ་སྒྲར་བ་ལ་བཞེན་ནས་བཟོད་བྱའི་དོན་རེས་པ་འབྲེན་  
 པར་རྣམ་པ་ཞི་རྫོད་པར་བྱེད་པའི་མདོ་ལྟེན་འདི་ཁྱད་པར་འདི་ཉིད་དོ། ... དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་རྩིས་གྱུར་པའི་མདོ་ལྟེན་  
 འདིའི་བཟོད་པར་བྱ་བ་ཞི་རིག་པ་དང་སྒྲོང་པ་བྱུང་དུ་འཇུག་པ་མཐའ་གཉིས་རྣམ་པར་སྒྲར་བ་རྣམ་པར་  
 རིག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་དབྱུང་མ་གྱི་དཔྱད་དོན་ཡང་ཀུན་ནས་ཉེན་མེད་པ་དང་རྣམ་པར་བྱུང་བའི་ཚིགས་ཐམས་ཅད་

<sup>27</sup> Jñānavajra, D:2a-3-3a-1, P: 2b-3-3a-8, C: 2a-3-3a-1: 1. p. ཏུ 2. C. ཁྱོད 3. P. ཏུ 4. C. ཏུ

མེས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་འཕྱུལ་པ་ཡིན་པས་མེས་ལས་ཐ་དང་པ་མེད་ཅེས་མེས་ཉིད་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ཡང་རྒྱུ་རྫོབ་  
 ཏུ་<sup>1</sup> རྩེད་<sup>2</sup> རིག་ཅིང་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཡིན་ཞིང་དོན་དམ་པར་རྩེད་པ་ཉིད་དེ། དེ་དག་གྱུར་པ་ལྟར་ལྟོན་ཏུ་ལྷན་  
 བཅས་པ་གྱུར་ཏུ་འཇུག་པའི་ངོ་ཤོ་གླེ། ཞིབ་ཏུ་ནི་འོག་ནས་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱའོ། དེ་ལ་རེ་ཞིག་རྫོང་བྱེད་ཀྱི་  
 རྩེད་ཀྱིས་གྱུར་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་རྫོང་བྱེད་དང་འཕྲེན་པར་གྱི་རི་རྣམ་པའི་རྩེད་ཏུ་གྱུར་བ་ནི་དཔེས་ལུ་བཞེད་  
 པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ལ་བཞེན་ནས་རྩེད་པར་བྱ་བའི་དོན་ཀྱི་རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་རིག་པ་དང་རྩེད་པ་གྱུར་  
 ཏུ་འཇུག་པ་འཕགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་མོ་མོར་རང་གིས་རིག་པར་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཞེན་པའི་བཞེད་བྱའོ། བཞེད་པར་  
 བྱ་བ་དེ་དག་གྱི་རི་རྣམ་པའི་རྩེད་ཏུ་<sup>3</sup> རྩེད་པ་འཇུག་ཅིང་ལྟ་བུ་བཞིན་ཏུ་ཉམས་ལུ་རྩེད་པ་ནི་དཔེས་པའོ།  
 དཔེས་བ་དེ་ཉིད་རྫོང་བྱེད་མདོ་གླེ་ལ་རག་ལས་པ་ནི་འཕྲེལ་པ་ཞེས་བྱའོ། དེ་ལྟར་རྩེད་པ་འཇུག་ལུ་  
 རྩེད་པའི་དོན་ཡང་ནས་ཡང་ཏུ་གོམས་པ་ལ་བཞེན་ནས་གོམས་པར་རབ་ཀྱི་མཐར་ཕྱིན་པ་དྲི་མ་ཐམས་ཅན་  
 བག་ཆགས་དང་བཅས་ཏེ་རྒྱུས་པ། དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་དང་ཡང་དག་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་དབྱེར་མེད་པ། ཡོན་རྟན་  
 ཐམས་ཅན་ཀྱི་གཏེར་ཏུ་<sup>4</sup> གྱུར་པ། རྩེད་ཀྱི་སྒྲིལ་ངོ་ཤོ་ནི་དཔེས་པའི་དཔེས་པའོ།

Based on the above, there are three steps: first, the nature of mind. In conventional truth, the mind is the receiver, and, ultimately, it is empty. Second, after understanding the nature of mind, noble people have to realize the self-mark (*svalakṣaṇa*) in the space of reason and emptiness. Finally, as noble people practice gradually, they abandon all defilement, and obtain a dharmabody (*dharmakāya*), which is the storage of all qualities.

Here, we examine the themes in this sutra in light of the methods of these two commentators. In the LAS, the 108 questions and answers at the beginning of the second chapter are considered to be the condensed main structure of the LAS. This consists of two parts; the first is Bodhisattva Mahāmāti's questions, and the second is Buddha's answers. We have to pay attention to the following verse, which is considered Buddha's essential goal:

The Buddha answers: “Let sons of the Victorious One ask me, and, Mahāmati, you too ask and I will talk to you about my inner realization (*pratyātmagatigocara*).”<sup>28</sup>

Jñānaśrībhadrā comments on these above sentences as follows:

The Lord also asked the body of answer and question to chief Mahāmati.... the object of the inner realization is the object to the self-cognition. Therefore, the Omniscience One considered that “I will show you the ultimate reality, non-duality, mere correct cognition by which becomes special wisdom through samadhi of having appearance and without appearance by means of general manner.”<sup>29</sup>

Buddha and Jñānaśrībhadrā think that the main goal of the discourses in this sutra is to show the inner realization (*pratyātmagatigocaram*), which is ultimate truth.

<sup>28</sup> Nanjio edition, p. 23, in the chapter 2;

tasya tad vacanaṃ śrutvā buddho lokavidāṃ varaḥ/  
nirīkṣya pariśadaṃ sarvaṃ-alapī sugata-ātmajam//10//  
pṛcchantu mām jinasūtrās-tvaṃ ca pṛccha mahāmate/  
ahaṃ te deśayiṣyāmi pratyātmagati-gocaram//11//

།དེའི་ཚིག་དེ་གསུན་པ་དང་། །ཡང་ཡང་འཇིག་རྟེན་མཐུ་པའི་མཆོག་ལྷན་ཅན་འཕགས་པ་མ་གཟིགས་ནས། །བདེ་གསལ་སྤྱད་པ་  
གསུངས་པ་ནི། །ངའ་དྲིམ་གྱི་གསུང་སྤྱད་པས། །ཁ་གསུང་ནས་ཐོས་ཀྱང་དྲིམ། །ཁོ་མོར་ང་ཡི་གསུང་ཡུལ་ནི། །ངའི་མཐུང་ལ་བཞག་  
པར་བྱ།

<sup>29</sup> Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 31a:

བཅོམ་ལྷན་འདས་གྱིས་ཀྱང་བཅུན་གཙོ་བོ་སྤྱོད་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་སྐབས་ཐུབ་དང་། འདྲི་བའི་ལུས་ལྟ་  
བར་བྱེད་དོ་མོ་མོ་རང་གི་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་རང་གིས་ཤིག་པར་བྱ་པ་ལྟ། དེས་ན་གང་གིས་སྤྱང་བ་དང་བཅས་པ་དང་སྤྱང་བ་  
མེད་པའི་རྟེན་པེ་འཇིག་གྱིས་ཁྱད། པར་བྱེད་ཡེ་ཞེས་ལུ་འགྱུར་བ་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་མི་གཉིས་པ་ཡང་དག་པར་ཤིག་པ་  
ཙམ་ཉིད་སྤྱི་རྒྱུ་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་ངས་སྤྱོད་ལ་བསྟན་པར་བྱའོ་ཞེས་མཇུག་ཅན་མཐུན་པས་དགོངས་པའོ།



Moreover, in the first chapter, Rāvaṇa requests Bodhisattva Mahāmati to ask

Buddha:

Honoring Mahāmati as the best speaker, Rāvaṇa and the company of the Yakṣas honored and requested of him again and again, you are the asker of the Buddhas concerning the state of inner realization.<sup>30</sup>

This verse is one of forty-three verses in the beginning of the first chapter. These verses summarize the condensed 108 questions and answers in the second chapter, and the above verse provides a connection between the first chapter and the main body of the LAS. In the second chapter, Bodhisattva Mahāmati, the chief disciple from the audience, mainly poses questions to Buddha, while, in the first chapter, Rāvaṇa, the lord of Yakṣas, does so. Therefore, the author of the first chapter feels some compunction to show the common goal of the questions of these two disciples.

Consequently, the main goal of the LAS is to obtain inner realization. On analyzing the terminology of inner realization in the first chapter, the final stage of inner realization is the Buddha stage: *tathāgata-garbha-svapratyātma-ārya-jñāna-gocarasya* and *tathāgata- svapratyātma-bhūmi*. In other words, attaining Buddhahood, dharmabody, is the final goal of the LAS.

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<sup>30</sup> Nanjio edition, p. 7,  
rāvaṇo yakṣa-vargāśca sampūjya vadatām varam /  
mahāmatim pūjayanti adhyeṣanti punaḥ punaḥ /  
tvam praṣṭā sarva-buddhānām pratyātma-gati-gocaram //28//

Throughout the history of Buddhism, the most important subject is grasping the final goal as well as understanding what that final goal is. In the LAS:

Lord, ask to explain here the manner of dharma of showing self-awareness/cognition which is non-substantiality of personality and freed from view and purification and dharma storage of manner of the nature of mind.<sup>31</sup>

Both commentators clearly show the main ideas of this verse as follows (the first quotation is from Jñānaśrībhadrā, the second from Jñānavajra:

མེས་མ་གདོགས་པར་གཟུགས་ལ་མོགས་པ་མྱི་ཆོས་མེད་པ་ནི་བཅོམ་ལྷན་འདས་ཀྱིས་འདི་ཉིད་ཏུ་  
གཟུངས་པ། གཟུགས་ནི་རྒྱལ་ལྷན་གཞིགས་པ་ན། རྒྱལ་ལྷན་ཆ་ནི་ཡོད་པ་མེད། ཞེས་པ་ལ། འོན་ཅི་ཞིག་སྒྲ་  
ཞེས་པ་དང་། མྱི་ཡི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་ཡང་། མེས་མ་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ལུ་སྒྲ། ཞེས་པ་ལོ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་ནི་  
གཉིས་ཀྱི་མི་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན་ཡང་། གཉིས་དང་མི་གཉིས་པ་འི་སྒྲེ་མཆོད་ཆོས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་ལོ། དེ་ལ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་  
མཆོན་ཉིད་ནི་ཡུང་པོ་དང་། ཁམས་དང་། དང་། རྟེན་ཅིག་འབྲེལ་པར་འབྱུང་བ་དང་། བྱང་ཆུབ་ཀྱི་ཚུགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་  
ལུས་ཅུ་ཅུ་བརྟན་དང་། རྟོགས་བརྟན་དང་། མི་འཛིགས་པ་ལ་མོགས་པ་འི་མཆོན་ཉིད་དོ། མི་གཉིས་པ་འི་རང་  
བཞིན་འཛིན་པ་དང་། གཟུང་བ་དང་། རྟོན་པ་དང་། བཟོད་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་། རྟེན་པ་དང་། བསྐྱེད་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་།  
བྱ་བ་དང་། བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང་། དགོས་པོ་དང་། དངོས་པོ་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་དང་ལྷན་གྱིས་བཟོ།<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Nanjio edition, p. 3,  
citta-svabhāva-naya-dharma-vidhiṃ nairātmyaṃ drṣṭi-vigataṃ hi-amalam/  
pratyātmavedyagati-sūcanakaṃ deśchi nāyaka iha dharma-nayam//1//  
མེས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་ཚུལ་ཉིད་ཆོས་ཀྱི་གདེར། །བདག་མེད་ལྷན་འདས་བྱེད་མེད། །ཁོ་མོ་རང་ཅིག་ཞེས་པ་ལྟོན་པ་ཡི།  
།ཆོས་ཚུལ་མགོན་པོ་འདིར་ཡང་བཤད་ཏུ་གསོལ།

<sup>32</sup> Jñānaśrībhadrā, D:7b-1.

འདིར་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་དང་བཞད་པའི་ཚུལ་ལས་དང་པོར་གྲུབ་པའི་མཐའ་མྱོན་པ་ནི་མོ་མོར་<sup>1</sup> རང་རིག་  
 པའི་བར་གྱིས་ཏེ། དོན་ནི་མིང་གསུམ་ལེས་ལུ་འདུལ་ཤིང་ལེས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ཚུལ་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་<sup>2</sup>  
 མྱོང་བའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡིན་ཅིང་དོན་དམ་པར་མྱོང་པ་གྲེ་དེ་ཡང་ཐུར་བསྐྱེད་པ་ལྟར་ཕན་ཚུན་རྒྱུ་ཏུ་འཇུག་  
 བ་རིག་པ་དང་མྱོང་པ་དབྱེར་མེད་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཀུན་གཞིའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་མཐའ་ལྷན་པ་གྲེ་ཀུན་  
 ལས་ཉོན་མོངས་པ་དང་རྣམ་པར་བྱུང་བའི་ཚོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་གཏེར་ཏུ་<sup>3</sup> ལྷུང་པའོ་དེའི་དག་ཟུག་དང་  
 ཚོས་ཀྱི་བདག་གིས་མྱོང་ཅིང་དེའི་དེད་གྱིས་འཇིག་ཚོགས་ལ་ལྷ་བ་ལ་མོགས་པ་ལྷ་བར་གྱུར་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་  
 ཡུལ་ལས་འདས་པས་ལྷ་དང་རྣམ་པར་ལྷན་ཞེས་པའོ། ...མྱོན་པའི་ཚོས་ཚུལ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་བཞད་པའི་ཚུལ་ཏེ།  
 གསུང་རབ་ཡན་ལག་བརྒྱ་གཉིས་ལས་དགྲུག་བསྐྱེད་པའོ་དེ་ལ་འདིར་མྱོན་པ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་མྱོན་  
 པ་གྲེ་དེ་ཡང་དགོ་བ་མྱོན་པ་དང་མི་དགོ་བ་མྱོན་པ་ལས་འདིར་ནི་དགོ་བར་གྱུར་པ་མྱོན་པ་གྲེ་ཀྱི་རིགས་  
 ཀྱི་བྱ་དག་ལུས་ཀྱི་མི་དགོ་བའི་ལས་ཡོངས་ལུ་སྤྱད་<sup>4</sup> བར་བྱའོ་དེའི་ཕྱིར་ནི་མི་ལུས་ཀྱི་མི་དགོ་བའི་  
 ལས་ཡོངས་ལུ་སྤངས་ན་རྣམ་པར་གྲོལ་བར་འགྱུར་རོ།<sup>33</sup>

Carefully examining the two commentators' interpretations, the nature of mind is the subject of this sentence. Similarly, verse 106 of the tenth chapter is identical with verse 2 of the fourth chapter, and appears as follows:

Seven stages are the mind, the non-appearance is the eighth stage. Here, two stages (ninth and tenth) are space, and other stage (Buddha stage) is my nature.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 17a-1-17a-6, P: 20a-1-20a-7, C: 17a-1-17a-6: 1. p. ལྷ 2. P. ཏུ 3. P. ཏུ c. ཏུ 4. P. ལྷ c.

ལྷ

<sup>34</sup> Nanjio edition, p. 215 and p. 278,  
 cittam hi bhūmayah sapta nirābhāsā va aṣṭam  
 dve bhūmayo vihārasva śeṣā bhūmirmamātmikā//106//  
 ལ་བརྒྱན་དག་ནི་ལེས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ལྷུང་བ་མེད་པ་བརྒྱད་པའོ། འདིར་ནི་ལ་གཉིས་གནས་ཡིན་ཏེ། ལ་གསལ་དཔེ་རང་བཞིན་ནོ།

In this sutra, the bridge between conventional truth and ultimate truth is the eighth stage. The first seven stages are the object world of the mind. The main goal of the mind stage, the seventh stage, is to obtain the *dhamatā* (dharmaness, the nature of phenomenon) covered by all dharmas (phenomena).<sup>35</sup>

Bodhisattvas who enter into the eighth stage completely understand the doctrine of mind-only. In the first chapter, the terminology of *parāvṛttā-aśraya*, *svacitta-dṛśya-mātra- adhigama*, *vikalpa-pracāra-sthita*, and *anutpattika-dharma- kṣanti-adhigata*<sup>36</sup> shows how to enter into the eighth stage. Jñānavajra indicates the same opinion as follows:

Furthermore, since it is said that the lord of Lanka is changed and understands how to obtain the tolerance of non-arising dharma, it is clear that Rāvaṇa is the eighth stage etc.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> atha vā dharmatā hi-eṣā dharmāṇāṃ citta-gocare/  
na ca bāla-avabudhyante mohitā viśca-kalpanaiḥ//41//

|འིན་ཏེ་ཐེམ་མ་གྱི་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་ལ། ཆོས་རྣམས་གྱི་ནི་ཆོས་ཉིད་དམ། རང་གི་རྟོག་པས་སྤྱོད་པ་ཡི། བྱིས་པ་རྣམས་གྱིས་མི་ཤེས་པོ།

<sup>36</sup> གནས་ཤིན་ཏུ་གྱུར་པ། རང་གི་ཐེམ་མ་སྤངས་པ་ཅམ་དུ་ཁོང་དུ་རྟོག་པ་རབ་དུ་རྟོགས། མ་ཐག་དུ་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པའི་རྒྱ་བལ་ལ་གནས་པ།  
མ་སྤྱོད་པའི་ཆོས་ལ་བཟོད་པ་ཐོབ་པར་བྱགས་ལུ་རྟོག་

<sup>37</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 15a-3-4, P: 17b-8-18a-1, C: 15a-3-15a-4: གཞན་ ཡང་ ལང་ ཀའི་ བདག་ པོ་ གནས་ ཤིན་ ཏུ་ གྱུར་ ཞེས་ པ་  
དང་ མི་ སྤྱོད་ བའི་ ཆོས་ ལ་ བཟོད་ པ་ ཐོབ་ པ་ཉིད་དུ་ ཐུགས་ ལུ་ རྟོག་ ཅེས་གསུངས་ པས་ འདིས་ བརྟུན་ པ་ ལ་ ཐོགས་ པ་ ཡིན་ པར་ མཐོན། ཁོ།

Consequently, in this sutra, the notion of mind-only is required to obtain the true nature of conventional and ultimate truths, because this *dhamatā* (dharmaness, the nature of phenomenon) is the same as the nature of ultimate truth. Once a practitioner enter into the eighth stage, inner realization (*pratyātmagatigocaram*) is the object of focus, rather than a focus on mind. To be successful in inner realization is to enter ultimate truth.

Finally, we understand why the four subjects are discussed twice in this sutra, in the second and the sixth chapters. In the second chapter, they are investigated from the conventional viewpoint. In other words, the nature of all phenomena is the object of the mind. In the sixth chapter, on the other hand, they are investigated from the standpoint of ultimate reality, the object of inner realization. For this reason, Jñānavajra explains his philosophical position in the beginning part of the dharma and adharma section of the first chapter. He considers this part to be the pinnacle of Buddha's teachings in this sutra. Similarly, Jñānaśrībhadrā divides the first chapter into three small sections. The last one is the section of dharma and adharma.<sup>38</sup> The framework of the three sections in his first chapter is also the framework of the entire sutra.

Likewise, Buddha also asks for an explanation of how to understand dharma and adharma in duality (conventional world). What does Rāvaṇa think? Nobles do not understand the *dhamatā* of object of non-duality

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<sup>38</sup> Jñānaśrībhadrā, D:30a: འཕགས་པ་ལང་ག་གཤེགས་པའི་བཞད་པ་ཡི་ཤེས་དབང་བཟང་པོས་བྱས་པ་ལས། ལེའུ་དང་པོ་  
སྤྱི་མཐི་རྣམ་པར་ཐར་པ་ཐོབ་ཅིང་འཇིག་རྟེན་གསུམ་ལས་རྣམ་པར་རྒྱལ་བ་རྣམས་ལ་མི་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐབས་ལ་མཁས་པས་བྱང་  
ཆུབ་ལེས་དཔའི་སྤྱད་པ་དང་ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་པ་གསོལ་བའི་ལན་བཀའ་རྒྱུ་པ་དང་ལེའུ་མཆོག་གསུམ་མོ།

ultimate truth through two kinds of dharma and adharma. Understanding of two kinds of dhamma and adharma on *dhammatā* of duality (conventional truth) is shown to be an emanation and illusiory. In the tenth stage, the nature which persists in one who understand ultimate truth, is the non-duality that is agreeable with the manner of dharma and is like showing that consecrated one, and causes to demonstrate the dharma which is not a falling object of the word of Buddha's bodies.<sup>39</sup>

It is important to recognize that while the final teachings of dharma and adharmā from ultimate truth are discussed in the LAS as the main goal, nevertheless, the nature of the mind is the fundamental doctrine elucidated in the LAS.

To understand all of these main themes in the LAS, we have to notice Jñānavajra's framework for this sutra. Jñānavajra explains the structure of these connections most clearly in his first chapter.

འདི་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ནི་སྤང་སྤང་གཞི་བསྟན་པ་འོས་པ་མཛད་ཅིང་ཕྱི་ལྷན་རྒྱུ་ཡང་འཁོད་པ་གྲོ་དེ་ཡང་ལེན་  
རྒྱུ་པ་བསྟན་ཀྱི་ཚེ་ནས་སྟོན་ལ་དེ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དོན་བསྟན་པ་ནི་རྣམ་པ་ལྗོངས་པར་བྱ་པ་འདི་དོན་རྒྱུ་

[illegible]

པར་བསྟན་པ་དང་དེ་རྒྱུ་ལྟ་བུ་ལ་མེས་ཀྱི་ཚེས་ཉིད་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པའི་རྣམ་པོ་ལས་  
 རིགས་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་བསྟན་པ་དང་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་འོ་མ་སྟོང་པར་བྱེད་པ་མཛོན་པར་རྟོགས་པ་ལས་གྱི་བྱེད་ཐུག  
 བསྟན་པ་དང་སྐྱེས་པས་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་ཐོབ་པ་གནས་སྐབས་དང་མཐར་ཐུག་པའི་འབྲས་བྱུང་<sup>40</sup>

Moreover,

གཞན་པར་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱིས་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ལ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཉིད་ཏུ་ཤེས་ཏེ་དེ་ཉིད་དོན་དམ་པ་<sup>1</sup>ཤེས་པ་ཡང་  
 ཡིན་ནོ། དེ་ལ་འདིར་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཕྱིར་དོན་དགག་པ་དང་སྐྱེས་པ་མེས་པོས་ཏུ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་དོན་དམ་  
 པར་མེས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་རྟོག་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་དང་དེ་ཉིད་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པའི་རྣམ་པོ་ལས་  
 རིགས་ཉིད་ཏུ་བསྟན་པ་དང་རིགས་དེ་ཉིད་སྟོང་<sup>2</sup>པར་བྱེད་པའི་ལས་གྱི་རིམ་པ་དང་སྐྱེས་པས་རྣམ་པར་  
 དག་པ་ཐོབ་པའི་ཚུགས་མཛོད་བཟོད་བྱའི་དོན་རྣམ་པར་བྱེ་བེ་གོང་ཏུ་བསྟན་པ་དེ་བཞིན་ཏུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱུང་།<sup>41</sup>

This is Jñānavajra's framework of the entire sutra. The first three categories (a, b, and c) and (1) are nothing more than the notion of two truths. The main goal is explained as the realization of the nature of mind-only of all phenomena (*dharmas*) and emptiness. Next, the notion of *tathāgatagarbha*, (2) and (d), concern the realization of the self-mark. Finally, the path and fruition, (3, 4) and (e, f) concern practice and the attaining of the dharmabody.

<sup>40</sup> Jñānavajra, D:12a-6- 12a-7, P: 14b-5-14b-8, C: 12b-1-12b-3.

<sup>41</sup> Jñānavajra, D:37b-5-38a-1, P: 43b-1-43b-4, C: 37b-4-37b-6: 1. c. པར་ 2. P. སྟོང་ 3. སྟོང་

Jñānavajra's framework is also connected to the four subjects of this sutra. The five *dharma*s and the three *svabhāvas* are related to the two truths, conventional and ultimate. This is number (1) and (a ,b, and c) in his structure. Second, the eight *vijñānas* are related to the *tathāgata*garbha, (2) and (d). Generally speaking, the most significant philosophy in this sutra is the eighth consciousness, *ālayavijñāna*, which is identical to the *tathāgata*garbha. Finally, the two *nirātmanyas* are related to the path and the result. The fundamental tenets for Mahayanists are to completely realize the non-substantiality of self and phenomenon. Furthermore, the main body of the LAS, from the second to the eighth chapter, can be divided into two truths. Jñānavajra mentions the eight chapters, including the first chapter, where he defines the characteristic of the first chapter as the nature of all knowledge of objects.<sup>42</sup> In Jñānavajra's framework, the second chapter discusses the two truths, and the other chapters discuss Buddha nature, the path and its result. In other words, the second chapter explains the *nirodha*, cessation, and the other chapters explain the *mārga*, the path, as well as the result.

We can surmise from the way there two Indian scholars explain the structure of the LAS how they thought about the relationship of ideas in the LAS. Clearly, the two Indian commentators considered that the topics that Buddhist scholars consider the main ideas are intimately related to each other. In particular, the framework provided by Jñānavajra answers all the questions concerning the main themes in this sutra.

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<sup>42</sup> Jñānavajra, D:12a- 8, P: 14b-8, C: 12b-3: དེ་ལས་དང་པོ་འབོད་འགྲོགས་སྤྱི་མ་གཞི་ལ་བརྟུང་པའི་ལེའུ་རྒྱུ་འདིས་  
ཀྱང་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བའི་རང་བཞིན་ཉིད་མྱོན་རྟེན་



Clearly, the main goal of this sutra is to obtain Buddha nature, dharmabody, through completely understanding the nature of dharma (*saṃskṛta*), which is appearing to knowledge and adharma (*asaṃskṛta*), which is non-appearing to knowledge, from the aspects of conventional and ultimate truths. In conventional truth, the nature is the object of the mind (*cittagocara*), but in ultimate truth, it is the object of inner realization (*pratyātmagocara*). Realizing the notion of mind-only in the conventional world is indispensable for entering into the object of inner realization in ultimate truth, because the nature of dharma in the conventional world is identical with the nature of dharma in ultimate truth. The final goal of this sutra, however, is to obtain the nature of dharma and adharma from ultimate truth, because it is the object of the Buddha stage. To prove the doctrine of mind-only, the non-existence of external objects, the above four subjects are essential methodologies in the LAS. Realizing mind-only in conventional truth is to enter into ultimate truth.

## Chapter 4

### Philosophical Analysis in the Two Indian Commentaries

#### 4-1. The Two Truths

##### I. Introduction

The main purpose of all Indian religions and philosophies is to provide a path for all practitioners to actualize ultimate truth. In other words, attaining “*nirvāṇa*,” absolute reality, is the ultimate goal. In order to reach this final objective, Indian religious practitioners and thinkers have invented various methods, using approaches that are both ontological and epistemological. Although the viewpoints of Buddhism, when compared with those of other non-Buddhist Indian philosophies have what many consider to be the same final goal, what distinguishes Buddhist views is the theory of non-substantiality with respect to both conventional and ultimate truths. Buddhist inquiry examines the nature of existence and truth, and poses the following question: Are existence and truth different from or identical to each other? This metaphysical question underlies the notion of the two truths, conventional (*saṃvṛti*) and ultimate (*paramārtha*). As mentioned in the preceding chapter, early Madhyamaka philosophy is fundamentally an interpretation of the notion of the two truths from the ontological perspective by means of emptiness.

Later, the Yogācāra school applied the epistemological approach to conventional truth, and, as a result, the notion of the two truths became complex and more sophisticated. Yogācārins attempt to interpret all knowledge of external objects (*jñeya*)

through their unique theory of the three natures. In other words, they examined external objects by valid cognition and rejected the notion of the existence of external objects as substances, which are distinct from anything produced by the mind. The Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school adapts some of the Yogācāra school's ideas to Madhyamaka philosophy. This school maintains the ontological interpretation of ultimate truth on the one hand, while, on the other hand, accepts that conventional truth can be investigated by means of valid cognition. Along with the history of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers have invented various notions of the two truths.

My main concern, in this chapter, is to investigate how the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school's notion of the two truths was transmitted to the later Indian Buddhists. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, major Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, such as Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla, utilized the teachings of the LAS in their own works in order to lend credence to their interpretations of Buddha's true teachings. On the contrary, Jñānavajra interpreted the LAS entirely by means of theories invented by his predecessors. Therefore, prior to studying the notion of the two truths in Indian commentaries, it is necessary to track the philosophical influence of their predecessors.

## II. The Notion of the Two Truths in the Early Mahayana Schools

Although all Indian Buddhists agree that conventional truth is not totally separate from the ultimate truth, Mahayanists insist that nothing is real, either in conventional truth or in ultimate truth. By contrast, Abhidharma Buddhists accept that things are real and can be recognized as external objects in conventional truth. Nevertheless, they regard transitory existence as part of ultimate truth. The fundamental difference here can be summed up as follows: Abhidharma Buddhists, both Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika, recognize only the non-substantiality of self (*pudgala nairātmya*), whereas Mahayanists insist on the non-substantiality of phenomena (*dharma nairātmya*) as well as of self (*pudgala nairātmya*). In proving the non-substantiality of phenomena, Madhyamaka thinkers divide all knowledge of external objects (*jñeya*) into two truths: *saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*. Whether external objects (*bāhyārtha*) exist or not, either in conventional truth or in ultimate truth, is the main question of the notion of the two truths.

The basic tenets of *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* and Nāgārjuna reject ontological existences even in conventional truth based on the notion of emptiness. Nāgārjuna's main opponents are Abhidharma Buddhist realists, rather than other Indian thinkers, such as Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, or Nyāyika. His unique dialectic is directed refuting the Abhidharma school's realistic assumptions and their ontological existence. Nāgārjuna asserts that there is no existence, either real or unreal, in conventional truth or in ultimate truth. On this point, Nagao explains:

Because such an ontology refers to the middle path that is beyond the extremes of existence and non-existence, E. Conze refers to this as “the new ontology.” When E. Conze says, the new ontology, he is probably referring to “new” in contrast to the Hinayanic ontology.<sup>1</sup>

There are two major controversial aspects of the notion of the two truths in Mahayana Buddhism: first, it is an ontological approach and, second, it is an epistemological approach. The main point of discussion with respect to the ontological approach concerns substantial or intrinsic existence, and the fundamental questions are: What is the essential principal elementary existence? What is the foremost cause of existence? What is true reality? According to Conze:

In Aristotelian metaphysics, the principle of contradiction governs all that is (to on). Quite different is the supreme and unchallenged principle of Buddhist ontology, which is common to all schools and has been formulated on many occasions. It states that the truth “lies in the middle” between “it is” and “it is not.” Not approaching either of these dead ends, the Truth-finder teaches Dharma by the middle way.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, Conze interprets the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* as ontological teachings:

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<sup>1</sup> G. Nagao, *Mādhyamika and Yogācāra: A Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies*, translated by Leslie S. Kawamura (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 157.

<sup>2</sup> E. Conze, *Buddhist thought In India: Three Phases of Buddhist philosophy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), 219 and Nagao (1991), 157.

If ontology in the usual sense is interpreted to mean any attempt to contact the true nature of reality, the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* are replete with it.<sup>3</sup>

This ontological tendency appeared in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* and Nāgārjuna's works. Specifically, the *Śatasāhasrika Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* show the relationship between *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*:

Nothing of Saṃsāra is different from Nirvāṇa;  
nothing of Nirvāṇa is different from Saṃsāra.  
The limit of Nirvāṇa is the limit of Saṃsāra;  
there is not even the subtlest something separating the two.<sup>4</sup>

The main teaching of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* is that there are no entities either in conventional truth or in ultimate truth. This is because all existences are of non-substantiality and emptiness. This theory of ontological equality between *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* is from the theory of emptiness (*śūnyatā*). This theory is a new interpretation of the middle way in Buddha's discourses, based on the theory of depending co-arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) from two viewpoints of the non-substantiality of self as well as the non-substantiality of phenomena. This is because the interpretation of the middle way in Abhidharma Buddhism is only concerned with the non-substantiality of self.

This verse in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* sums up the significant ontological tenets of all of Mahayana Buddhism. This verse appears not only in Nāgārjuna's

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<sup>3</sup> E. Conze, "The Ontology of the *Prajñāpāramitā*," *Philosophy East and West* 3-2 (1953): 117.

*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, but also in the later Mādhyamikas' works. In Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, there are three famous verses for the notion of the two truths, MK XXIV, 8-10, as follows:

The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma is based on the two truths: the truth of conventional truth and ultimate truth. Those that are unaware of the distinction between these two truths are incapable of grasping the deep significance of the teaching of Buddha. Without relying on everyday common practices (that is, relative truths), the absolute truth cannot be expressed. Without approaching the absolute truth, *nirvāṇa* cannot be attained.<sup>5</sup>

Nāgārjuna also divides Buddha's teachings into two truths, and, according to verse 10, he explains that, without conventional truth, ultimate truth cannot be obtained. Although in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, detailed explanations of the two truths are not given, Nāgārjuna's philosophy of the two truths is emphasized with respect to ontology, rather than the epistemology because his interpretation of the emptiness totally is completely

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<sup>4</sup> Conze (1967), 228.

<sup>5</sup> F. Streng, "The significance of *pratītyasamutpāda* for understanding the relationship between *Samvṛti* and *Paramārthasatya* in Nāgārjuna," *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, ed. M. Sprung (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1973), 27.

dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā  
lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ// 8  
ye 'nāyora vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoh  
te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddaśāsane// 9  
vyavahāraṃ anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate  
paramārtham anāgamyā nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate// 10

consistent with the philosophy of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*. In his MMK, XXIV, 18, he writes:

What is depending co-arising, we call emptiness. It is a designation based upon (some material). Only this is the middle path.<sup>6</sup>

This verse is along the same lines as the above verse in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*. Whatever depending co-arising is in conventional truth, it is emptiness in ultimate truth because it is based on the middle path. And, the middle path is free from either existence or non-existence. This verse heavily influenced the later Madhyamaka thinkers, who interpreted the notion of the two truths in their philosophical system.

The attention spent on the notion of the two truths in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras* and Nāgārjuna is intended to refute ontological existence and non-existence in both conventional truth and in ultimate truth, and is necessary because their main opponent is the realism of Abhidharma Buddhists. In early Mahayana Buddhism, Mahayanists made an attempt to interpret the depending co-arising and the middle way in Buddha's discourses with the notion of emptiness. This unique theory of the Madhyamaka school is based on both non-substantiality of self and phenomena. Their philosophy also applies the notion of the two truths, because, according to Nāgārjuna, the notion of the two truths is the fundamental structure of understanding Buddha's true discourses.

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<sup>6</sup> Nagao (1991), 190.

yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyataṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe  
sa prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā//18



After Nāgārjuna, some Mahayanists applied the epistemological approach as a means to investigate the non-existence of external objects in conventional truth.

According to Conze:

The terminological definition is that, where ontology was concerned with the difference between reality and appearance, epistemology concentrated on that between valid and invalid knowledge.<sup>7</sup>

Yogācāra thinkers made an attempt to interpret the fundamental tenets of Mahayana Buddhism in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*. Their basic philosophical assumptions are exactly the same as the philosophy of the Madhyamaka school. Their emphasis on interpreting tenets in the Mahāyānasūtras, however, is to analyze in detail phenomena of conventional truth. As La Vallée Poussin notes:

..... the distinction is not carried to the conception of ultimate truth, but to their theories of relative truth.<sup>8</sup>

Along the same lines, Yogācāra thinkers search for a common reality that encompass both conventional truth and ultimate truth. As a result of this approach, Yogācāra thinkers reevaluated the meaning of subjectivity as understood by earlier Buddhist thinkers. As such Yogācāra thinkers were the first to emphasize the activity of the mind to look at the

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<sup>7</sup> Conze (1967), 25.

<sup>8</sup> Cited in N. Katz, "An Appraisal of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Debates," *Philosophy East and West* 26-3 (1976): 256.

world of phenomena. Their unique interpretation of all knowledge of objects is the theory of three natures (*parikalpita*, *paratantra*, and *pariniṣpanna*). The distinction of this theory is that Yogācāra thinkers introduce the epistemological tendency in the Mahayana world with the concept of faulty imagination, *parikalpita*.

After the epistemological approach was introduced to the Mahayana world, the interpretation of the two truths became more complex and nuanced. As Kajiyama explains:

Although yearning for the absolute truth is naturally accompanied by negation of the relative and conditioned knowledge, another question should in this context be reflected on; that is, whether the system of the relative knowledge can be, so far as the phenomenal world is concerned, recognized as valid or not, though it is always delusive from the absolute point of view. This very problem seems to have become a fork which divided Indian Mahayana Buddhism into the Mādhyamika and the Vijñānavadin, and the Mādhyamika itself into the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika. When validity is granted for the conditioned knowledge, the absolute is considered in some meaning as the ground of the conditioned knowledge, the former being immanent in the latter. On the other hand, when the conditioned knowledge is considered as invalid or self-contradictory in itself, the absolute world is transcendently searched after from the relative world.<sup>9</sup>

The valid knowledge of a conventional world is the key concept based on the different interpretations of the two truths that appeared after Nāgārjuna. This is another approach

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<sup>9</sup> Y. Kajiyama, "Bhāvaiviveka and the Prāsaṅgika School," *Nava-Nālandā- Mahāvihāra Research Publication* vol.1, ed. S. Mookerjee (Patna: Navananda Mahavihara, 1957), 291-292.

to identifying the nature of conventional truth, rather than simply negating conventional truth in order to obtain the ultimate truth.

Mahayana Buddhists think that the true nature of ultimate truth is an aspect of conventional truth even if it is not really apparent. This is also shown in verse 10 of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*: without knowing conventional truth, ultimate truth cannot be obtained. The early Yogācāra thinkers focus on this point. In the terminology of the Yogācāra school, it is *dharmatā dharmanām* in conventional truth, and this *dharmatā* is connected to the real nature, *śūnyatā*, in ultimate truth. For Mahayana Buddhists, valid knowledge is to recognize the *dharmatā* that is covered by all dharmas. The main goal in conventional truth is to obtain the real nature, *dharmatā*, to remove imagined knowledge by valid knowledge. As a result of this approach, the term “*saṃvṛti-mātra*” (convention only or nothing but convention) was created by the later Mahayana Buddhists. The notion of the Buddha nature grew out of this search on something connecting conventional truth with ultimate truth. To recognize *dharmatā* and *saṃvṛti-mātra* as the final goal of conventional truth, these two concepts have to have the same quality of *śūnyatā* as that of ultimate truth. This real nature is hidden in conventional truth. Some later Madhyamaka thinkers, especially Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, accepted this Yogācāra view and developed their unique philosophies.

The Yogācāra school introduces the epistemological approach to analyzing all knowledge of objects (*jñeya*) with the first step, *parikalpita* (falsely imagined). But their main philosophical viewpoint is from the perspective of ontological analysis. The most

central of the three nature theory is the second, *paratantra*, (dependent-on-other), and this contains both the *parikalpita* and *pariniṣpanna* worlds. Yogācāra thinkers bring into being “the triple worlds are consciousness only (*cittamātra*, *vijñaptimātra*)” theory grounded on the new interpretation of the *paratantra*. It is nothing but a new interpretation of depending co-arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and the middle way. With this interpretation, Yogācāra thinkers maintain their philosophical position with respect to ontological theory. As Nagao has already indicated in two verses on the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga*.

There exists unreal imagination; duality does not exist therein. Emptiness, however, exists in it, and also the former exists in the latter. Therefore, it is stated that all entities are neither empty nor non-empty because of existence, because of non-existence, and again because of existence. And this is the Middle Path.<sup>10</sup>

These two verses are considered revolutionary reinterpretations of depending co-arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) by the Yogācāra school. Although they adopt epistemology in the first step, their interpretation of the two truths is maintained with respect to ontology.

According to Nagao:

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<sup>10</sup> Nagao (1991), 195.

abhūtaparikalpo ‘sti, dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate  
śūnyatā vidyate tu atra, tasmāt api sa vidyate//  
na śūnyaṃ nāpi cāśūnyaṃ tasmāt sarvaṃ vidhiyatesa  
sattvād asattvāt sattvāc ca, madhyamā pratipac ca sā//

The three nature theory can be said to be an ontological theory. This is a very advanced ontological theory that combines both the dharma-theory of the Abhidharmic philosophy and the Mādhyamika philosophy of emptiness ... The Yogācāra endeavored mainly to develop their cognition theory and to maintain an ontological view that claimed that only cognition is the unique and ultimate existence... Ontology in Buddhism context is not an ontology of being, but that of *śūnyatā*.<sup>11</sup>

Although the Yogācāra school introduces a certain epistemological approach to recognize all knowledge of external objects in Mahayana Buddhism, they maintain an ontological approach in their interpretation of the final stage of the nature of conventional truth. That fundamental philosophical point is shared by the entire Madhyamaka school. Indeed, this is why the Yogācāra school is considered a Mahayana school in Indian Buddhism. The difference between the Yogācāra school and the other later Madhyamaka schools concerns the interpretation of the notion of the two truths: the Yogācāra school asserts that, in conventional truth, there is nothing but the mind-only, yet they argue that ultimate truth, both natures of the *paratantra* (dependent-on-other) and of the *pariniṣpanna* exist. The Yogācāra school's ontological interpretations which relied on their epistemological method was vigorously rejected by the later Madhyamaka thinkers.

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<sup>11</sup> Nagao (1991), 186-187.

### III. The Two Truths in the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka School

Bhāvaviveka, a founder of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, insisted that Madhyamaka thinkers recognize existence on a conventional level, but that there is no existence in ultimate truth. His main opponent was the Yogācāra school, which contended that, in conventional truth, there is nothing but mind-only. Bhāvaviveka follows Nāgārjuna's ontological interpretation, for example, his interpretation of Nāgārjuna's MMK. XVIII. 8:

Everything is real or unreal, real and unreal, and neither real nor unreal -  
this is the teaching of the Buddhas.<sup>12</sup>

Bhāvaviveka interprets the verse as follows:

All dharmas are like *nirvāṇa*, but we accept as real, in a mundane sense, certain things that are conducive to the acquisition of prerequisites (*sambhara*) for the understanding of ultimate truth and are real according to ordinary conventional usage. We also accept that some are unreal. Therefore, conventionally everything is real or unreal. As the lord said, "Whatever ordinary people accept as real, I speak of as real. Whatever ordinary people do not accept, I speak of as unreal." On the other hand, [the Lord] also said that everything is real, in the sense that the sense media (*ayatana*), such as the eye, and objects, such as form, do not contradict conventional truth. He also said that everything is unreal, ultimately nothing is established in its own right (*svabhavena*), like magic. Hence nothing is what it seems. With regard to both truths, then, everything is real and unreal. At the moment of insight (*abhisamaya*), a

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<sup>12</sup> Eckel (1987), 35-36.

yogi is completely free from concepts of the reality of dharmas. Therefore, everything is neither real nor unreal--this is the teaching of the Buddha.<sup>13</sup>

According to the above verses, Bhāvaviveka completely follows Nāgārjuna's philosophy. In the two truths, Bhāvaviveka explains the detailed philosophical argumentation that Nāgārjuna does not mention. His intention is to prove how little the Yogācārins understand of the real teachings in Nāgārjuna's philosophy with the three nature theory. His objections to the Yogācārins's two truths are two-fold. First of all, through the influence of the Sautrāntika school, Bhāvaviveka recognized subtle particles in conventional truth, while Yogācāra thinkers reject the notion of the existence of external objects except for mind-only conventionally. Second, Bhāvaviveka asserted that there is nothing in ultimate truth, while Yogācāra thinkers accept that, ultimately, the existence of the natures of both the *paratantra* and of the *pariniṣpanna*. For Yogācāra thinkers, the nature of dependent-on-other (*paratantra svabhāva*) is fundamental to existence. For Bhāvaviveka, the Yogācāra thinkers did not properly understand the tenets of Nāgārjuna or of Mahayana philosophy.

Although Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti have almost the same ideas on the two truths, the difference between them lies in the emphasis of their theories. As N. Katz has noted, the Prāsaṅgika school focuses on verse 9 in the MMK, XXIV, but the Svātantrika

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<sup>13</sup> S. Iida, "The Nature of Saṃvṛti," *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, ed. M. Sprung (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1973), 68 and Eckel (1987), 36.

School concentrates on verse 10.<sup>14</sup> Verse 10 in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* emphasizes attaining ultimate truth through understanding the nature of conventional truth. According by Bhāvaviveka divides not only conventional truth, but also ultimate truth into two kinds. Discussing the notion of the two truths with respect to conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*), Bhāvaviveka spells out two divisions: false convention (*mithyasaṃvṛti*) and true convention (*tathyaṃvṛti*). His true convention is the wisdom of ultimate truth. He further divides ultimate truth into two parts: *aparyaya* (that which cannot be inferred) and *paryaya* (that which can be inferred). By contrast, Candrakīrti recognizes only one *paramārtha*, while he divides *saṃvṛtisatya* into two: *lokasaṃvṛti* and *alokasaṃvṛti*, which are correct and incorrect cognition. Candrakīrti's *lokasaṃvṛti* is identical with Bhāvaviveka's *mithyasaṃvṛti*, and *alokasaṃvṛti* in Candrakīrti's philosophy is the same as Bhāvaviveka's *tathyaṃvṛti*.

The reason that Bhāvaviveka divides the two truths into two kinds is to provide a meeting point between conventional truth and ultimate truth. As Katz points out:

Bhāvaviveka seeks to restore teachings of other Buddhist schools as *paryaya-paramārtha*, the meeting point of *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti*, and his method of establishing the fundamental (absolute) contradiction is by means of his syllogism. Since Bhāvaviveka has unearthed the fundamental contradiction, any negation which begins on the level of *saṃvṛti* must proceed to the level of *paramārtha*<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Katz (1976), 258.

<sup>15</sup> Katz (1976), 261.



This approach to the two truths is from Nāgārjuna's philosophy and the Yogācāra school.

The Yogācāra school invented the conversion of the ground (*āśrayaparāvṛti*), which is outside of the nature of the *paratantra* (dependent-on-other) based on both afflicted and purified states. Madhyamaka thinkers, however, do not recognize any kind of conversion of the ground as the nature of the *paratantra*. Thus, Bhāvaviveka's two kinds of two truths are a result of solving philosophical contradiction without accepting the conversion of the ground.

To resolve this dilemma, Bhāvaviveka puts forth effort to establish the convertible logical ground that is the connection between ultimate truth and conventional truth. From this point of view, he widely adopts the syllogistic method of argumentation from Buddhist logicians, especially Dignāga, and recognizes the validity of conventional knowledge (*saṃvṛti-jñāna*). Thus, in Bhāvaviveka's philosophy, the meeting point of both *saṃvṛtisatya* and *paramārthasatya* is the *paryaya-paramārtha*. It is like *dharmatā* in the Yogācāra philosophy. *Paryaya-paramārtha*, however, has causal efficacy, while *saṃvṛtisatya* does not. His main point is that causal efficacy is fundamental to ultimate truth, and even though ultimate truth is hidden in conventional truth, ultimately to be found in conventional truth.

In eighth-century Indian Buddhism, the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school had another sub-school called the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamika school. Unlike Bhāvaviveka, some Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, such as Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla, accepted the notion of mind-only and rejected the notion of

the existence of external objects in conventional truth. Even though they agreed with the Yogācāra school with respect to the interpretation of the nature of conventional truth, they concurred with the Madhyamaka school's interpretation of the nature of ultimate truth. In addition, they accepted Bhāvaviveka's methodology in their philosophies. Thus, they were called Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers. As Dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po writes in his *Grub pa 'i mtha' i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che' i phreng ba*:

If one divides it, there are two (that is) the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika among them. The Mādhyamika who maintains self-awareness (*rang rig, svāsaṃvedana*) which rejecting the external object, has the character of the first, namely Ācārya Śāntarakṣita... The Mādhyamika who rejects self-awareness but admits the external object established through its particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) has the latter characteristic, namely Ācārya Bhāvaviveka. This is the further explanation of terms; As far as the most basic points are concerned, by reasoning of maintaining agreement with the Vijñānavādin, he is called a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. By reasoning of maintaining the external object as an aggregate of atoms, in the manner of the Sautrāntikas, he is called a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika.<sup>16</sup>

Once again, the fundamental difference between the two sub-schools is the issue of whether or not to accept the existence of external objects in conventional truth. Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, however, follow almost all of Bhāvaviveka's tenets, except with respect to the non-existence of external objects. Among the three major Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, Jñānagarbha wrote the *Dvayasatyavibhāṅga*. Although this work is very short, it is a textbook on the notion

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<sup>16</sup> Iida (1973), 66.

of the two truths for this school. In it, he follows Bhāvaviveka's two kinds of two truths: false convention (*mithyasamvṛti*) and true convention (*tathyasamvṛti*) in conventional truth, and the concept of causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*).<sup>17</sup> Unlike Dharmakīrti and Bhāvaviveka, who apply this concept to distinguish of ultimate truth, Jñānagarbha utilizes it to distinguish real conventional truth. In verse 12 of the *Dvayasatyavibhaṅga*, he writes

Correct and incorrect relative [truth] are similar in appearance, but they are distinguished by their ability or inability to produce effective action (*arthakriyā*).<sup>18</sup>

This philosophical tendency arises because Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers overlay the Yogācāra school's the three nature theory on their philosophical system and emphasize on epistemological approach to conventional truth, whether phenomena are imagined or not.

Furthermore, in the Madhyamaka school, the actual epistemological tendency of the two truths begins with Jñānagarbha. Bhāvaviveka adopts a logical method to reject the Yogācāra school's ontological tendency of the three nature theory, but he does not make any attempt to introduce or apply the Yogācāra school's epistemological approach to Madhyamaka tenets. Bhāvaviveka's main concern with the tenets of the Yogācāra school is that they assert that there is nothing but mind-only in conventional truth. Bhāvaviveka, however, deals with an epistemological approach to conventional truth.

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<sup>17</sup> Iida (1973), 68.

<sup>18</sup> Eckel (1987), 39 and 54.

The clearest evidence that Jñānagarbha is introducing of his epistemological approach to the Madhyamaka thought is found in an examination of his notion of self-awareness.

Like the notion of causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*), the origin of the concept of self-awareness comes from Dharmakīrti's philosophy which is to identify the true knowledge of ultimate truth. Jñānagarbha and other Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers introduce this notion to their tenets about conventional truth. Bhāvaviveka, on the other hand, rejects this notion of self-awareness, because he asserts the existence of external objects. When he does not accept the non-existence of external objects, he naturally rejects the concept of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). Consequently, Jñānagarbha, although he was an eighth-century Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, incorporates two philosophical concepts, causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*) and self-awareness from the Yogācāra school, into his own notion of the two truths. The fundamental reason for this is that he accepts the theory of mind-only in conventional truth. The difference between Jñānagarbha and the Yogācāra school is that Jñānagarbha applies these two concepts to his notion of conventional truth, while the Yogācāra school considers these two concepts to be concerned with the fundamental criteria to ultimate truth.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla were Buddhist scholars and contemporaries of Jñānagarbha belonging to the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school in the eighth century. Their notion of the two truths is rooted in both Bhāvaviveka's and Jñānagarbha's tenets. In other words, the notion of the two truths in Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's philosophy

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maintains Bhāvaviveka's ontological tenets from Nāgārjuna's philosophy, except for the existence of external objects, and follows Jñānagarbha's epistemological approach.

The unique theory of conventional truth in Bhāvaviveka's philosophy is divided into two kinds of conventional truths: false convention (*mithya-saṃvṛti*) and correct convention (*tathya-saṃvṛti*). Based on Bhāvaviveka's philosophy, Jñānagarbha, in the eighth century, developed his own ideas of the correct convention. For Jñānagarbha, the correct convention (*tathya-saṃvṛti*) is "as it appears" (*tatha-abhasa, ji ltar snang ba*): the correct convention is free from the nature of imagination and depending co-arising. It has causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*) and appears in the knowledge of beings, while false convention is the nature of imagination and does not have causal efficacy. In addition, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla also follow Jñānagarbha's interpretation of self-awareness in their conventional world. Śāntarakṣita's major work, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, for example, shows that the theory of mind-only establishes that which is self-awareness.

One cannot conceive of the nature of knowledge as something other than its being established but itself. This nature of knowledge--that is self-awareness/validated--is just like the form of a dream, an illusion, etc.<sup>19</sup>

Consequently, the notion of the two truths in the eighth century Madhyamaka school is that, in conventional truth, there is nothing but the mind-only, and, in ultimate truth, only emptiness, a notion that emerges under the Yogācāra school's influences. To sum this

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<sup>19</sup> Ichigō (1985), LXV.

up, the major ideas of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers were influenced by Dharmakīrti's thought, but how these ideas were applied to fundamental concepts of reality differed in important concept.

#### IV. The Two Truths according to Jñānaśrībhaddra and Jñānavajra

The two truths in the LAS are explained using an ontological rather than an epistemological approach. Among five verses in both the second and the tenth chapters, verse 120 in the second chapter shows the fundamental position of the two truths in the LAS:

1. Conventional and ultimate truth, there is no third cause. The imagination is called conventional, after cutting that (convention) it is called the realm of the noble one.
2. Every thing exists in conventional truth, but there is nothing in ultimate truth. One sees the non-substantiality of all things only in ultimate truth. Therefore, conventional truth is called in the non-substantiality of object.
3. Non-form is on word, but it is not even in conventional truth. Because of form of mistake, the obtain is impossible.
4. Substances are in conventional truth, but substances are not in ultimate truth. That which is mistaken in the non-substantiality is conventional truth.
5. When all dharmas are not existed, I establish the thought-conception. The object and experience of common people is opposed to the truth.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Suzuki (1987), I. II. 187, 2. II. 120, 3. X. 122, 4. X. 429, and 5. X. 430:

1. saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaśca tṛtīyaṃ nāstihetukam  
kalpitaṃ saṃvṛtir hy uktā tacchedādāryagocaram
2. sarvaṃ vidyati saṃvṛtyāṃ paramārthe na vidyate  
dharmānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ paramārthe 'pi drśyate  
upalabdhi niḥsvabhāve saṃvṛtistena ucyate
3. nirvastuko hy abhilāpas tat saṃvṛtyāpi na vidyate  
viparyāsasya vastutvāccoplābdhir-na vidyate

Most scholars understood the second chapter as dealing with all dharmas, and that these two verses from the second chapter are evidence of the fact that the LAS basically divides all knowledge of external objects into two truths. Throughout, the LAS maintains an ontological approach to interpret the two truths.

This point becomes much clearer when we speculate on how two Indian commentators interpret the 108 questions and answers. This section consists of two portions: Mahāmati Bodhisattva's questions and Buddha's answers. Buddha's answers begin with sloka 61 and 62:

Well done, well done! O great wisdom, Mahāmati! Listen well, I will show you in order to answer your questions. Birth, and then no-birth, *nirvāṇa*, emptiness, transmigration, non-svabhāva, Buddhas, and sons of *pāramitā*.<sup>21</sup>

In Jñānaśrībhadrā's commentary, he explains as follows:

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4. bhāvā vidyanti saṃvṛtyā paramārthe na bhāvakāḥ  
niḥsvabhāveṣu yā bhrāntiḥ tat-satyam saṃvṛtiḥ bhavet
  5. asatsu sarvadharmāṃ prajñaptiḥ kriyate mayā  
abhitāpo vyavahārsca bālānāṃ tattvavarjitaḥ

<sup>21</sup> Suzuki (1987), II. 61 and 62:

sādhū sādhū mahāprajñā mahāmate nibodhase/  
bhāṣiṣyāmi anupūrvāṇa yat-tvayā paripṛcchitam //61//  
utpādam atha notpādam nirvāṇam śūnya lakṣaṇam  
saṃkrāntim asvabhāvatvaṃ buddhāḥ pāramitāsutāḥ //62//

Although among those the answer will be given by those chief askers, the 108 questions which are answered by Buddha should be called correct ultimate reality. Having asked how to listen this, that which is shown by the Omniscience One is the word of arising and the word of non-arising etc. In that connection, the word of arising is kind by both other dependent (*paratantra*) conventionally. The word of non-arising is the word of ultimate truth by two non-substantiality (*dharma* and *pudgala nairātman*) which is without the connection of subject and object.<sup>22</sup>

And in the second chapter, he writes:

Although Buddha avoided the answer of noble Mahamati's 108 questions about duality with 108 words of non-duality ultimately, noble Mahāmati Bodhisattva makes a general and particular question concerning others.<sup>23</sup>

In this context, duality refers to conventional truth, and non-duality to ultimate truth.

Later in the second chapter, he explains this clearly as follows:

<sup>22</sup> Jñānaśrībhaddra, D: 50b: དེ་དག་ལས་ཏེ་བའི་གཙོ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ལན་ནི་སྒྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་མེད་གྱི། ཏེ་པ་བརྒྱ་ཅུ་བརྒྱད་པོ་  
མངས་ཀྱིས་བཏགས་པ་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་ཡང་དག་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ནི་ཉོན་ཅིག་ཅེས་ནས་ཐམས་ཅད་མཐོན་པས་  
སྒྲོན་པར་མཛད་པ། རྒྱེ་བའི་ཚིག་དང་མི་རྒྱེ་བའི་ཚིག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་ཐོགས་པའོ་དེ་ལ་རྒྱེ་བའི་ཚིག་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་གཞན་གྱི་  
དབང་གི་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་རྣམ་པའོ་མི་རྒྱེ་བའི་ཚིག་ནི་བདག་མེད་པ་གཉིས་བྱེད་པ་དང་བྱེད་པ་པོ་མཛོན་པར་འབྲེལ་པ་མེད་པས་ཀྱི་  
མའི་འོག་ཏུ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ན་མི་གཉིས་པ་དོན་དམ་པའི་ཚིག་གོ།

<sup>23</sup> Jñānaśrībhaddra, D: 65a-1: འཕགས་པ་སྟོ་གྲོས་ཆེན་པོ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པའི་ཁྱུ་པ་བརྒྱ་ཅུ་བརྒྱད་ཀྱི་ལན་ནི་བཅོམ་ཡུན་  
འདས་ཀྱིས་གཉིས་ལུ་མེད་པ་དོན་དམ་པའི་ཚིག་བརྒྱ་ཅུ་བརྒྱད་ཀྱིས་སྤངས་མེད་གྱི། འོན་ཀྱང་འཕགས་པ་སྟོ་གྲོས་ཆེན་པོས་  
གཞན་གྱི་ཆེད་ཏུ་རྒྱུ་དང་ཁྱད་པར་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཏེ་པར་བྱེད་པ།



The space of dividing into 108 words means the nature of clarity of the entity of noble wisdom that is the mark of imagined, dependent-other, and the consummated, and is the basis of the truth of both the conventional and ultimate...<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, in this same place of Jñānavajra's commentary, he summarizes Jñānaśrībhadrā's commentary as follows:

When that meaning is explained by Master Jñānaśrībhadrā, one hundred mistaken places are avoided by reason of ultimate truth of non-duality.<sup>25</sup>

Consequently, both the five verses and 108 questions and answers demonstrate the ontological nature of the two truths.

Now, let us turn our attention to the way in which the two Indian commentators interpret the notion of the two truths in their own works. As mentioned in the preceding

<sup>24</sup> Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 83a: ཆོག་བརྒྱ་ཅུ་བརྒྱད་རབ་དུ་བྱེ་བའི་གནས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་བརྟག་པ་དང་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་དང་ཡོངས་ལྷན་གྱི་ལྷན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་འཕགས་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་དངོས་པོ་རབ་དུ་མཛོན་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཏེ། ཀུན་རྫོབ་དང་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པའི་གཞི་ལོ། དེ་ལ་འཕགས་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་དབང་པོའི་རང་བཞིན་ནི་སྒྲུང་བ་དང་བཅས་བ་དང་སྒྲུང་བ་མེད་པའི་ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་དུ་བྱེད་པས་བྱེ་བའོ། ཆོག་བརྒྱ་ཅུ་བརྒྱད་ལ་མཉམས་པར་ཀུན་དུ་བརྟགས་པ་སྐྱེ་དང་དོན་གྱི་ཐ་སྙད་ནི་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་སྒྲུང་བ་ལ་འཕགས་པ་རྣམས་ལ་སྒྲ་ཆོགས་ལུ་འབྲེད་པར་ཏི་པ་དེ་ལ་གྲུབ་པ་གཉིས་ལུ་མེད་པའི་འཕགས་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ལུ་ལན་སྒྲན་ནོ།

<sup>25</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 70b-5-6, P: 82a-4, C: 70b-6-7: དོན་དེ་ཉིད་སྒྲོབ་དཔོན་ཡེ་ཤེས་དང་ལ་བཟང་པོས་འཆད་བ་ན། འཕྱུ་ལ་གནས་པའོ་བ་བརྒྱ་<sup>1</sup> ནི་གཉིས་ལུ་མེད་པའི་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པའི་རིགས་པས་སྒྲར་<sup>2</sup> རོ།

1. p. བརྒྱ་ c. བརྒྱ་ 2. p. སྒྲ་ c. སྒྲ་

chapter, Jñānaśrībhadrā follows the Yogācāra school, specifically Dharmakīrti. Jñānavajra, on the other hand, belongs to the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. For this reason, their interpretations of the two truths differ slightly. Why their interpretations differ, however, is due to their own ideas, but rather can be traced to ideas associated with their respective lineage. Jñānaśrībhadrā, as a Yogācārin, interprets external objects based on the three natures. As already mentioned, the Yogācāra school explains external objects by means of the three natures, and they reject the notion of the existence of external objects as substances:

ཞེས་པ་མ་གཏོགས་པར་ཕྱིར་དོན་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་གང་དག་གིས་ཡོངས་ལུ་རྟོགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོགས་གོ།  
 ཕྱིར་དོན་འབྱུང་བ་ནི་མདོ་ལྗེ་འདི་ཉིད་ལས་འབྱུང་གྱི་གཞུགས་ནི་རྒྱལ་ལྷན་གཞིགས་པ་ནི་རྒྱལ་ལྷན་ཆ་ནི་  
 ཡོད་པ་མིན། ཞེས་པ་ལོ། གཞུགས་སྒྲུབ་པོ་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་ཆར་དབྱེ་ན་ཁང་པ་དང་། ལྗེ་དང་ནགས་ཚལ་བཞིན་ཏེ་  
 རྟོར་པ་ཡིན་གོ། རྒྱལ་ལྷན་མོ་ཡང་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་ཆར་དབྱེ་ན་རྟོར་པ་ཉིད་དོ།<sup>26</sup>

On the contrary, Jñānaśrībhadrā, as a late Indian Buddhist, receives some influence from the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, especially in his interpretation of the two truths. In his commentary, Jñānaśrībhadrā includes the three natures and the two truths, which appear in the second chapter from 65a to 109a, in two sub-chapters out of nine sub-chapters. The fourth and the fifth sub-chapters deal with

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<sup>26</sup>Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 3b:

*ālayavijñāna* and *śūnyatā*.<sup>27</sup> In this section, Jñānaśrībhadrā explains the non-existence of external objects and the mere appearance of mind, and emptiness:

འཕགས་པ་ཡང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་སྒྲོལ་དོན་མར་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡི་ཤེས་དཔལ་བརྩམ་པོས་བཀའ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ལེའུ་  
གཉིས་པར་ནི་བརྟོད་པ་ཟེར་མོ་དང་གཉིས་ལུ་མེད་པར་གསོལ་བ་བརྒྱ་དང་དེའི་བཀའ་ཡན་བརྒྱ་དང་ཀུན་  
གཞི་རྣམས་ཤེས་པ་ཡོངས་ལུ་ཤེས་པ་དང་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་རྣམས་པར་གསལ་པ་དང་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པའི་  
སྟོང་པོ་དཔྱད་པ་དང་རྒྱ་དང་འབྲས་ལུ་དཔྱད་པ་དང་སྒྲིའི་དོན་བརྟགས་པ་ཡོངས་ལུ་ཤེས་པ་དང་ཚུད་པའི་  
གནས་མོར་ལུ་དཔྱད་པ་མར་པོ་དང་ལེའུ་སྒྲན་དགུ་ལྟེ་ལེའུ་གཉིས་པ་ཡང་རྫོགས་གོ།

རང་གི་མེས་ལྷན་གྱི་ཕ་ཙམ་ལ་བརྒྱུར་བས་ལྷིའི་དོན་དོས་པོ་མེད་པར་གསལ་ལ་སྟོན་ཏེ། མེས་པོ་ཙམ་ཡང་  
བདག་དང་གསལ་གྱི་དཔར་གི་མཐུ་ལས་མགོ་འཁོར་བ་དང་བརྒྱུད་བ་ལ་མེགས་པ་བཞིན་དུ་རྣམ་པ་སྒྲུབ་  
ཚོགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་སྒྲུབ་པོ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱིས་དཔྱད་ཅིང་ཚོས་འཆད་དོ། ཀར་གི་ཚོ་ནི་གཤེགས་ནི་རྒྱལ་སྒྲན་  
གཤེགས་པ་ནི་རྒྱལ་སྒྲན་ཆ་ནི་མེད་པ་སྟེ། ལྷི་ཡི་དོས་པོ་མེད་པར་ཡང་མེས་ལ་ནི་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ལུ་སྒྲུབ་  
ཞེས་པ་དེ་ཡང་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་སྟོང་པའི་མེས་ལྷན་གྱི་ཕ་ཙམ་ལ་མེད་ཅིང་དོན་དམ་པའི་བཞེན་པ་མི་གཉིས་པར་  
ཡང་དག་པར་རིག་པ་དོས་པོ་དང་དོས་པོ་མེད་པར་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་དང་ལྷན་པའི་དབུ་མའི་ཏིང་པོ་  
འཛོལ་ལ་མཉམ་པར་འཇོག་གོ།<sup>28</sup>

Jñānaśrībhadrā's basic structure is that the dependent-on-other (*paratantra svabhāva*) is related to conventional truth, and the consummated (*pariniṣpanna svabhāva*) is related to

<sup>27</sup>Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 162a:

<sup>28</sup>Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 105a:

the ultimate truth.<sup>29</sup> These two doctrines are also connected to the doctrine of depending co-arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*):

དེ་བཞིན་ཏུ་ཡང་གུན་ནས་ཉོན་མེས་པ་དང་རྣམ་པར་བྱུང་བ་གུན་མོལ་དང་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་གཞན་  
གྱི་དབང་དང་མེས་པུ་གྲུབ་པ་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་དེ་འབྱུང་བ་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས་ལ་སྦྱར་བར་བྱ་གྱེ། དེས་ན་རིམ་  
གྱིས་འཇུག་པ་མི་འབྱུང་ངོ།<sup>30</sup>

On the other hand, Jñānavajra, as a Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinker, interprets all knowledge of external objects based on the two truths:

The meaning is that the three worlds are collected in the mind, and the manner of nature of mind is the nature of the perceiver in conventional truth, and in ultimate truth it is empty.<sup>31</sup>

Nevertheless, in his interpretation, the two truths are not separated from one another:

Furthermore, through the wisdom of conventional truth there is conventional truth and that is also knowing ultimate truth.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Jñānaśrībhadra, D: 8b: གཉིས་གྱི་རྣམ་པའི་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་ནི་གུན་མོལ་གྱི་བདེན་པ་ལོ། མི་གཉིས་པའི་ཚུལ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པ་  
གྱེ།

<sup>30</sup> Jñānaśrībhadra, D: 116b:

<sup>31</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 17a-12, P: 20a-3, C: 17a-1-2: དོན་ནི་མིང་གསུམ་མེས་པུ་འདུམ་ཤིང་མེས་པུ་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ཚུལ་  
ནི་གུན་མོལ་ཏུ་སྦྱར་བའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡིན་མིང་དོན་དམ་པར་སྦྱར་པ་གྱེ།

His final conclusion concerning the two truths is based on the philosophy of his lineage, which is that *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are the same:<sup>33</sup>

Furthermore, the great lord of the tenth stage asks that, in order to explain the etymology of wisdom, it is explained because of knowing wisdom. There is no mistake. Here, the essence of conventional truth is the object of the perfection of wisdom, and the essence of that (conventional truth) is also included in the ultimate truth. It is said (in the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*) Subhuti! Worldly conventional truth and ultimate truth are no different. Whatever is the essence of conventional truth is the essence of ultimate truth.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 37b-4, P: 43b-1, C: 37b-4: གཞན་ཡང་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ཆོས་ལ་ཀྱང་ཆོས་ཉིད་ཏུ་ཤེས་ཏེ་དེ་ཉིད་  
རྟོག་དམ་པ་ཤེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་ནོ།

<sup>33</sup> Hadano (1981), 81.

34 Jñānavajra, D: 37b-3-5, P: 43a-7-43b-1 C: 37b-2-4: གཞན་ཡང་མ་ཐུག་མགོན་པོ་ཆེན་པོས་དོན་དམ་ཤེས་པའི་  
ཕྱིར་བཤད་དོན་ཤེས་ཤེས་རབ་གྱི་དཔེ་པའི་ཆོག་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ་ཆེ་ནི་མཁྱེན་མེད་ཏེ། འདིར་ཀུན་རྫོབ་གྱི་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ཤེས་  
རབ་གྱི་མ་རོལ་དུ་ཕྱིན་པའི་ཡུལ་ཡིན་ལ། དེའི་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་དོན་དམ་པར་འདུག་ཏེ། རི་རྒྱུད་དུ་རབ་འཕྱོར་པ་རྒྱུ་ཆེན་གྱི་  
ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱང་གཞན་ལ། དོན་དམ་པ་ཡང་གཞན་པ་ཉིད་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཀུན་རྫོབ་གྱི་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་དོན་དམ་  
པའི་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་དོན་ཤེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

## 4-2. The Mind-only

### I. Introduction

The Yogācāra school brought the notion of mind-only to the Mahayana world around the third century in India. Traditionally, Indian Buddhists have considered that the notion of mind-only (*cittamātra*) appeared in three Mahayana texts: the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, and the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. The principle is that the three worlds are only mind. “The three domains of existence” (*tridhātu* or *tribhāva*) are: *kāmadhātu* (*kāmaabhāva*) “the domain of sense-desires,” *rūpadhātu* (*rūpabhāva*), “the domain of form,” and *arūpyadhātu* (*arūpabhāva*), “the domain of no-form.” These three domains include all of our existence, both external and internal, physical and mental. According to the notion of mind-only, all things, conditioned and unconditioned (*saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta*), are merely an idea, just a thought (*cittamātratā*), just a conception (*vijñaptimātratā*).

The Yogācāra school, however, is not the original power of this notion. As Rahula explains:

The *śūnyatā* philosophy elaborated by Nāgārjuna and the *cittamātra* philosophy developed by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are not contradictory, but complementary to each other. These two systems, known as Mādhyamika and Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda, explain and expound, in different ways with different arguments, the very same doctrines of *nairātmya*, *śūnyatā*, *tathatā*, *pratītyasamutpāda*, but are not a philosophy of their own which can properly be called Nāgārjuna’s or Asaṅga’s or Vasubandhu’s philosophy.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> W. Rahula, “Vijñaptimātra Philosophy in the Yogācāra System and Some Wrong Notions,” *Middle*

Like other Buddhist scholars,<sup>36</sup> his main opinion is that like emptiness, the notion of mind-only is one of the interpretations of Buddha's fundamental discourses. In other words, this notion is one with the fundamental teaching of Mahayana Buddhism.

Even though the Yogācāra school did not invent this theory, the school's paramount contribution to this notion is that they interpret conventional truth with mind-only and then assert the non-existence of external objects, even in conventional truth, because there is nothing but one's own mind. In order to describe all phenomena with the non-existence of external objects, the Yogācāra school searches for the basis of all phenomena (*dharmaṭā dharmanām*) supported by the theory of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*): the *parikalpita svabhāva* (imagined), the *paratantra svabhāva* (depend-on-other), and the *pariniṣpanna svabhāva* (consummated). Among the three, the second is the most important with regard to the basis of all phenomena, and it is considered to be a new interpretation of depending co-arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) in Buddha's discourse.

The notion of mind-only provoked controversy between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools in the sixth and the seventh centuries. Unlike the Yogācāra school, the Madhyamaka school tended to explain all things by applying the notion of two truths without thoughts considering the basis for doing so. The Yogācāra school's sensational interpretations, especially the notion of mind-only or the non-existence of external

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Way: *Journal of the Buddhist Society* (1974):120.

<sup>36</sup> The inquiry that the *tri-svabhāva* doctrine of the Yogācāra school is related to the authority of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, especially *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* and *Pañca*, has long been of interest to Buddhist Studies scholars, such as E. Obermiller, É. Lamotte and S. Yamaguchi. The Maitreya chapter in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* based on works by E. Conze and Iida has recently been done by N. Hakamaya.

objects, were vigorously criticized by Madhyamaka thinkers, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti, in the sixth and seventh centuries in India. Although Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti refuted the Yogācāra school's notion of mind-only, the later Madhyamaka thinkers recognized that it is a more effective interpretation of the non-substantiality of phenomenon. Thus, after the eighth century in Indian Buddhism, both the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools took the theory of mind-only as their own theory of conventional truth. As mentioned above, the main characteristic of the later Madhyamaka thinkers in the eighth century was that they followed Bhāvaviveka's interpretation of the two truths, and they also adopted certain concepts, such as causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*) and self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) from Dharmakīrti's ideas, but they applied these concepts to differentiate correct from incorrect convention rather than to distinguish convention from ultimate truth. Like Bhāvaviveka, they also rejected the basis of all phenomena.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Madhyamaka thinkers utilized the LAS in relation to the notion of mind-only. Thus, my main concern in this section is to investigate the theory of mind-only in relation to Madhyamaka thinkers.

Regarding controversies between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools, there are two main issues: first, dependent-on-other (*paratantra svabhāva*), and second, the concept of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*, *rang rig*) along with the existence of storage consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). As Iida and Hirabayashi state:

We shall focus on the Madhyamaka critique of the *paratantra*, rather than the critiques of the *ālayavijñāna* and *svasaṃvedana*, because this forms the



heart of this distinction between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra point of view.<sup>37</sup>

The early Madhyamaka thinkers criticized the interpretation of mind-only by their Yogācāra counterparts from an ontological perspective. The concept of the dependent-on-other was the main controversy between the two Mahayana schools. Later Madhyamaka thinkers, however, who accepted the notion of mind-only in the Madhyamaka system, attempted to examine this theory from ontological and epistemological perspectives. Thus, for the later Madhyamaka thinkers, the concept of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*, *rang rig*) is an issue with the Yogācāra school. Here, my main concern is how the two concepts of mind-only are understood in these two Indian commentaries on the LAS.

## II. The Notion of Mind-only Among Madhyamaka Thinkers

In approximately the sixth century, Madhyamaka thinkers officially began to criticize the Yogācāra school's doctrines, including the notion of mind-only, the existence of the storage consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*), and so forth. The critique of the notion of mind-only appears in the fifth chapter of Bhāvaviveka's *Tarkajvālā*, in the sixth chapter of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, and in the ninth

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<sup>37</sup> J. Hirabayashi and S. Lida, "Another look at the Mādhyamika vs. Yogācāra Controversy Concerning Existence and Non-existence," *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems: Studies in Honor of Edward Conze*, eds. L. Lancaster and L. O. Gomez (Berkeley: University of California, 1977), 341-360.

chapter of Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. Even though Madhyamaka thinkers, both Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, rejected the notion of mind-only, their basic viewpoints are not exactly alike. In the fifth chapter of *Tarkajvālā* in the passage that is supported by Yogācāra thinkers in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, Bhāvaviveka asserts that “these three realms are mind only” does not mean that external objects are non-exist, but only that there is no agent other than the mind. He also argues that the notion of mind-only does not agree with Buddha's discourses.<sup>38</sup> On the other hand, Candrakīrti asserted that Buddha taught the notion of mind-only for those who do not understand the real meanings of Madhyamaka philosophy.<sup>39</sup> Consequently, both of these early Madhyamaka thinkers admitted the existence of external objects in conventional truth, but their reasons for rejection are different.

Like Sautrāntika, Bhāvaviveka accepts external objects (*bāhyārtha*) in conventional truth and rejects that a form of direct knowledge called self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana* or *svasaṃvṛtti*), which is cognition comes from the five sense-faculties and the mind. His critique of mind-only is in the fifth chapter of his *Tarkajvālā*. Rather than searching for the basis of all phenomena. As was done by the Yogācāra school, he tried to find some connection between all phenomena and the nature of ultimate reality through a thought exploration and development of the notion of two truths. For him,

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<sup>38</sup> Yamaguchi (1941), 211-228.

<sup>39</sup> D. Cozort, *Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1998), 73-101 and C. W. Huntington, *The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 60-68.

understanding the nature of conventional truth by applying logic would gradually lead to the true nature of ultimate reality. S. Iida defines this characteristic of Bhāvaviveka as follows:

At this point we notice the characteristics of Bhāvaviveka's reasoning. He does not argue only from *yukti* (reasoning), but also on the basis of *āgamas* (scriptures).<sup>40</sup>

Consequently, Bhāvaviveka uses the distinctions between two *saṃvṛtisatyas* and two *paramārthasatyas*, and he rejects the basis of all things. In conventional truth, there are two truths; one, such as the mirage of water, is false or incorrect (*mithya*), and the other, such as water itself, is real or correct (*tathya*). The criterion for distinguishing between the two is causal efficacy (*kriyākārasāmarthya*). In ultimate truth, there are also two truths: the inexplicable variety typified by silence (*aparyaya-paramārtha*) and the other sort embodied in the action of Buddha (*paryaya-paramārtha*). Bhāvaviveka's interpretation of the two truths is fundamentally in opposition to the Yogācāra school's theory of the three natures, because he refutes any ultimate basis of all things. For this reason, his interpretation of the two truths was criticized by Sthiramati of the Valabhī school and Dharmapāla of the Nalanda school.

Candrakīrti's criticism of the tenets of the Yogācāra school also concerns the doctrine of mind-only (*cittamātra*) and the existence of a storage consciousness

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<sup>40</sup> S. Iida, *Reason and Emptiness: A Study in Logic and Mysticism* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980), 2.

(*ālayavijñāna*). In his commentary on the notion of mind-only, he also criticizes the Yogācārins' assertion of the existence of dependent-on-other (*paratntra svabhāva*), by which Yogācārins assert the existence of the dependent-on-other, while Madhyamaka thinkers desire to refute their true existence. His criticism is found in the sixth chapter of his *Madhyamakāvatāra*.<sup>41</sup> Candrakīrti denies that apparent objects are the result of activities of *ālaya* (storage) from beginningless time and that consciousness is separate from objects.

If one rejects the non-existence of external objects, one simultaneously rejects the notion of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) as well as the notion of storage consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*). First, the notion of self-awareness or self-cognition (*svasaṃvṛtti* or *svasaṃvedana*) was elaborated by Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārttika*, which was inspired by his teacher, Dignāga. Dharmakīrti's idea was derived from Sautrāntika's representation theory of consciousness, holding that the form and image (*ākāra*) of consciousness is an external object, and the form of external objects exists regardless of what we perceive directly in consciousness. According to the notion of self-awareness, there are three aspects of our consciousness: the object, its cognition, and self-awareness (*grāhya*, *grahaka*, and *svasaṃvṛti*). In a single moment of function of our consciousness, the three aspects of consciousness are not separate, and the object is apprehended only

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<sup>41</sup> The sixth chapter of *Madhyamakāvatāra* is partial translated by L. de la Vallée Poussin (1907-11). The Tibetan text is available (with auto-commentary) as *Madhyamakāvatāra* par Candrakīrti edited by La Vallée Poussin (Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, reprint, 1970). P. Fenner, "Candrakīrti's refutation of Buddhist idealism," *Philosophy East and West* 33- 3 (1983): 135-173. This article is based on his translation of the MA, Ch. 6. Verse 6.45-6.77 from La Vallée Poussin's edition.

through cognized form. Madhyamaka thinkers reject the notion of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*), however, and assert that the comprehended object itself is the cause of recollection.

In eighth-century Indian Buddhism, Śāntarakṣita adopted the notion of mind-only into the Madhyamaka system just as Vasubandhu, Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti synthesized the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra philosophies. The former school is called the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, and the latter is called the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka. In order to establish the new notion in conventional truth, Śāntarakṣita accepted the notion of causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*), which was originally formulated by Dharmakīrti.<sup>42</sup> Sautrāntika's idea of causal efficacy (*arthakriyākāritvā*) was made possible by Dharmakīrti's notion. For both Sautrāntika and Dharmakīrti, it was a criterion of ultimate reality, but Śāntarakṣita applied this notion to the correct conventional truth (*tathya-saṃvṛti*), and he illuminated ultimate truth by means of the notion of neither unitary nor plural, which means there is no existence at all. Although Śāntarakṣita and other later Madhyamaka thinkers developed their doctrines under the strong influence of the Yogācāra school, they maintained the doctrine of ultimate reality in the tradition of the Madhyamaka school. For this reason, they examined correct convention by means of concepts from the Yogācāra school. Śāntarakṣita adopted self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*), and he is considered *sākārajñānavāda*.

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<sup>42</sup> K. Kano, "On the Background of PV II 12ab-The Origin of Dharmakīrti's idea of Arthakriyā," *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition: Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference*, ed. E. Steinkellner (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991), 119-128.

### III. Jñānaśrībhaddra and Jñānavajra on Mind-only

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Jñānaśrībhaddra's and Jñānavajra's fundamental philosophical position in interpreting the LAS is based on the non-existence of external objects, except for mind-only or mere cognition (*cittamātra* or *vijñaptimātra*). Due to their respective lineages, however, Jñānaśrībhaddra explains the notion of mind-only by means of Dharmakīrti's ideas, while Jñānavajra interpreted it within the tradition of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school.

Madhyamaka thinkers developed the notion of the two truths because they did not accept the basis of all phenomena as developed by the Yogācāra school. Like Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha's and Śāntarakṣita's distinct notion of the two truths divides conventional truth into two kinds: correct and incorrect conventions (*tathya* and *mithya saṃvṛti*).<sup>43</sup> Like other Madhyamaka thinkers, however, Jñānaśrībhaddra divides object of knowledge into two truths, but his unique interpretation of the two truths is by means of the three natures:

So, the Omniscient One (is Buddha) has shown, by means of conventional and ultimate truths, imagined, dependent-on-other, and consummated established.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Eckel (1987), 75-76.

<sup>44</sup> Jñānaśrībhaddra, D: 27b: ཀུན་རྒྱལ་དང་དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པས་བརྟགས་པ་དང་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་དང་ཡོངས་ལུ་གྲུབ་བ་  
རྒྱལ་མཁས་ཅན་མཐུན་པས་དེ་ལྟར་བཞག་རྟོ།

But Jñānaśrībhadrā, as a Yogācāra thinker, explains all phenomena “external” as follows:

... because there being except for cognition no external objects all these objects (are) of the nature of a mental image.<sup>45</sup>

Although Jñānaśrībhadrā follows Dharmakīrti’s epistemological approach, he maintains Madhyamaka’s ontological approach. Like Dharmakīrti, he applies his concept of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana, rang gi rig pa*), which is a very important concept in the notion of mind-only, as a means to know ultimate truth.

The gross and subtle knowable object are seen through insight (*prajñā*), having become empty on the basis of non-perception, then since these is no dualistic conceptual thought such as apprehender and apprehended, speech and object of speech, act and subject, created and creator, thing and non-thing etc. non-duality they are fully understood and cognized to be non-dual.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Jñānaśrībhadrā, D:11b-5: རྟོགས་པ་མ་གཏོགས་པར་ཕྱི་དོན་མེད་པར་ནི་འདི་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐྱར་བའི་ཚེས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་  
ཕྱིར་ ཏེ།

<sup>46</sup> Jñānaśrībhadrā, D: 3b-7: [བདག་གི་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐྱར་བའི་ཕྱི་དོན་ལ་ཡོངས་སུ་ཤེས་པའི་དོན་ལ་མཁས་པ་ཞེས་པ་ལ་ལམ་དག་གིས་ཐམས་  
ཅད་པར་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡུལ་ཉིད་ཏུ་མཁས་པ་གར་དག་གིས་དོན་ཡུངས་སུ་ཤེས་པ་དེ་དག་ལ་དེ་སྐད་ཅེས་བྱའོ། ཤེས་པ་མ་  
གཏོགས་པར་ཕྱིར་དོན་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་གར་དག་གིས་ཡོངས་སུ་རྟོགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚོགས་གོ། ཕྱི་དོན་འབྱུང་བ་ནི་མདོ་ལྟེ་འདི  
ཉིད་ལས་འབྱུང་མེ་གཟུགས་ནི་རྒྱལ་མཚན་གཞིགས་པ་ན། རྒྱལ་མཚན་ཆ་ནི་ཡོད་པ་མེད། ཞེས་པའོ། །གར་གི་ཚེ་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བ་སྐྱོམ་  
པ་དང་། རྩ་བ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱིས་གཞིགས་ཏེ་མི་དམིགས་ནས་སྐྱོར་པར་སྐྱར་པ་དེའི་ཚོ། འཛིན་པ་དང་། གཟུང་བ་དང་། སྐྱབ་པ་དང་།  
སྐྱབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དང་། བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང་། བསྐྱེད་པ་དང་། བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང་། དངོས་པོ་དང་། དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་མཁས་པ་  
གཉིས་སུ་རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པས་ན་མི་གཉིས་པར་ཁོང་ཏུ་ཆད་ཏུ་ཅེར་རྟོགས་པ་རྣམས་མོ། །གཟུང་བ་མེད་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འཛིན་

Jñānaśrībhaddra, however, shifts his attitude regarding ultimate truth, and unlike the Yogācāra school, he does not recognize the nature (*svabhāva*) of dependent-on-other and consummated nature in either the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* or the LAS.<sup>47</sup>

Jñānavajra's ideas of both the two truths and mind-only, on the other hand, are based on the ideas of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school that, in ultimate truth, all phenomena are empty, but, in the conventional truth, there is mind-only.

Here, since what appears as variety of (things) such as form etc. appears incongruent with (what is) ultimately mind, it is but (a question) of not accepting nature of mind as simply ultimate. So, were it be shown that even for what is true conventionality external object would not be

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པ་མེད་པར་འཇགས་སྒྲེ། མོ་མོ་རང་རིག་ཅེས་པ་ནི་ཡང་དག་པར་རིག་པ་མཛོན་ལུས་དུ་སྒྲེ། མེག་གི་ཤེས་པ་རེས་པར་ཐུགས་  
པ་དབྱགས་ལུབ་པ་ཡང་དག་པར་རིག་པ་བཞིན་ནོ།

<sup>47</sup> Jñānaśrībhaddra, D:129a: དེ་ལ་རྟག་པ་ནི་རྟག་པ་དང་བདག་དང་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དང་རུལ་ལྟ་མོས་བརྩམས་པ་དང་ཐུགས་དང་  
ཡོན་རྟན་དང་ལས་དང་གྱི་ལ་མོགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གང་གིས་ཀླན་བརྟགས་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་དག་གིས་དེ་ལ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པའོ།  
གཞན་གྱི་དཔར་གི་རྣམ་པ་རྣམས་ནི་སྒྲེ་བ་མེད་པ་ཉིད་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པའོ། དོན་དམ་པ་ལ་ཡང་གཉིས་གྱི་རྣམ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་  
མེད་ཅིང་བསམ་པ་མེད་པ། ལྟར་བ་མེད་པ། དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་མི་གཉིས་པ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་འོད་གསལ་བ་དངོས་པོ་དང་  
དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་རྣམ་པར་མི་རྟོག་པའི་རྒྱུད་པར་དགོངས་པ་ལ་གང་ཡང་བརྟགས་པ་མེད་པ་བཞིན་པ་དང་གཞན་གྱི་དཔར་  
དངོས་པོ་མེད་པ་བཞིན་དུ་ཡོངས་ལྷ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡང་མེད་ཅེས་སྒྲེ་བ་དེ་ནི་དམ་པའི་ཚེས་དང་རྩལ་པར་འབྱུང་པའི་ལས་སྒྲུབ་  
པར་བྱེད་དོ། དེ་འདི་ལྟར་དགོངས་པ་རེས་པར་འགྲོལ་པའི་རྩོད་གྱིས་ཁྱིད་པའི་དོན་གྱིས་ལང་ཀར་གཤེགས་པ་དམ་པའི་ཚེས་  
གྱི་འགྲོལ་པར་ཕྱོད་པའི་གནས་མདོ་ཐུའི་དོན་བཞི་པར་མ་ལུས་པ་རྒྱ་ཆེར་བཤད་པར་བྱའོ།



appropriate, then thinking “what is then such a mental image,” a mental image for what is conventional established to be mind-only.<sup>48</sup>

As mentioned in the previous chapter, although Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers accept the notion of mind-only from the Yogācāra school, they do not recognize any existence in ultimate truth. This is because they maintain their ultimate reality from an ontological rather than an epistemological perspective. Jñānavajra also follows ideas of the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, as states as follows:

[In this way,] the dependent-on-other (*paratantra*) or the consummated (*pariniṣpanna*) of mind-only, awareness, is taught to be born from other causes and conditions. So it is not non-existent. The meaning of unborn or non-existent etc. refers as stated before, to the three ways of non-existence. This is not acceptable. In this sutra, it is said that just like an illusion, view the nature of arising as non-existent. Like an illusion, things arise in the convention depending on other causes and conditions but not on oneself. In ultimate truth, it is not appropriate for anything to arise either from oneself or from others, so the characteristics of dependent-on-other (*paratantra*) also does not exist.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 44b-5-6, P:51b-3-4, C: 44b-4-5: འདིར་གཞུགས་ལ་མཐོགས་པ་སྐྱ་ཚོགས་ལུ་སྐྱར་བ་དོན་དམ་པར་  
མཐོགས་དང་མི་མཐུན་པར་སྐྱར་བས། མཐོགས་ཀྱི་རོ་བོ་དོན་དམ་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་<sup>1</sup> ཁས་མི་ཡིན་པ་ཁོ་ནས་ལོ་ལྟ་བུ་དམ་དག་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་  
ཙམ་ཏུ་ཡང་ཕྱི་དོན་མི་འབད་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་བསྐྱན་པ་ནི་དེ་སྐྱར་སྐྱར་བ་འདི་ཅི་ཡིན་སྐྱེ་བའི་མཐོགས་ནི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་སྐྱར་བ་མཐོགས་  
ཙམ་ཏུ་སྐྱབ་སྒྲེ། <sup>1</sup>. P. བློ་

<sup>49</sup> Jñānavajra, D: 53b-1-3, P: 62a-2-5, C: 53b-1—3: མཐོགས་ཉིད་རིག་པའི་གཞན་དཔར་དང་ཡོངས་ལུ་གྲུབ་པ་སྐྱ་ཚུན་  
གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་པ་ཉིད་ཏུ་བསྐྱན་པས་འདི་ནི་མེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ལ། མེད་པ་དང་མ་སྐྱེ་པ་ལ་མཐོགས་པར་བསྐྱན་པའི་དགོངས་དོན་  
ནི་སྐྱར་བསྐྱན་པ་བཞིན་ཏུ་མེད་པ་སྐྱེ་པ་གསུམ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པས་འདི་ནི་མི་འབད་དེ། མདོ་ལྟེ་དེ་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱ་མ་བྱས་པ་ཇི་ལྟ་བུ་

In the same context, Jñānavajra recognizes self-awareness (*svasamvedana*) in conventional truth, but he rejects it in ultimate truth.

If one objects: “cognitiveness is established by self-awareness (*svasamvedana*) immediate perception and also different mind streams is established by yogis by means of immediate perception through an aspect of other awareness and the ordinary people, however, prove (it) by means of inference,” while it is needed so ultimately it is not correct (to consider) only self-awareness; (this will be shown in) other context. So, since there is no prove and since there is a counter argument it is not correct (to hold) that awareness as the mind itself is an ultimate entity.<sup>50</sup>

བཞིན་ཏུ་སྐྱེ་བ་དོ་ཤོད་མེད་པ་བསྟན་<sup>1</sup> བར་གྱི་ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་སྐྱེ་མ་བཞིན་ཀྱང་རྫོང་ཏུ་སྐྱེ་བཞིན་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་གིས་  
སྐྱེ་བ་དག་ཉིད་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ལ། རྟོན་དམ་པར་ནི་རང་དམ་གཞན་གང་ལས་ཀྱང་སྐྱེ་བ་མི་འབྱེད་པས་གཞན་གྱི་དབང་གི་  
མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་མེད་པར་བསྟན་རྟོ།

1. p. ལྟ་

<sup>50</sup>Jñānavajra, D: 54b-1-2, P: 63a-4-6, C: 54b-1-2: གཤམ་རྟེ་ཞེས་པ་ནི་<sup>1</sup> རང་རིག་པའི་མཚན་ལུས་ཉིད་གྱིས་གྲུབ་ལ།  
མེས་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་པ་ཡང་རྣམ་འབྱེད་པ་རྣམས་གྱིས་ནི་གཞན་རིག་པའི་རྒྱུ་<sup>2</sup> མཚན་ལུས་གྱིས་གྲུབ་ཅིང་ལམ་པ་རྣམས་གྱིས་  
ཀྱང་རྫོང་ལུ་དཔག་<sup>3</sup> པའི་སྐོ་ནས་གྲུབ་པོ་ཞེ་ན། ཀྱང་རྫོང་ཏུ་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་མེད་གྱི་རྟོན་དམ་པར་རང་རིག་པ་ཉིད་མ་འབྱེད་དེ།  
རྣམས་ལུ་ལབ་པ་ན་བསྟན་པར་གྱི་དེ་ལྟར་སྐྱེ་བུད་མེད་ཅིང་གཞོན་བྱེད་ཡོད་པས་མེས་ཉིད་རིག་པ་རྟོན་དམ་པའི་དངོས་  
པོར་མི་འབྱེད་རྟོ།

1. p. དང་ 2.p. ཆ་ཡིས་ 3.p. རྫོང་ལུ་པག་

Consequently, Jñānavajra accepts some aspects of the epistemological approach in his interpretation of mind-only, but his final philosophical position is on Madhyamaka's ontological approach.

In sum, Jñānaśrībhaddra's and Jñānavajra's interpretations of mind-only is based on the philosophical tendencies of later Indian Buddhism. That is they are both strongly influenced by the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. Even though Jñānaśrībhaddra claims to be a follower of Dharmakīrti, his philosophical position regarding the ultimate truth adopts the ontological ideas of the Madhyamaka school's ontological idea. As such these two Indian commentaries on the LAS entertain the philosophical ideas of later Indian Buddhism.

## Afterward

The goal of this dissertation has been to examine the influence of the LAS on the Madhyamaka school through Indian commentarial literatures. This investigation has been shaped by a central question: If the LAS was originally composed as a primary text for the Yogācāra school, why do Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers quote the LAS as source of authority when refuting certain doctrines of the Yogācāra school? While exploring answers to this question it becomes clear that reasons can be traced to both the historical situation and philosophical perspectives of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school.

In addition to raising the important question regarding the relation between the LAS and the Madhyamaka school, this dissertation brought to light important issues related to the Indian commentaries on the LAS. In chapter one, the search for the date of composition of the LAS revealed a preeminent concern that Āryadeva's two short commentaries preserved in the Chinese Canon show the relation between the LAS and the early Madhyamaka thinkers. This suggests that, instead of focusing on the relation between the LAS and the later Madhyamaka thinkers, we should take seriously the fact that the early Madhyamaka thinkers seem to have been concerned with the relation of the LAS to the fundamental teachings of the Mahayana tradition. The recognition of this concern, in turn, calls for a close study not only of the LAS itself, but also of Āryadeva's works in relation to the LAS.

The relation between the LAS and the early Madhyamaka thinkers has been addressed by Lindtner. He argues that the LAS was composed in Nāgārjuna's time. In proving his assumption, he compared the LAS with Nāgārjuna's and Āryadeva's works.<sup>1</sup> Although Lindtner observes some similarities between the LAS and the early Madhyamaka thinkers' works, the specific philosophical topics in the LAS and the works of early Madhyamaka thinkers are not an issue he investigates.

Further studies may examine the doctrinal similarities between the LAS and Āryadeva's works. Of particular significance here are the accounts of Āryadeva's composition of the two commentaries on the LAS along with his other works, which deal with other schools' views, his refutation of these other schools' views in favor of the Madhyamaka perspective, and then his eventual conversion to the Mahayana tenets. A close analysis of Āryadeva's refutation of other schools' tenets may also tell us something more about both the early relationship between the LAS and Āryadeva's works and the relationship between the LAS and the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. Such studies also may help to understand Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* and its philosophical extension of Jñānavajra's *Tathāgatahrdayālaṃkāra*.

Another further study may investigate the relationship between the LAS and Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers' works: Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* and *Tarkajvālā*, along with Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhāṅga*, Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, and Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka*. Buddhist scholars have studied the above mentioned Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers' works individually. However, no Buddhist scholar

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<sup>1</sup> Lindtner (1992).

has attempted to investigate the development of the philosophical ideas in the tradition of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. Therefore, I suggest a study of the relationship between the LAS and the philosophical works in the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. This is because, as already mentioned, Jñānaśrībhadra and Jñānavajra's Indian commentaries on the LAS discuss later philosophical tendencies of Indian Buddhism. Both commentators constructed their ideas under strong influences from the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. To clarify the relationship between the LAS and the philosophical idea of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school will shed light on determining the place of the LAS in Indian Buddhism.

Finally, among Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers, later Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka thinkers depended more heavily on the LAS to develop their ideas. One example of this is Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamkāloka*. Unfortunately, no Buddhist scholar has studied this text which contains very important materials for identifying the philosophical tendencies of later Indian Buddhist thinkers as well as these of early Tibetan Buddhist thinkers. Studying Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamkāloka* from the perspective of its relationship with the LAS is one of the basic concerns of later Indian Buddhist thinkers.

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